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NOT JUST WHISTLING DIXIE: THE CASE FOR TAX
WHISTLEBLOWERS IN THE STATES
DENNIS J. VENTRY, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
TAX whistleblowing has been in the news lately.  In September 2012,the IRS wrote a check for $104 million to Bradley Birkenfeld, a for-
mer banker with UBS, the Swiss banking giant.  The payment, made under
the federal government’s tax whistleblower program,1 represented
Birkenfeld’s cut for providing information to the IRS that exposed how
UBS actively concealed taxable income of U.S. clients for decades by hid-
ing assets in secret offshore accounts.2  Birkenfeld’s assistance was “excep-
tional in both its breadth and depth,” the IRS explained in making the
award, and allowed the U.S. government to pursue “unprecedented ac-
tions against UBS AG, with collateral impact on other enforcement
activities.”3
“Collateral impact” hardly does justice to the effect of Birkenfeld’s
whistleblowing.  The “treasure trove of inside information” that Birkenfeld
provided U.S. officials formed “the foundation for the UBS debacle and
everything that followed.”4  Indeed, thanks to one of “the biggest
whistleblowers of all time,”5 the U.S. government (take a deep breath)
* Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law.  I thank Gregory Krakower,
Darien Shanske, and Dean Zerbe for their helpful comments.  I also benefited
from suggestions and conversations at the Norman J. Shachoy Symposium,
sponsored by the Villanova Law Review, particularly those from Jeremiah Coder and
J. Richard Harvey.
1. For a discussion of the IRS whistleblower program, see infra notes 349–86
and accompanying text.  Birkenfeld’s whistleblower payment of $104 million was
calculated off a portion ($400 million) of the total fine ($780 million) paid by UBS
pursuant to a deferred prosecution agreement reached with the U.S. Department
of Justice in early 2009.  The $400 million represented money that UBS failed to
withhold from U.S. taxpayer accounts while the remaining $380 million repre-
sented profits that UBS earned from its cross-border business between 2001 and
2008. See William P. Barrett & Janet Novack, UBS Agrees to Pay $780 Million, FORBES
(Feb. 18, 2009, 7:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/18/ubs-fraud-off-
shore-personal-finance_ubs.html; see also infra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
2. Jeremiah Coder, IRS Pays Birkenfeld $104 Million Whistleblower Award, 136
TAX NOTES 1359 (2012).
3. IRS, IRS Summary Award Report Recommends $104 Million Payment to
Whistleblower, 2012 TAX NOTES TODAY 177-20 (2012).
4. Robert Goulder, Year in Review: The 2009 Person of the Year, 126 TAX NOTES
7, 9 (2010).  A DOJ official stated, “without Mr. Birkenfeld walking through the
doors of the Justice Department in the summer of 2007, I doubt this massive fraud
scheme would have been discovered by the United States government.” Id.; see also
Lee A. Sheppard, Swiss Banking Derobed: Implications of Birkenfeld, 136 TAX NOTES
1361 (2012).
5. Goulder, supra note 4, at 8.
(425)
1
Ventry: Not Just Whistling Dixie: The Case For Tax Whistleblowers in the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR302.txt unknown Seq: 2 14-AUG-14 14:25
426 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 425
received: $780 million and the names of 250 high-dollar Americans with
secret accounts as part of a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with
UBS;6 another 4,450 names and accounts of U.S. citizens provided as part
of a joint settlement between the U.S. and Swiss governments;7 more than
120 criminal indictments of U.S. taxpayers and tax advisors;8 additional
indictments against foreign bankers, advisors, and lawyers;9 still more for-
eign nationals pleading guilty to conspiring to assist U.S. taxpayers to file
false returns and evade U.S. taxes;10 the closure of prominent Swiss
banks—including the oldest private bank11—based on their participation
in helping U.S. clients evade tax liability;12 more than $5.5 billion col-
lected13 from the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP),
with untold tens of billions of dollars still payable due to only a quarter of
the 39,000 OVDP cases being closed;14 program participants ratting out
banks as a requirement of their participation;15 banks themselves disclos-
ing the names and accounts of clients who refuse to participate in the
program to avoid their own monetary penalties and to defer or avoid crim-
6. See Jeremiah Coder & Lee A. Sheppard, UBS Settles with DOJ for $780 Million,
122 TAX NOTES 944, 944 (2009).  Immediately after signing the DPA, the U.S. De-
partment of Justice sought to enforce a summons against UBS for information
pertaining to all 52,000 U.S. account holders. See David D. Stewart, DOJ Seeks En-
forcement of John Doe Summons Against UBS, 122 TAX NOTES 945 (2009).
7. See David D. Stewart, Swiss Agree to Expedite Processing of 4,450 UBS Accounts,
124 TAX NOTES 744 (2009).
8. See Laura Saunders, More U.S. Taxpayers Admit to Secret Swiss Accounts, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2013, 6:42 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424
0527023038.
9. See Kristen A. Parillo, Offshore Crackdown Seen As a Success Despite Little Jail
Time, 141 TAX NOTES 696, 696 (2013) (quoting Steven R. Toscher of Hochman,
Salkin, Rettig, Toscher & Perez, P.C. as calling indictments of foreign nationals
“really a watershed event in federal criminal white-collar prosecutions”).  One of
those indicted, Raoul Weil—a Swiss citizen, the former number three official at
UBS, and a fugitive since 2009—was arrested in Italy in October 2013, extradited,
and appeared in a U.S. court in December 2013 on charges that he aided and
abetted U.S. citizens in evading taxes. See Kristen A. Parillo & Andrew Velarde,
Fugitive Swiss Banker Wanted by U.S. Arrested in Italy, 141 TAX NOTES 392 (2013);
David Voreacos, Ex-UBS Banker Weil Heads Back to Court As He Prepares Defense,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 6, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/-01-
06/ex-ubs-banker-weil-heads-back-to-court-as-he-prepares-defense.html.
10. See David D. Stewart & Stephanie Soong Johnston, Swiss Lawyer Pleads
Guilty to Helping U.S. Clients Evade Taxes, 140 TAX NOTES 879 (2013).
11. See Shamik Trivedi, Swiss Bank Wegelin Ordered to Pay $58 Million, 138 TAX
NOTES 1171 (2013) (describing winding down of Wegelin, founded in 1741, and its
payment of penalties and fines to U.S. government as part of first ever guilty plea
of foreign bank charged with conspiracy to evade U.S. tax).
12. See Stephanie Soong Johnston, Swiss Bank Ends Operations, Citing U.S.-Swiss
Tax Dispute, 141 TAX NOTES 393 (2013) (referring to Bank Frey & Co.).
13. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-318, OFFSHORE TAX EVA-
SION: IRS HAS COLLECTED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, BUT MAY BE MISSING CONTINUED
EVASION 2 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/gao-13-318.
14. See Lee A. Sheppard, Former IRS Agent Reeves Tells His Tale, 139 TAX NOTES
979, 982 (2013).
15. See id.
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss3/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR302.txt unknown Seq: 3 14-AUG-14 14:25
2014] NOT JUST WHISTLING DIXIE 427
inal prosecution;16 and the IRS aggressively going after taxpayers who
tried to “stay under the radar” by failing to participate in the program and
then “quietly” filing amended returns on foreign bank accounts for prior
years.17  All because one person blew the tax whistle.
Tax whistleblowers have been busy at the state level too.  In 2012, the
state of New York sued telecommunications provider Sprint Nextel based
on a whistleblower’s information.  According to the State’s complaint,
Sprint “illegally avoided its New York sales tax obligations” by failing to
collect sales taxes on its “flat-rate” calling plans and knowingly filing false
tax returns,18 actions for which New York sought damages exceeding $300
million under the state’s False Claims Act (FCA).19  In June 2013, a New
York Supreme Court denied Sprint’s motion to dismiss the case after con-
cluding that New York had sufficiently alleged violations of the state’s tax
laws,20 a decision unanimously affirmed by the Supreme Court’s Appellate
Division.21  In a press release announcing the court’s decision on the mo-
tion to dismiss, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman stated,
“[a]s the very first tax case prosecuted under the False Claims Act—which
rewards and protects whistleblowers—this ruling sends a message that tax
dodgers will be exposed and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.”22
Three years earlier, as a member of the New York State Senate,
Schneiderman authored changes to New York’s FCA that prominently in-
cluded a new section authorizing “claims, records, or statements made
under the tax law.”23  The legislature unanimously passed the changes,
making New York the first state to specify tax claims under its FCA.24  The
16. See Stephanie Soong Johnston, 10 Swiss Banks Agree to Participate in DOJ
Settlement Program, 141 TAX NOTES 1285 (2013); Saunders, supra note 8.
17. See Jaime Arora, IRS Taking Closer Look at Quiet Disclosures of Offshore Ac-
counts, 141 TAX NOTES 273, 273 (2013).
18. Superseding Complaint at 1, People ex. rel. Schneiderman v. Sprint Nextel
Corp., 970 N.Y.S.2d 164 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (No. 103917-2011), available at http:/
/www.ag.ny./sites/default/files/press-releases/2012/Sprint-Complaint.pdf.
19. See Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Attorney Gen., A.G.
Schneiderman Files Groundbreaking Tax Fraud Lawsuit Against Sprint for Over
$300 Million (Apr. 19, 2012), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-
schneiderman-files-groundbreaking-fraud-lawsuit-against-sprint-over-300-million;
see also John Buhl, New York Sues Sprint for Alleged Sales Tax Fraud, 64 STATE TAX
NOTES 211 (2012).  Subsequent to New York filing suit against Sprint, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission opened its own investigation of Sprint’s state and
local sales tax collection practices. See John Buhl, SEC Investigating Sprint’s Sales Tax
Collection Practices, 65 STATE TAX NOTES 450 (2012).
20. See Sprint Nextel Corp., 970 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
21. See People v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 980 N.Y.S.2d 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
22. Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneider-
man Announces Court Decision Upholding $300 Million Tax Case Against Sprint-
Nextel Corporation (July 2, 2013), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-re-
lease/ag-schneiderman-announces-court-decision-upholding-300-million-tax-case-
against-sprint.
23. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(4)(a) (McKinney 2013).
24. See New York False Claims Act, N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §§ 187–94.
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tax press proclaimed the law “the most far-reaching in the country,”25
while Schneiderman proudly called it a “False Claims Act on steroids.”26  It
permitted the state, local governments, and whistleblowers to bring tax
enforcement actions against businesses with net income or sales exceeding
$1 million and alleged damages exceeding $350,000.27  It made losing de-
fendants liable for treble damages based on total damages incurred by the
state,28 statutory penalties between $6,000 and $12,000 per claim,29 and all
reasonable costs and expenses for bringing the action (including attor-
ney’s fees).30  Moreover, whistleblowers were entitled to as much as 30%
of all proceeds collected from the action,31 and the law extended anti-
retaliation protections for informants.32  To process and investigate
whistleblower submissions, and to enforce the enhanced FCA, Attorney
General Schneiderman established the Taxpayer Protection Bureau.33
Other high-profile tax enforcement efforts based on whistleblower tips
processed under the state’s FCA already include a conviction of a New
York City “tailor to the stars”34 on felony tax evasion of sales and income
taxes,35 a multi-million dollar settlement with a medical imaging company
for knowingly evading New York state and city taxes,36 an active investiga-
tion of more than a dozen private equity firms for illegally converting ex-
25. Billy Hamilton, New York’s Qui Tam Law: Jackpot Justice or Creative Tax
Tool—or Both?, 59 STATE TAX NOTES 109, 111 (2011).
26. Amy Hamilton, New York Attorney General Investigates Equity Firms, 65 STATE
TAX NOTES 698, 698 (2012) (quoting New York Attorney General Eric T.
Schneiderman).
27. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(4)(a)(i)–(ii).
28. See id. § 189(1)(h).
29. See id.  The “per claim” penalty becomes significant when actions involve
thousands of claims.  “If a tax case involves numerous transactions, invoices, or
billings, each of those documents can be considered a false claim.”  Jack
Trachtenberg et al., Applying False Claims Acts in State Taxation, 64 STATE TAX NOTES
373, 375 (2012).
30. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(3).
31. Id. § 190(6)(b).
32. See id. § 191.
33. Amy Hamilton, New York AG’s Tax Probes Energize Whistleblowers, 66 STATE
TAX NOTES 155, 156 (2012).
34. Laura Italiano, Tailor to Stars Mohan Ramchandani Pleads Guilty to Tax Eva-
sion, N.Y. POST (Mar. 6, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2013/03/06/tailor-to-
stars-mohan-ramchandani-pleads-guilty-to-tax-evasion/.  The tailor, Mohan “Mike”
Ramchandani, outfitted, among others, Rudy Giuliani, Ed Koch, New York Knick
legends Walt Frazier and Patrick Ewing, and baseball greats Rickey Henderson and
Darryl Strawberry. See id.
35. As part of his settlement with the state, Ramchandani paid $5.5 million in
back taxes, interest, and penalties. See Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y.
Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces Arrest, Conviction and $5.5 Million
Settlement in Tax Fraud Case Against Prominent Tailor (Mar. 5, 2013), available at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-arrest-convic-
tion-and-55-million-settlement-tax-fraud-case.
36. Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneider-
man Announces $6.2 Million Settlement with Lantheus Medical Imaging and Bris-
tol-Myers Squibb for Failing to Pay New York Corporate Income Taxes (Mar. 14,
4
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ecutive management fees charged to investors into personal stakes in fund
investments to “substantially reduce or escape [ ] tax liabilities,”37 another
active inquiry into the operations of 501(c)(4) organizations that engage
in “electioneering” with the help of dark money,38 and cases under investi-
gation that are expected to “dwarf” the Sprint prosecution.39
While some states are experiencing outsized benefits due to tax
whistleblowers, others are under siege.  Illinois finds itself in a particularly
tight spot, with a single Chicago-based class action plaintiffs’ firm filing
hundreds of cases against remote sellers under the state’s FCA alleging
fraud for failure to collect sales and use taxes.40  In all cases, the law firm
filed suit after conducting investigations based purely on information al-
ready in the public domain or simply after ordering a few items online
from an out-of-state retailer and then bringing an action when the vendor
failed to charge Illinois sales tax on the sale.41
2014), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-an-
nounces-62-million-settlementwith-lantheus-medical-imaging-bristol.
37. Hamilton, supra note 26, at 698; see also Nicholas Confessore, Julie Cres-
well & David Kocieniewski, Inquiry on Tax Strategy Adds to Scrutiny of Finance Firms,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/02/business/in-
quiry-on-tax-strategy-adds-to-scrutiny-of-finance-firms.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
By waiving all or part of a management fee (typically 2% of money under manage-
ment) in exchange for an investment in the fund, private equity executives attempt
to convert the fees (taxed at 39.6% and due upon payment) into “carried interest”
plus returns on the fund (treated as long-term capital gains taxed at 20% and
payable years later).  If the compensation is not at risk of forfeiture, the argument
for capital gain treatment is bogus.  Or, as one prominent tax attorney has ex-
plained, “[t]he less the fees are at risk, the more it seems as though they are cur-
rent income from labor that should be taxed at ordinary rates.”  Reed Albergotti &
Laura Saunders, Informer Sparked New York Probe, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:34
AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443696604 (quot-
ing Bryan Skarlatos of Kostelanetz & Fink LLP).  As part of the investigation, the
New York Attorney General is also examining whether private equity executives
deferred payment of the converted fees (or treated the fees as a return of invested
capital). See id.
38. Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneider-
man Adopts New Disclosure Requirements for Nonprofits that Engage in Election-
eering (June 5, 2013), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-
schneiderman-adopts-new-disclos-nonprofits-engage-electioneering; see also Letter
from Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Attorney Gen., to Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator,
and Dave Camp, U.S. Congressman (Sept. 24, 2012), reprinted in 2012 STATE TAX
TODAY 187-23 (describing how New York’s FCA “empowers [the AG’s] office to
bring cases against entities or individuals that have committed tax fraud,” includ-
ing 501(c)(4) groups).
39. See Pete Brush, NY Tees up Tax FCA Suits that May Dwarf Sprint Case,
LAW360 (Mar. 13, 2013, 6:08 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/423350/ny-
tees-up-tax-fca-suits-that-may-dwarf-sprint-case.
40. See Amy Hamilton, Attorneys Call for Safe Harbors in State False Claims Acts, 69
STATE TAX NOTES 262, 263 (2013).
41. The basis of these claims is loosely grounded in an Illinois Supreme Court
case from 2009 holding that shipping charges for certain internet purchases of
tangible personal property are subject to Illinois sales tax. See Kean v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 919 N.E.2d 926, 940–41 (Ill. 2009); see also Trachtenberg et al., supra
note 29, at 376.
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In response to these improper nuisance suits, a member of the Illinois
Assembly, Michael Zalewski, introduced legislation to amend the state’s
FCA by prohibiting qui tam actions—that is, actions prosecuted by a
whistleblower on behalf of the government—based on alleged underpay-
ment of tax.42  Specifically, the bill gave the state attorney general sole
authority to prosecute tax-related matters originating under the Illinois
false claims statute.43  Whistleblowers would still be permitted to submit a
complaint alleging tax noncompliance under the FCA,44 but the depart-
ment of revenue would initially investigate the complaint and then make a
recommendation to the Attorney General as to the merits of the case.
Meritorious claims would proceed under the tax department unless the
Attorney General decided to prosecute the case, at which point the admin-
istrative action would be stayed until resolution of the judicial action.
Defaulting to the tax department ensured that tax experts would eval-
uate whistleblower submissions and filter out nuisance claims.  Meanwhile,
cutting out informants and “bounty hunter” attorneys would further re-
duce the prevalence of nuisance suits and mitigate the unauthorized dis-
closure of a defendant’s confidential tax return information.45  The bill
had the support of the Attorney General and the Department of Reve-
nue,46 heads of the legislative tax committees, taxpayer organizations, and
business groups.47  Inexplicably, the proposal died in the Assembly’s Rules
Committee, but observers predict the bill will be reintroduced in 2014.
42. See 98th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 74, 2013 Sess. (offering new section
740 ILCS 175/4.5(c), introduced on Jan. 9, 2013), available at http://www.ilga.
gov/legislation/full.asp?DocName=&SessionId=85&GA=98&DocTypeId=HB&Doc
Num=74&GAID=12&LegID=&SpecSess=&Session=; see also ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, Bill
Status of HB0074, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=74&
GAID=12&DocTypeID=HB&SessionID=85&GA=98 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014)
(tracking bill’s progress through Illinois legislature).
43. The language of the bill read, “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over a
civil action brought under” the FCA and involving state taxation “unless the action
is brought by the Attorney General.”  House Bill 74, supra note 42.
44. Some observers of the events in Illinois have argued for removing tax
claims altogether from the FCA. See, e.g., Amy Hamilton, MTC Project Would Mini-
mize Seller Exposure to Class Actions, 65 STATE TAX NOTES 367 (2012) [hereinafter
MTC Project Would Minimize] (summarizing comments by Todd Lard, general coun-
sel for Council on State Taxation (COST), saying that allowing tax claims under
state’s FCA “enable[s] enterprising class action attorneys to prey on some of those
gray areas of the law”); Amy Hamilton, Negotiations Underway on Illinois Qui Tam
Statute, 66 STATE TAX NOTES 379, 380 (2012) [hereinafter Negotiations Underway]
(reporting that Lard proposes barring all claims involving taxes and unclaimed
property under statute).
45. For a discussion of the proposal and what motivated it, see Jennifer Carr,
Should the MTC Take on a Model False Claims Act? 68 STATE TAX NOTES 37, 38–40
(2013); Negotiations Underway, supra note 44, at 379.
46. In fact, the two offices jointly wrote the draft statute, according to knowl-
edgeable insiders with whom I spoke.
47. See Amy Hamilton, MTC to Work on Limiting Tax Class Action and Qui Tam
Suits, 67 STATE TAX NOTES 544, 545 (2013).
6
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Illinois’s experience with FCA claims involving state taxation has also
prompted action from the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC).  In particu-
lar, the proliferation of nuisance suits under the Illinois FCA raises the
specter of an untenable Catch-22 for retail businesses that collect state and
local transaction taxes: over-collect taxes on behalf of a state and face con-
sumer refund class action suits or under-collect taxes on behalf of a state
and face qui tam actions initiated and even prosecuted by whistleblowers.
To address the “rock and a hard place” dilemma that sellers experience
when collecting tax for states,48 the MTC has formed a work group
charged with considering a model statute that addresses both sides of the
whipsaw.49  The MTC effort piggybacks on an earlier American Bar Associ-
ation (ABA) project that produced a model statute to minimize vendor
exposure due to under-collection and over-collection of state taxes,50
while addressing additional complications due to whistleblower actions
under false claims statutes.  Resolving the lose-lose paradox in a timely
manner is imperative not just for Illinois, but also for other states that
permit—or are considering—tax actions under their FCAs.51
48. I am grateful to Sheldon Laskin, Counsel to the MTC, for the apt phrase-
ology of this dilemma.
49. See Hamilton, supra note 47, at 544; see also MTC Project Would Minimize,
supra note 44.  The group, the “Tax Undercollection Class Action & Tax Overcol-
lection False Claims Act Work Group,” has been holding regular teleconference
meetings.  I have participated in the meetings.
50. See ABA, SECTION OF TAXATION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES:
TRANSACTION TAX OVERPAYMENT MODEL ACT PROJECT 1 (2011) [hereinafter MODEL
ACT PROJECT], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ad-
ministrative/taxation/_resolution_with_report_model_model_transactional_tax_
overpayment_act.authcheckdam.pdf (describing “two main liability risks” for sell-
ers collecting state and local transaction taxes: “First, if sellers fail to collect suffi-
cient tax, they face liability risks attributable to audit assessments.  Second, if sellers
over-collect or collect for the wrong jurisdiction, they face potential actions and
lawsuits filed on behalf of purchasers or pursuant to consumer protection stat-
utes.”).  One member of the group that drafted the ABA model statute has said
that the extent of the actions and lawsuits for refund “are really only limited by the
imagination of plaintiffs’ attorneys.”  Hamilton, supra note 47, at 545 (quoting
Bruce Johnson, Chair of Utah State Tax Commission).  The ABA subcommittee’s
report was officially adopted by the ABA in 2011. See MODEL ACT PROJECT, supra
note 50.
51. The North Dakota Senate passed a concurrent resolution last year di-
recting a committee to report at the beginning of the upcoming session on “the
growth in use of state False Claims Acts with qui tam provisions in state and local
taxation matters and whether that approach is feasible and desirable in North Da-
kota.” Act of Jan. 8, 2013, S. Con. Res. 4007, 63d N.D. Legislative Assembly (intro-
duced by Dwight Cook, Chair of Senate Finance & Taxation Committee), available
at http://openstates.org/nd/bills/63/SCR4007/documents//; see also Amy Ham-
ilton, MTC Explores Qui Tam Issues, Advances Passthrough Project, 67 STATE TAX
NOTES 723, 723 (2013) (describing North Dakota resolution).  At least two addi-
tional state legislatures will take up the issue in 2014, including Kentucky (consid-
ering legislation creating a false claims act explicitly barring tax actions, while also
considering a separate bill establishing a standalone tax whistleblower program)
and Mississippi (considering legislation that is silent as to tax claims, with the bill’s
sponsors saying it will not apply to tax actions). See Henry J. Reske, Maryland and
7
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This Article analyzes arguments for and against tax whistleblowing at
the state level, both with respect to permitting tax actions under False
Claims Acts and through standalone whistleblower statutes.  Part II exam-
ines the contention that false claims statutes should be used only for in-
stances of outright fraud, and that mere noncompliance with the law or
overaggressive (though good faith) interpretations of the law should be
handled through traditional tax administration procedures.  After consid-
ering both the historic and modern culpability thresholds under false
claims statutes, Part II demonstrates that the critics are in fact advocating
for a more lenient standard of care under FCAs—both for taxpayers and
tax advisors—than currently exists under the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC), its underlying regulations, and Circular 230 (the Treasury Depart-
ment’s prevailing standard of care for tax practitioners).
Part III scrutinizes a related argument from critics that tax law should
be off limits to false claims statutes because it is somehow more complex,
ambiguous, and uncertain than other areas of the law.  It evaluates this
argument in the context of assertions that whistleblowing in the tax arena
threatens taxpayer rights of process, privacy, and confidentiality, that it
circumvents tax administrators and expert review of tax claims, and that it
encourages frivolous and harassing actions.  In the end, this Part exposes
fallacies in the argument that “tax is different” and thus entitled to special
treatment—or no treatment at all—under false claims statutes.  At the
same time, it suggests structural safeguards for FCAs designed to protect
against undue disclosure of tax return information, to filter out nuisance
suits, and to guarantee that tax experts investigate whistleblower claims.
Finally, this Part makes the case that leveraging whistleblowers’ unique,
inside information can assist outgunned state tax agencies in combating
two persistent and insidious problems in tax administration: namely the
information gap and the tax gap.
Part IV addresses flaws in current whistleblower regimes by recom-
mending specific improvements to whistleblower statutes at both the state
and federal level.  It identifies key characteristics that should be part of
any state-level FCA permitting tax whistleblower claims.  Moreover, it sug-
gests organizational changes within businesses that reduce risks associated
with tax whistleblower laws and that at the same time help organizations
uncover economic crime while maximizing the potential of whistleblower
procedures and statutes.  This Part concludes by offering alternative poli-
cies for states to consider beyond authorizing tax claims under FCAs, par-
ticularly standalone whistleblower statutes based on section 7623 of the
Kentucky False Claims Act Bills Take Different Approaches to Taxes, 71 STATE TAX NOTES
392 (2014); David Sawyer, Bill Would Authorize DOR Whistleblower Program, 71 STATE
TAX NOTES 574 (2014); David Sawyer, Proposed False Claims Act May Permit Qui Tam
Actions in Tax Disputes, 71 STATE TAX NOTES 213 (2014).  Another state, Maryland,
enacted expansions to its FCA in early 2014, including an amendment clarifying
that the statute does not apply to state and local taxes. See Jennifer DePaul, House
Approves Expansion of False Claims Act, 71 STATE TAX NOTES 690 (2014).
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Internal Revenue Code.  It offers the case of California as a state ripe for a
robust tax whistleblower program.
Part V summarizes the Article’s findings by concluding that a properly
drafted and implemented tax whistleblower program, either run through
a state’s FCA or under a standalone statute, can overcome the real and
perceived shortcomings of permitting citizens to report tax noncompli-
ance to the government.  On balance, there is no compelling reason to
prevent or discourage state tax enforcement actions from exploiting inval-
uable knowledge and information derived from citizen insiders.  In fact,
soliciting and rewarding such information can help tax enforcement at
the state level and potentially yield significant revenue from unpaid tax
liabilities.
II. FALSE CLAIMS ACTS DO NOT IMPOSE ANY NEW
LIABILITY ON TAXPAYERS
Nearly all criticisms of using false claims statutes to uncover illegal
behavior in the tax context focus on the purported uniqueness of tax non-
compliance compared to other forms of legal noncompliance.  According
to this criticism, false claims statutes (beginning in 1863 with the enact-
ment of the federal False Claims Act52) have been used to uncover and
prosecute fraudulent behavior, while the overwhelming majority of tax
noncompliance fails to rise to the level of fraud.  Underpayments of tax,
whether to federal or state tax agencies, rarely result from outright tax
evasion, defined in the Internal Revenue Code as willful attempts to evade
or defeat tax liability.53  Instead, taxpayers and their advisors engage in tax
planning to navigate unsettled, complicated, and ambiguous areas of the
law to satisfy their tax obligations in good faith.54  Permitting
whistleblowers to bring claims against taxpayers in this context, the argu-
ment goes, would result in inapposite and unfair application of FCAs.
52. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33
(2012)).
53. I.R.C. § 7201 (2012).
54. See Hamilton, supra note 33, at 155 (quoting Jack Trachtenberg as saying
that tax noncompliance being swept up in FCA claims is really just about “legiti-
mate tax planning and people legitimately trying to comply with ambiguous tax
laws”); id. (summarizing defense lawyers as saying that using FCA statutes to un-
cover and prosecute tax noncompliance is inappropriate, because “False Claims
Act cases are intended to address knowing and deliberate fraud”); see also Wal-
treese Carroll, Should State Whistleblower Laws Exclude Tax Fraud?, 65 STATE TAX
NOTES 441, 442 (2012) (quoting Jordan Goodman of Horwood Marcus & Berk as
saying, “[p]laintiffs should not be allowed to file qui tam lawsuits for state tax [ ]
because the law is often complicated and unclear and as a result, a taxpayer may be
complying with the law to the best of its ability”); MTC Project Would Minimize, supra
note 44, at 367 (quoting Todd Lard of COST as saying that qui tam lawsuits in tax
context “focus on unsettled areas of tax law rather than [traditional] whistleblower
concerns”); Trachtenberg et al., supra note 29, at 376 (stating that taxpayer-de-
fendants in qui tam lawsuits are usually guilty only of taking “good faith” positions
in “unsettled” areas of law).
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The critics’ assertions of inaptness and unfairness stem in part from a
fundamental misunderstanding of false claims statutes and, in further
part, from the flawed belief that tax is somehow different than other areas
of the law and therefore off-limits.  Using false claims laws to uncover and
prosecute tax noncompliance is not a trap for the unwary, as critics would
have us believe, but rather a legitimate and powerful weapon in a multi-
faceted tax enforcement regime.
For starters, liability under false claims statutes has encompassed
more than fraudulent behavior from the very beginning.  Indeed, while
the nineteenth century version of the federal False Claims Act aimed to
“prevent and punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States”
(specifically, with respect to illegal price-fixing and defective weaponry
and supplies sold to the Union Army during the Civil War),55 it also identi-
fied a considerably wider swath of wrongdoing than traditional fraud.  For
example, the original statute forbade persons from making “any claim
upon or against the Government of the United States . . . knowing such
claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent.”56  “Knowing” or “knowingly” ap-
peared six more times in the statute, and referred to behavior that was
“false,” “fictitious,” and “fraudulent,” or that was meant to “cheat,” “de-
fraud,” “injure,” or “conceal.”57
In 1986, Congress significantly revised the federal FCA,58 but pre-
served the requirement that punishable behavior for submitting “false or
fraudulent” claims had to be “knowing.”59  Moreover, Congress added the
“reverse false claim” to covered behavior, whereby persons are prohibited
not only from submitting false claims to obtain money or property from the
55. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 696 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729
(2012)).  Enacted during the heart of the Civil War, the original version of the
FCA was popularly known as both Lincoln’s Law and the Informants’ Act.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 697.  It is also worth pointing out to critics of modern-day FCA stat-
utes that the original 1863 statute levied a $2,000 fine on each claim—compared to
between $5,500 and $11,000 under modern FCA statutes—which translates into
$37,700 (using a simple calculation that multiplies $2,000 by the percentage in-
crease in the consumer price index from 1863 to 2012), $451,000 (using an “eco-
nomic status” index), or $4,220,000 (using an “economic power” index) in 2012
dollars. See Samuel H. Williamson, Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S.
Dollar, MEASURINGWORTH (2014), http://www. .com/uscompare/.  In addition,
successful whistleblowers received 50% of the amount the government collected
from the claim, plus all costs. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 698
(codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33).
58. See Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153, 3154 (codified
at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733).  The only notable revision of the statute between 1863
and 1986 took place in 1943.  In that year, Congress significantly reduced the
power and effectiveness of the law by, among other things, slashing the potential
award for whistleblowers from 50% of collected proceeds to 25% in the event the
government declined the case and the whistleblower took over primary responsi-
bility for prosecuting the matter, and to just 10% if the government took over and
prosecuted the case without the whistleblower. See Act of Dec. 23, 1943, Pub. L.
No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608, 609 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)).
59. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A).
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government, but also to avoid paying or transmitting money or property to
the government.60  In addition, Congress broadly defined the terms
“knowing” and “knowingly” to require that a person possess “actual knowl-
edge” of the false information, while also allowing for lower threshold
levels of knowledge including acting in “deliberate ignorance of the truth
or falsity of the information,” or acting in “reckless disregard” of the
same.61  Under the statute, moreover, establishing “knowing” and “know-
ingly” does not require any specific intent to defraud.62
The same knowledge requirement is reflected in subnational FCAs.
Currently, twenty-nine states have their own false claims statutes.63  All of
them proscribe “knowingly” submitting false or fraudulent claims to the
state government, and they adopt the broad federal definition of “know-
ing” and “knowingly.”64  In addition, the District of Columbia and four
municipalities have followed suit with their own false claims statutes.65
Most of the subnational FCAs bar tax claims, as does the federal False
60. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(G).  The reverse false claim provision covers a person
who “knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obli-
gation to pay or transmit money” to the government. Id.
61. Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A).
62. Id. § 3729(b)(1)(B).
63. The twenty-nine states with FCAs include California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.  An inventory of all state-
level statutes is available at the Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund’s website.
See TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND, States with False Claims Acts, https://
www.taf.org/states-false-claims-acts (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
64. A handful of states deploy an even more expansive definition of “know-
ing” and “knowingly.”  For example, Michigan substitutes for actual knowledge a
definition covering persons “in possession of facts under which he or she is aware or
should be aware of the nature of his or her conduct and that his or her conduct is
substantially certain to cause the payment of” unwarranted benefits.  Michigan
Medicaid False Claims Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.602(f) (2014) (emphasis
added).
65. See WHISTLEBLOWERLAWS, District of Columbia False Claims Act, http://
www. .com/false-claims-act/district-of-columbia-false-claims-act/ (last visited Apr.
15, 2014) (Washington, D.C. act).  The four municipalities include Allegheny
County Pennsylvania, Chicago, New York City, and Philadelphia. See PIETRAGALLO
GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI, LLP, County of Allegheny False Claims Ordi-
nance, FALSE CLAIMS ACT RES. CTR., http://www.falseclaimsact.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/02/County__Allegheny_Municipality.pdf (last visited Apr. 15,
2014) (Allegheny County act); PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI,
LLP, Philadelphia False Claims Act, FALSE CLAIMS ACT RES. CTR., http://www.fal-
seclaimsact.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/_Municipality.pdf (last visited
Apr. 15, 2014) (Philadelphia act); WHISTLEBLOWERLAWS, Chicago False Claims Act,
http://www.whistleblowerlaws.com/-act/chicago-false-claims-act/ (last visited Apr.
15, 2014) (Chicago statute); WHISTLEBLOWERLAWS, New York City False Claims Act,
http://www.whistleblowerlaws./false-claims-act/new-york-city-false-claims-act/ (last
visited Apr. 15, 2014) (New York City act).
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Claims Act.66  Six states impose no bar on tax actions under their FCAs,67
while three states impose only partial bars on tax actions involving state
income taxes.68
Members of the defense bar, the primary critics of FCAs authorizing
tax claims (either implicitly or explicitly), express significant anxiety over
false claims statues.  In particular, they fear a knowledge requirement for
liability and punishment that they believe is too low; that is, for including
acts of “deliberate ignorance” or “reckless disregard” of the truth and fal-
sity of the information.  They also fear that the use of false claims statutes
as a tool for reinforcing state tax enforcement will proliferate as the early
adopters enjoy success in uncovering and prosecuting tax underpay-
ments.69  And while the threat of insiders blowing the whistle on overag-
gressive tax positions undoubtedly alters the risk calculus with respect to
tax compliance,70 some members of the defense bar have overreacted to
66. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(d) (prohibiting “claims, records, or statements under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986”).
67. These states include Delaware, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, and New York.  Although Florida’s FCA does not contain a tax bar, the
Florida legislature added a provision to the state’s standalone tax whistleblower
statute in 2002 that expressly disapproves of informant claims relating to taxes be-
ing brought under any other statute other than the tax informant statute:
[T]his section is the sole means by which any person may seek or obtain
any moneys as the result of, in relation to, or founded upon the failure by
another person to comply with the tax laws of this state.  A person’s use of
any other law to seek or obtain moneys for such failure is in derogation of
this section and conflicts with the state’s duty to administer the tax laws.
FLA. STAT. § 213.30(3) (2013).
68. These states include Illinois and Indiana (barring claims based on all state
income taxes) and Rhode Island (barring claims based on personal income taxes).
69. Like the federal FCA, state-level FCAs award civil penalties for each false
claim (between $5,500 and $11,000 under the federal FCA) plus three times (or
treble) the damages “the Government sustains because of the act of that person.”
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12651(a) (West 2013) (award-
ing between $5,500 and $11,000 per claim plus treble damages); 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 175/3(a)(1)(A) (2013) (same); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(1)(h) (McKinney
2013) (awarding between $6,000 and $12,000 per claim plus treble damages, “in-
cluding consequential damages”).
70. Anxiety over tax whistleblowing claims, either under state-level FCAs or
the federal tax code’s section 7623, has had a discernible effect on corporate tax
departments and outside counsel. See Michael P. Dolan & Timothy J. McCormally,
Which Way the Wind Blows: Mitigating Whistleblowing Risk, 139 TAX NOTES 1537, 1537
(2013) (writing that uptick in tax whistleblower actions “underscores the need for
corporate taxpayers and other tax professionals to take the possibility of tax
whistleblowing seriously,” and furthermore that “the headlines” over tax
whistleblowing “are alluring or disquieting.  For tax executives, they certainly have
the potential to be distracting.”); Tim Gustafson et al., Between a Rock and a Hard
Place: Third-Party Enforcement Actions, 66 STATE TAX NOTES 49, 50 (2012) (“Various
aspects of qui tam actions alter the playing field in favor of the government when it
comes to enforcing state tax laws.  First, after the whistleblower commences the
action, the state’s attorney general may take over the case and prosecute the mat-
ter as an enforcement action.  That places the attorney general in complete con-
trol of the litigation, which brings the full force of the government and its
resources to bear against the taxpayer.”); Kendall L. Houghton et al., Qui Tam
12
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the new compliance landscape with alarmist and misinformed calls for re-
trenchment.  The remainder of this Part identifies and responds to some
of these overreactions.
***
Notwithstanding the long history of false claims statutes imposing lia-
bility without the intent to defraud, elements of the defense bar have gone
on record as saying that tax actions brought under false claims laws should
be reserved exclusively for fraudulent behavior.  States “should enact a
safe harbor” as part of their false claims statutes, a trio of tax practitioners
recently wrote, that would apply “when a corporation has technically vio-
lated the false claims act but without willfully intending to defraud.”71
The same trio suggested enacting a corollary three-year safe harbor to pro-
vide corporate taxpayers an opportunity to “perform their necessary inter-
nal review to rectify any potential filing or reporting problems that could
result in false claims act suits brought by [whistleblowers] during the same
period.”72  For the duration of the safe harbor, “companies should be im-
munized from false claims act lawsuits.”73
Both proposals suffer from serious shortcomings.  First, they inexpli-
cably treat violations of state tax law differently than other areas of state
law, thereby making it easier to cheat a state out of tax revenues than
cheating a state out of other moneys and property.  Second, both recom-
mendations would limit the use of FCAs to instances of outright fraud, a
limitation never imposed on false claims statutes.  Third, in combination,
the proposals would allow business taxpayers to comply with their annual
tax liabilities over three years while all other taxpayers—including individ-
ual taxpayers—would still be responsible for satisfying their tax liabilities
on an annual basis.  Fourth, and finally, the proposals would create huge
Lawsuits: Recommendations for Meaningful Reform—Part 1, 67 STATE TAX NOTES 595,
596 (2013) (noting that “corporations have grown increasingly fearful of qui tam
FCA suits”); Mary Kay Martire & Lauren A. Ferrante, A Decade of Lessons from Litigat-
ing State Tax False Claims Act Cases, 70 STATE TAX NOTES 127, 130 (2013) (advising
corporations that “[w]hen deciding whether to take a particular tax position, con-
sider not just the possible penalties and interest associated with an adverse audit
determination, but also the risk of FCA or class action litigation.  Risky tax posi-
tions can be fodder for litigation.”); Trachtenberg et al., supra note 29, at 373
(calling tax claims under state FCAs “disturbing trend”).
71. Houghton et al., supra note 70, at 595.
72. Kendall L. Houghton, Matthew P. Hedstrom & Charles C. Capouet, Qui
Tam Lawsuits: Recommendations for Meaningful Reform—Part 2, 68 STATE TAX NOTES
453, 457 (2013).
73. Id.; see also Timothy P. Noonan & William Comiskey, Calling All Tax
Whistleblowers—New York Wants You!, 59 STATE TAX NOTES 349, 352 (2011) (criticiz-
ing treble damages under false claims statutes where defendants might “not actu-
ally know that the claim was false,” “were not deliberately trying to defraud the
government,” and simply “should have known that the claim was false” but did not,
due to deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of truth or falsity of
information).
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opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion, as companies could neglect
internal tax compliance procedures and instead play the audit lottery,
knowing that even if they were caught underpaying taxes within the three-
year safe harbor they could escape liability.
Other tax practitioners have insisted that false claims acts should
never be applied to areas of law—and specifically tax law—that suffer from
any uncertainty or ambiguity.  In the tax context, these practitioners ar-
gue, the permissive knowledge requirement under false claims statutes,
when combined with ambiguous and uncertain tax laws, imposes an unfair
burden on taxpayers.  The knowledge standard—including “deliberate ig-
norance” and “reckless disregard” of the truth or falsity of the informa-
tion—“will be a challenge to apply in the tax area, where . . . the law and
rules are not a model of clarity, and where mistakes occur even when tax-
payers and practitioners act in good faith.”74  These standards are espe-
cially “unclear in the context of state tax and unclaimed property in which
the law itself is unclear and companies regularly take ‘positions’ based on
advice.”75  In these instances, business taxpayers could be subject to en-
forcement actions under state-level FCAs, even though they “took reasona-
ble positions regarding unsettled areas of the tax law.”76  “Despite taking
the correct position,” warns a particularly insistent practitioner, “defend-
ants will settle qui tam actions because, if unsuccessful, the risks are so
great and the costs are so high.”77
These claims of inaptness and unfairness are unfounded.  To begin
with, innocent mistakes are not prosecuted under false claims statutes.
The New York FCA, for instance, explicitly makes “acts occurring by mis-
take or as a result of mere negligence” a defense under the statute.78
Moreover, in interpreting the knowledge requirement under FCAs (at
both the state and federal level), courts regularly hold that defendants are
not liable for reasonable interpretations of an ambiguous statute or regu-
lation.79  Thus, not only would a “correct” position fall outside the purview
74. Noonan & Comiskey, supra note 73, at 352.
75. Houghton et al., supra note 70, at 600.
76. Trachtenberg et al., supra note 29, at 374.
77. Carroll, supra note 54, at 442 (quoting Jordan Goodman of Horwood Mar-
cus & Berk).
78. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 188(3)(b) (McKinney 2013); see also Noonan & Co-
miskey, supra note 73, at 352 (arguing against knowledge requirement contained
in FCAs, but acknowledging that “[s]omething more is required than merely mak-
ing a mistake”).
79. See, e.g., Long v. Dell Computer Corp., No. PB 03-2636, 2012 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 50, at *45 (Apr. 2, 2012) (noting, in context of state sales tax collection,
“gray areas in applying the tax law” such that defendant’s “honest misinterpreta-
tion of a delicate area of state tax law cannot be held to be an unfair act”); see also
Noonan & Comiskey, supra note 73, at 352 (writing that courts interpreting knowl-
edge requirement under federal FCA “have held that a person who reasonably
relies on an interpretation of an ambiguous statute or regulation should not face
liability”).
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of false claims statutes, but a taxpayer could take an “incorrect” position,
even negligently, so long as it was an honest, good faith mistake.
But elements of the defense bar argue that their taxpayer-clients
should be free to make not only innocent and negligent mistakes, but also
reckless and deliberately ignorant mistakes.  They also want clients to be
free to take positions contrary to published guidance and clear agency
interpretations of the law.80  And they further want to advise on those po-
sitions and transactions without fear of liability under false claims statutes
for either the taxpayer or the tax advisor.
In other words, elements of the defense bar want a more lenient stan-
dard of care under FCAs than under either the Internal Revenue Code or
the Treasury Department’s standards of practice contained in Circular
230.  Even more pointedly, by arguing that deliberate ignorance and reck-
less disregard of the truth is too high a standard of care for tax compliance
under false claims statutes, the critics of permitting tax claims under state
FCAs are effectively asking for immunity to engage in behavior that cur-
rently subjects taxpayer-clients and tax practitioners to penalty under the
IRC and that further subjects practitioners to discipline (including suspen-
sion and disbarment) under Circular 230.
Let me explain.  Elements of the defense bar complain that FCA stat-
utes “liberally define[ ]” the term “knowingly” by considering “reckless dis-
regard” and “deliberate ignorance” of the law as knowing violations.81  Yet
taxpayers are currently subject to penalty under the IRC for “negligence
or disregard of rules or regulations.”82  “Negligence” is defined, moreover,
as “any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply” with the tax law
“or to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the preparation of a tax
return,”83 which includes receiving any tax benefit that appears “ ‘too
good to be true’ under the circumstances.”84  Meanwhile, the term “disre-
gard” includes “any careless, reckless or intentional disregard of rules or
regulations” (the latter of which encompasses provisions of the IRC, tem-
porary or final Treasury regulations promulgated under the IRC, and pub-
lished Revenue Rulings and Notices).85  Finally, taxpayers are not
80. See, e.g., Noonan & Comiskey, supra note 73, at 352 (criticizing scenario
where “the agency responsible for administering the applicable law or regulation
has publicly issued a definitive interpretation intended to resolve that ambiguity”
and “a claim that does not comply with that definitive interpretation [ ] lead[s] to
False Claims Act liability”).
81. Id. at 353.
82. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) (2012).
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1) (2003).
84. Id. § 1.6662-3(b)(1)(ii); see also Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 299
F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that when taxpayer “is presented with what
would appear to be a fabulous opportunity to avoid tax obligations, he should
recognize that he proceeds at his own peril”); Stobie Creek Invs., LLC v. United
States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 713–14 (2008); Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed.
Cl. 11, 56 (2007).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2) (2009).
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considered to have disregarded a rule or regulation if they take a position
contrary to a Revenue Ruling or Notice so long as the position possesses a
“realistic possibility” of success (or a 33% chance) on the merits.86
Practitioners, for their part, are subject to penalty for “willful” or
“reckless” conduct under the IRC.87  Specifically, they are prohibited from
any willful attempt to understate a client’s tax liability or to engage in a
“reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations”88 (with “rules
and regulations” defined in the same manner as under the analogous stat-
ute for taxpayers).89  Furthermore, practitioners recklessly or intentionally
disregard a rule or regulation if they advise a position on a client’s return
or claim for refund “that is contrary to a rule or regulation,” and they
“know[ ] of, or [are] reckless in not knowing of, the rule or regulation in
question.”90  Finally, practitioners are not considered to have recklessly or
intentionally disregarded a rule or regulation if they adequately disclose a
position that possessed, at the very least, a reasonable basis for succeeding
on the merits.91  Similarly, in the case of taking a position contrary to a
Revenue Ruling or Notice, practitioners can escape liability so long as the
position meets the “substantial authority” standard, a level of certainty re-
flecting a probability of succeeding on the merits approaching 50%.92
Thus, the Internal Revenue Code already prohibits the kind of behav-
ior—acting knowingly, in deliberate ignorance, and reckless disregard of
the rules and regulations—that members of the defense bar say should
not be covered under false claims statutes.  Moreover, it already prevents
taxpayers, except in very limited circumstances, from taking positions con-
trary to published guidance and clear agency interpretations of the law.
And, it already punishes practitioners for advising on or facilitating this
kind of behavior.
But that’s not all.  Current law sanctions additional behavior that ele-
ments of the defense bar would like to see protected under state-level
FCAs.  Under the Internal Revenue Code, taxpayers face a “substantial un-
derstatement” penalty93 for taking positions or engaging in tax avoidance
transactions unless, on the one hand, the position or transaction possesses
“substantial authority,”94 or on the other hand, the taxpayer “adequately
86. Id.
87. I.R.C. § 6694(b)(2).
88. Id.
89. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(e).
90. Id. § 1.6694-3(c)(1).
91. Id. § 1.6694-3(c)(2).  For discussion of the meaning of “reasonable basis,”
see infra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(c)(3).  The practitioner’s “substantial authority”
standard is a considerably higher standard than a taxpayer’s “realistic possibility of
success” standard.  For a discussion of the “realistic possibility of success” standard,
see supra note 86 and accompanying text, while for the “substantial authority” stan-
dard, see infra notes 94–98, 101 and accompanying text.
93. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2).
94. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i).
16
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disclose[s]” and proves a “reasonable basis” for the sought after tax treat-
ment.95  Tax practitioners are held to the same standard, subject to pen-
alty for preparing or advising “unreasonable positions” (defined as
positions lacking “substantial authority”) that they knew or reasonably
should have known were reflected on the return.96  As with taxpayers,
practitioners can escape penalty if they provide adequate disclosure and
establish a reasonable basis for an otherwise “unreasonable position.”97
Current law further defines “substantial authority” as “less stringent than
the more likely than not standard (the standard that is met when there is a
greater than 50-percent likelihood of the position being upheld), but
more stringent than the reasonable basis standard”98 (with the latter stan-
dard generally reflecting a 10–20% likelihood of success on the merits,99
or a level of support that although arguable is “fairly unlikely to prevail in
court upon a complete review of the relevant facts and authorities”).100
Thus, while it is possible to reach “substantial authority” for a position at
low levels of confidence, most practitioners would peg the requisite level
of certainty as substantially closer to 50% than 10–20%.101
In determining whether substantial authority exists, taxpayers and
practitioners must demonstrate that the “weight of the authorities support-
ing the treatment is substantial in relation to the weight of authorities sup-
porting contrary treatment.”102  It is possible that substantial authority
exists for more than one interpretation of a particular tax issue.  However,
the substantial authority standard is an objective standard such that a tax-
payer’s subjective belief that there is substantial authority for the tax treat-
ment of an item “is not relevant in determining whether there is
substantial authority for that treatment.”103  The objective authorities to
95. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii).
96. Id. § 6694(a)(1)–(2).
97. Id. § 6694(a)(2)(B).
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (2014).
99. See Sheldon I. Banoff, Dealing with the “Authorities”: Determining Valid Legal
Authority in Advising Clients, Rendering Opinions, Preparing Tax Returns and Avoiding
Penalties, 66 TAXES 1072, 1128 (1988); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2003)
(defining “reasonable basis” as “a relatively high standard of tax reporting, that is,
significantly higher than not frivolous or not patently improper.  The reasonable
basis standard is not satisfied by a return position that is merely arguable or that is
merely a colorable claim.”).
100. H.R. REP. NO. 97-760, at 575 (1982).
101. In fact, some authorities state that the level of certainty to achieve sub-
stantial authority “should approach” 51% and can extend only as low as 45%. See
EXEC. TASK FORCE, IRS, COMMISSIONER’S PENALTY STUDY, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PEN-
ALTIES, 43 (1989).  It is worth noting that under no circumstances may a taxpayer
or practitioner consider the possibility that a return will not be audited (or that an
item not be raised on audit) in determining whether a tax position or transaction
possesses either substantial authority or reasonable basis. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-
4(d)(2) (2014).  That is, the position must be evaluated on its merits, as if it were
litigated to a final conclusion in a court of law.
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i).
103. Id.
17
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be considered (rather than one’s sincere though unreasonable belief in a
position) include the IRC and other statutory provisions, Treasury Regula-
tions, Revenue Rulings, IRS Memoranda, Notices and other publications,
case law, and congressional intent.104  There is no substantial authority for
positions or transactions lacking in economic substance.105
The Internal Revenue Code provides a limited defense to the above
penalties pertaining to “negligence and disregard of rules and regula-
tions” and “substantial understatement.”  Under section 6664, a taxpayer
can mitigate or overcome penalties by demonstrating reasonable cause for
the underpayment of tax and, furthermore, acting in good faith in taking
the position associated with the underpayment.106  The taxpayer can meet
these requirements by demonstrating reasonable reliance on professional
tax advice,107 with the reasonableness inquiry turning on the practi-
tioner’s standard of care in rendering the advice.108  In particular, the
practitioner’s advice must itself be reasonable.109  The relevant inquiry de-
pends on whether the taxpayer knew or had reason to know that the prac-
104. Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii).
105. See, e.g., Fidelity Int’l Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC v. United States, 747
F. Supp. 2d 49, 240 (D. Mass. 2010) (finding no substantial authority “where the
transactions lack economic substance or must be recharacterized under the step
transaction doctrine”); Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp.
2d 122, 204–05 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that for transaction lacking economic
substance, taxpayer cannot cite authority, much less substantial authority, to sup-
port claimed tax benefits); Stobie Creek, Invs., LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl.
636, 706 n.64 (2008) (stating that where taxpayers’ “transactions lack economic
substance, or must be disregarded pursuant to the step transaction doctrine, plain-
tiffs cannot contend successfully that substantial authority supported the tax treat-
ment claimed based on the form of their transactions rather than their
substance”).
106. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(a) (2003).
107. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c) (2003); see also United States v. Boyle, 469
U.S. 241, 251 (1985) (“When an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer on a
matter of tax law, such as whether a liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer
to rely on that advice.”); Stobie Creek, 82 Fed. Cl. at 717 (“[T]he concept of reliance
on the advice of professionals is a hallmark of the exception for reasonable cause
and good faith”).
108. Indeed, the relationship between the reasonableness of professional ad-
vice as defined in section 6664 and the standard of care for advisors in other areas
of the IRC and in Circular 230 is so interrelated that the Treasury Regulations for
section 6664 explicitly cross-reference “rules applicable to advisors,” and include
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6694-1 through 1.6694-3 (regarding preparer penalties), and Cir-
cular 230 §§ 10.22 (regarding diligence as to accuracy) and 10.34 (regarding stan-
dards for advising with respect to tax return positions and for preparing or signing
returns). See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(3).
109. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1); see also Fidelity Int’l, 747 F. Supp. 2d at
243 (stating that taxpayer’s reasonable reliance on professional advice “requires
that the advice itself be reasonable”); Stobie Creek, 82 Fed. Cl. at 717 (finding that
reliance on advice of tax professional “does not necessarily demonstrate reasona-
ble cause and good faith” and noting that “reliance on professional advice must,
under all the circumstances, be reasonable.” (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-
4(b)(1))).
18
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titioner could not render competent, diligent, and independent advice;110
that the practitioner failed to base her advice on “all pertinent facts and
circumstances and the law as it relates to those facts and circum-
stances[;]”111 or that the practitioner based the advice on “unreasonable
factual or legal assumptions” or by “unreasonably rely[ing] on the repre-
sentations, statements, findings, or agreements of the taxpayer or any
other person.”112  Nor can the taxpayer reasonably rely on an opinion or
advice that states a final or temporary regulation is invalid.113
Therefore, through section 6664, a taxpayer can escape tax penalties
by showing reasonable reliance on professional tax advice unless the tax-
payer exhibits behavior that would also trigger liability under false claims
statutes.  Taxpayers cannot show reasonable reliance on advice when they
know or have reason to know (i.e., not just actual knowledge but also de-
liberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the infor-
mation) that they are entering into a transaction primarily for tax
avoidance purposes; that the transaction lacks sufficient business purpose;
that the transaction has no pre-tax profit potential; or that they signed off
on false or misleading representations.114  Nor can a taxpayer show rea-
sonable reliance on professional advice to mitigate or escape penalties
when the taxpayer knows or has reason to know that the tax professional
had a conflict of interest and thus was not providing independent ad-
vice.115  Exemplary disqualifying conflicts of interest about which taxpay-
110. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1).
111. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i).
112. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii); see also I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(iii) (2012) (iden-
tifying opinions on which taxpayer can never reasonably rely in good faith, includ-
ing those based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions, those that
unreasonably rely on representations, statements, findings, or agreements of tax-
payers or any other person, and those that fail to identify and consider all relevant
facts).
113. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(iii).
114. See id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i)–(ii).
115. See I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii) (listing characteristics of “disqualified ad-
visors,” all of which involve conflicts of interests); see also Am. Boat Co., LLC v.
United States, 583 F.3d 471, 482 (7th Cir. 2009) (“What exactly constitutes an ‘in-
herent’ conflict of interest is somewhat undefined, but when an adviser profits
considerably from his participation in the tax shelter, such as where he is compen-
sated through a percentage of the taxes actually sheltered, a taxpayer is much less
reasonable in relying on any advice the adviser may provide.”); Neonatology As-
socs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 299 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that taxpayer’s
“reliance itself must be objectively reasonable in the sense that . . . the professional
himself does not suffer from a conflict of interest or lack of expertise that the
taxpayer knew of or should have known about”); Chamberlain v. Comm’r, 66 F.3d
729, 732 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The reliance must be objectively reasonable; taxpayers
may not rely on someone with an inherent conflict of interest . . . .” (footnote
omitted)); Pasternak v. Comm’r, 990 F.2d 893, 903 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he pur-
ported experts were either the promoters themselves or agents of the promoters.
Advice of such persons can hardly be described as that of ‘independent profession-
als.’”); Illes v. Comm’r, 982 F.2d 163, 166 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding no reasonable
reliance where accountant was “not a disinterested source” but rather promoter of
shelter at issue); Fidelity Int’l Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC v. United States, 747
19
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ers are expected to know or should know include advisors participating in
the planning, promotion, or sale of the tax avoidance transaction;116 advi-
sors receiving compensation from the planners or promoters of such a
transaction rather than from the taxpayer-client;117 advisors whose com-
pensation is contingent upon the taxpayer receiving some or all of the
intended tax benefits of a transaction;118 and advisors with any other dis-
qualifying financial interest in the transaction, such as being compensated
based on how many opinions they churn out rather than on the quality
and independence of their professional advice (such behavior, by the way,
also violates Circular 230’s prohibition against “unconscionable fees”
under section 10.27 and the ABA’s prohibition on “unreasonable fees”
under Model Rule 1.5).119
Elements of the defense bar do not only want practitioners to be able
to engage in behavior under false claims statutes that would otherwise sub-
ject taxpayer-clients and their advisors to liability under the IRC.  They
also want a lower standard of care for tax advisors than is currently de-
manded under Circular 230, the prevailing standard governing tax practi-
tioners nationwide.  For those readers who think that the strictures of
Circular 230 only apply to tax professionals with federal tax practices and
not state and local practices, think again.  For starters, while Circular 230
provides rules “relating to the authority to practice before the Internal
Revenue Service,”120 such practice is defined broadly and includes any
communication with the IRS or any written advice that influences a tax-
payer’s federal tax liability,121 including state tax liability.  Second, no
other practice standard provides such detailed rules of behavior for tax
practitioners nationwide, not only for lawyers and accountants, but also for
enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, enrolled retirement plan agents, and
registered tax return preparers.122  In addition, no other standard garners
F. Supp. 2d 49, 243 (D. Mass. 2010) (“Professional advice may not be objectively
reasonable where the taxpayers knew or reasonably should have known that the
professional had a conflict of interest.”).
116. See I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii)(I).
117. See id. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii)(II).
118. See id. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii)(III).
119. See id. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii)(IV).
120. 31 C.F.R. § 10.0(a) (2011).
121. See id. § 10.2(a)(4).
122. See id. § 10.3(a)–(f).  A recent U.S. Court of Appeals decision challenged
the authority of the Treasury Department to regulate “tax return preparers” under
Circular 230. See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1021–22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (invalidat-
ing CLE and certification requirements, which IRS had imposed in effort to tackle
widespread fraud, on hundreds of thousands of unregulated tax return preparers
on grounds that authorizing statute provides insufficient authority); see also Brief
Amici Curiae of Former Commissioners of Internal Revenue in Support of Defend-
ants-Appellants, Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5061), 2013
WL 1386248, at *16–17 (“In 1884, Congress empowered the Treasury to regulate
the conduct of claims agents pursuing financial benefits from the government; and
in 2013 Treasury retains that authority to regulate the conduct of tax return
preparers who similarly assist in preparing and filing tax returns that present to the
20
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as much respect from tax professionals123 or imposes such strictly en-
forced124 and mandatory125 disciplinary rules126 rather than loosely en-
forced127 aspirational and permissive guidelines.128  Finally, no other
standard has had as great an influence on the development of the other
Treasury millions of claims worth billions of dollars each year.”); Lawrence B.
Gibbs, Loving v. IRS: The Treasury Department’s Authority to Regulate Tax Return Prepa-
ration Conduct of Commerical Return Preparers, 59 VILL. L. REV. 503, 514 (2014) (argu-
ing that Treasury’s 2011 amendments to Circular 230 regulating tax return
preparation by commercial preparers “are authoritative and should be upheld”).
But see Steve R. Johnson, Loving and Legitimacy: IRS Regulation of Tax Return Prepara-
tion, 59 VILL. L. REV. 515 (2014) (arguing the statute authorizing Circular 230 does
not confer authority on Treasury to regulate tax return preparation).
123. As legal scholar Michael Lang has written, “[w]hen tax practitioners
think of who addresses substandard behavior by their colleagues they think of the
IRS Office of Professional Responsibility [which enforces Circular 230] and they
are right to do so.”  Michael B. Lang, Thinking About Tax Malpractice, 32 ABA SEC-
TION OF TAXATION NEWSQUARTERLY 1, 1 (2012).
124. The Treasury Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)
has, unlike state bar disciplinary boards, embraced its authority to regulate and
prosecute all “matters related to practitioner conduct and discipline . . . .”  31
C.F.R. § 10.1(a)(1); see also Jeremiah Coder, Circular 230 and Due Process, 135 TAX
NOTES 538 (2012); Jeremiah Coder, OPR’s Role in Guiding Practitioner Sanctions, 134
TAX NOTES 1347 (2012); Jeremiah Coder, Strong Headwinds for Those Facing Circular
230 Discipline, 131 TAX NOTES 539 (2011).
125. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.20–10.38 (pertaining to “duties and restrictions relat-
ing to practice before the Internal Revenue Service”).  The only exception to the
mandatory rules under Circular 230 is § 10.33, pertaining to “best practices for tax
advisors.” Id. § 10.33.
126. See, e.g., id. § 10.50 (pertaining to penalties and other sanctions for vio-
lating regulation); id. § 10.51–10.52 (pertaining to prohibited behavior); id.
§ 10.60–10.82 (pertaining to adversarial disciplinary proceedings for tax practi-
tioners charged with violating its rules).
127. Disciplinary boards of state bar associations, for example, are “notori-
ously underfunded” and fail to police the behavior of their members with any con-
sistency or enthusiasm. See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of
Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1121 (1996) (finding also that state bar disciplinary
boards are “unable or reluctant to mount the effort needed to do battle with
wealthy class action lawyers and powerful members of the defense bar”).
128. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2009) (pertaining
to limiting scope of representation); id. R. 1.6(b) (pertaining to revealing informa-
tion relating to representation of client); id. R. 1.13(c) (pertaining to “reporting
out” information of organizational misconduct after failing to receive “timely and
appropriate” internal response); id. R. 1.14(b) (pertaining to clients with dimin-
ished capacity); id. R. 1.16(b) (pertaining to declining or terminating representa-
tion); id. R. 2.1 (pertaining to acting as “advisor” to client); id. R. 3.1 (pertaining to
meritorious claims and contentions); id. R. 3.6(b)–(c) (pertaining to trial public-
ity); id. R. 3.7(b) (pertaining to lawyer as witness); id. R. 6.1 (pertaining to volun-
tary pro bono public service); id. R. 6.4 (pertaining to law reform activities
affecting client interests); id. R. 8.3(c) (pertaining to reporting professional
misconduct).
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standards of care governing tax practitioners129 or has been adopted as
widely as the standard of care in both state130 and federal courts.131
Like the Internal Revenue Code, Circular 230 adopts the “knowing
and knowingly” standard for liability contained in false claims statutes.
Section 10.34 of Circular 230 forbids practitioners from “willfully, reck-
lessly, or through gross incompetence” preparing or advising a position
that lacks “reasonable basis” or substantial authority or that amounts to a
willful attempt to understate a client’s tax liability or “a reckless or inten-
tional disregard of the rules or regulations.”132  Moreover, Circular 230
sanctions practitioners with censure, suspension, or disbarment133 for
“willfully” violating any of its sections (other than its rules on “best prac-
tices” contained in section 10.33) or for “recklessly or through gross in-
competence” violating a handful of sections, including section 10.34.134
129. These other standards include the ABA Formal Ethics Opinions inter-
preting the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as applied to tax lawyers,
the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct and the Statements on Standards for Tax
Services, and the IRS penalty provisions and corresponding regulations, including
most prominently sections 6662, 6664, and 6694.  For a detailed discussion of the
Circular’s influence on these standards, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. & Bradley T. Bor-
den, Probability, Professionalism, and Protecting Taxpayers, 68 TAX LAW. 1 (2014).
130. See Lang, supra note 123, at 28 (writing that “breaches of Circular 230
rules that either parallel state bar ethics rules or are designed to protect clients are
likely to be treated like breaches of such state bar ethics rules” and “are likely to be
allowed to be offered in court as evidence of the breach of a duty to the client”); see
also Carberry v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 28 Cal. App. 4th 770, 790 (1994); Agran
v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 820–21 (1954); N.Y. State Soc’y of Enrolled
Agents v. N.Y. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 161 A.D.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); N.Y.
State Ass’n of Enrolled Agents, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation and Fin., 29
Misc. 3d 332, 334–38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); Estate of Heinz, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
4230, at *2 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Dec. 29, 2006).
131. See, e.g., Banister v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 499 F. App’x 668 (9th Cir.
2012); Diaz v. Century Pac. Inv. Corp., No. 92-56409, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9518
(9th Cir. Apr. 22, 1994); Owrutsky v. Brady, No. 89-2402, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
2613 (4th Cir. Feb. 19, 1991); Silverton v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341
(9th Cir. 1981); Pope v. United States, 599 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1979); Harary v.
Blumenthal, 555 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1977); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734,
741 (5th Cir. 1953); Ryan, LLC v. Lew, 934 F. Supp. 2d 159, 162 (D.D.C. 2013)
(“Simply stated, Circular 230 delineates who may practice before the IRS, the stan-
dards and restrictions such persons must follow, and the sanctions imposed for
violations of such standards and restrictions.”); United States v. Tomlinson, No. 12-
10051-01 JTM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82436, at *6–8 (D. Kan. June 12, 2013); Legel
v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury IRS Office of Prof’l Responsibility, No. 11-60914-CIV-
COHN/SELTZER, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136257 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2011); Banis-
ter v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, No. C 10-02764 JW, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 152803 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2011); Daniels v. United States, No. 1:05-CV-
0925-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57362 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2006); Jordan v. United
States, No. 3:04V02079, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32076 (D. Conn. Dec. 12, 2005);
Sicignano v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 2d 325 (D. Conn. 2001); Inst. of Certified
Practitioners, Inc. v. Bentsen, 874 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Poole v. United
States, No. 84-0300, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15351, at *2 (D.D.C. June 29, 1984).
132. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1)–(2) (2011).
133. See id. § 10.50(a).
134. Id. § 10.52(a)(1)–(2).
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Practitioners also face discipline for “knowingly, recklessly, or through
gross incompetence” providing a “false opinion,” which includes “inten-
tionally or recklessly misleading” opinions.135
As these examples indicate, the standards of care under Circular 230
and the IRC very clearly reflect the “knowing and knowingly” standard
under false claims statutes that elements of the defense bar have roundly
criticized.  Even if the critics succeed in persuading states to prevent tax
claims under FCAs, tax practitioners falling below the knowing and know-
ingly standard would still be subject to liability for advising impermissible
positions and transactions, while taxpayers would still be liable for under-
payments of tax.  Practitioners would also still be liable for claims of pro-
fessional misconduct if a taxpayer-client were made to pay back taxes,
interest, and penalties based on a return position made in reliance on the
substandard advice.
III. THE SPECIOUS ARGUMENT THAT TAX IS SPECIAL
Critics of using false claims statutes to uncover and prosecute tax
cheats insist that tax is different than other areas of the law.  Complying
with the tax law is “confusing, ambiguous, and difficult.”136  Due to tax
law’s complexity and uncertainty, these critics argue that submitting false
or fraudulent information in the tax context should be given a pass and
treated differently than submitting false or fraudulent information in, say,
healthcare or government procurement.
This Part demonstrates that tax law is no more complex, ambiguous,
or uncertain than other areas of the law.  In so doing, it exposes as non-
sense the argument that “tax is different” and thus entitled to special treat-
ment under false claims statutes.  Furthermore, it exposes these arguments
as self-serving attempts to preserve the status quo.  While some members
of the defense bar rail against “confusing, ambiguous, and difficult” tax
laws, many of them add to the confusion by exploiting the ambiguities and
making enforcement of the law that much more difficult.  As described in
Part III.C, the bluster of the “tax is different” argument—which also falsely
asserts that tax whistleblowing is at odds with traditional tax administra-
tion—appears to reflect the desire among elements of the defense bar to
preserve tax law’s ambiguities and to control the flow of information from
135. Id. § 10.51(a)(13).  “False opinions” are further defined as:
[T]hose which reflect or result from a knowing misstatement of fact or
law, from an assertion of a position known to be unwarranted under ex-
isting law, from counseling or assisting in conduct known to be illegal or
fraudulent, from concealing matters required by law to be revealed, or
from consciously disregarding information indicating that material facts
expressed in the opinion or offering material are false or misleading.
Id.
136. Hamilton, supra note 33, at 158 (summarizing Timothy Noonan of
Hodgson Russ questioning wisdom of permitting tax claims under state-level
FCAs).
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taxpayers to tax agencies.  Tax whistleblowers—by unveiling and detailing
exploited gray areas in the law—threaten both of those goals.
A. Tax Law Is No More Complicated Than [Fill in the Blank]
The argument that tax is different is really three related arguments.
First, tax law is more complicated and uncertain than other areas of the
law.  Second, tax liability should generally not attach when it is premised
on violations of unsettled areas of the law, because the accused taxpayer
cannot be said to have acted with sufficient culpability.  Third, and more
specifically, as a result of tax law’s unique complexity and uncertainty, it is
inappropriate to permit claims of noncompliance that originate outside of
traditional tax administration channels, and especially not from
whistleblowers.
As to the first argument, that tax law is more complex and uncertain
than other areas of the law, its proponents offer no evidence, empirical or
otherwise, to verify the repeated injunction.  To be sure, tax law, though
not as complex as rocket science, is hardly intuitive; understanding, inter-
preting, and complying with it often requires the assistance of paid experts
and professionals.  The law is constantly changing, moreover, both at the
federal and state level.  But the same can be said of other areas of the law,
including securities law, environmental law, health law, and corporate law.
As to the second argument, that tax liability should not attach when
the law is uncertain because taxpayers cannot be said to possess the requi-
site mens rea, its proponents seem to have forgotten that the very nature of
the common law results in potentially capricious results.  They also seem
to have overlooked the thousands of cases, both civil and criminal, in
which a defendant was found liable for wrongdoing in one jurisdiction
even though the same behavior would not have subjected the defendant to
liability in another jurisdiction.
As to the third argument, that tax law’s unique complexity and uncer-
tainty militates against allowing anyone but tax officials to uncover and
prosecute noncompliance, its adherents ignore other areas of complex law
with regimes that not only permit the participation of whistleblowers in
enforcement efforts, but encourage and protect it.  Two prominent exam-
ples of active whistleblower regimes include the informant programs run
through the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Office of the
24
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Whistleblower137 and the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Of-
fice of Inspector General (OIG).138
An example from securities law exposes the speciousness of all three
arguments.  The law pertaining to liability under section 10(b) of the Se-
curities and Exchange Act and SEC rule 10b-5 is all over the place, often
unclear, and typically evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  Defendants are
held to an evolving standard, adjudged innocent or guilty by what
amounts to a moving target.  The only thing we know for certain is that it
takes more than mere negligence to be found liable of a securities viola-
tion.  And while the statute has never contained a private right of action as
an enforcement mechanism,139 judges have created and reaffirmed im-
plied causes of action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 for more than
sixty-five years.140  As importantly, Congress has effectively endorsed these
judicial remedies by refraining from amending or reforming section
137. In 2010, section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act authorized the establishment of the SEC’s Office of the
Whistleblower to provide “whistleblower incentives and protections.” See Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 922, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  In practice, the Office handles whistleblower tips and
complaints, and provides guidance to the SEC Enforcement Division staff based on
relevant information received from whistleblowers.  According to its website, the
SEC whistleblower program embraces whistleblowers as partners in the effort to
uncover securities violations and to protect capital markets:
Assistance and information from a whistleblower who knows of possible
securities law violations can be among the most powerful weapons in the
law enforcement arsenal of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Through their knowledge of the circumstances and individuals involved,
whistleblowers can help the Commission identify possible fraud and
other violations much earlier than might otherwise have been possible.
That allows the Commission to minimize the harm to investors, better
preserve the integrity of the United States’ capital markets, and more
swiftly hold accountable those responsible for unlawful conduct.
See OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last
visited Apr. 21, 2014).  For the agency’s final rule implementing the whistleblower
provisions of Dodd-Frank (under section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934), see SEC FINAL RULE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS
OF SECTION 21F OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, No. 34-64545 (2011)
(codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/
2011/34-64545.pdf.
138. The EPA’s OIG operates a hotline to help whistleblowers recognize and
report fraud, waste, and abuse “in EPA programs and operations including mis-
management or violations of law, rules, or regulations by EPA employees or pro-
gram participants.  Complaints may be received directly from EPA employees,
participants in EPA programs, or the general public.” OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
EPA, OIG Hotline, http://www.epa.gov/oig/.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
139. See William H. Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development
of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1361, 1366 (1965)
(writing that “[n]either [rule 10b-5] nor [section 10(b)] expressly provides for a
civil remedy”).
140. For the first decision implying a private right of action under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5, see Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D.
Pa. 1946) (“[T]he mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not
sufficient to negative what the general law implies.”).
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10(b).141  Indeed, as a young Justice William Rehnquist wrote in 1974,
“[w]hen we deal with private actions under rule 10b-5, we deal with a judi-
cial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”142
Tack on another forty years of growth, and the judicial oak contains a lot
more lumber.
For a specific example, consider United States v. O’Hagan,143 an insider
trading case.  Under the “traditional” theory, liability for insider trading
attaches when a corporate insider trades in the securities of the corpora-
tion on the basis of material, nonpublic information.  That kind of trad-
ing, the Supreme Court held prior to the events in O’Hagan, qualifies as a
“deceptive device” under section 10(b), due to the “relationship of trust
and confidence between the shareholders of a corporation and those in-
siders who have obtained confidential information by reason of their posi-
tion with that corporation.”144  The “relationship gives rise to a duty to
disclose [or abstain from trading] because of the ‘necessity of preventing a
corporate insider from . . . tak[ing] unfair advantage of [ ] uninformed [ ]
stockholders.’”145  Officers, directors, and other insiders are held account-
able under the traditional theory, as are attorneys, accountants, consul-
tants, and other temporary fiduciaries.146  By comparison, under the
“misappropriation theory,” which was still evolving at the time of the
events in O’Hagan, a person violates section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 when
“he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading pur-
poses, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.”147  The
fiduciary’s undisclosed use of the information “defrauds the principal of
the exclusive use of that information.”148  While the classical theory out-
laws “a corporate insider’s breach of duty to shareholders with whom the
insider transacts,” the misappropriation theory bars trading on “nonpublic
information by a corporate ‘outsider’ in breach of a duty owed not to a
trading party, but to the source of the information.”149
In O’Hagan, a defendant “outsider” got caught in the crosshairs of the
still uncertain misappropriation theory.  Despite the uncertainty, the Su-
preme Court found Defendant O’Hagan criminally liable for insider trad-
ing.  O’Hagan was a partner in a law firm retained by a corporation to
advise on a tender offer for the common stock of another corporation.
141. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (unani-
mously finding that “[t]he existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond
peradventure”).
142. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
143. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  I am indebted to Tom Joo for suggesting the exam-
ple of O’Hagan and insider trading.
144. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
145. Id. at 228–29 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951)).
146. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
147. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 652–53.
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O’Hagan did no work on the matter but learned of the potential tender
offer, at which time he began purchasing call options for the target corpo-
ration’s stock as well as shares of its common stock.  After the acquiring
corporation publicly announced its tender offer, the price of the target’s
stock soared, O’Hagan sold his call options and common stock of the tar-
get, and made a sizeable profit.
In applying the misappropriation theory of liability under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 to corporate “outsiders,” the Court wrote that when a
“misappropriator [ ] trades on the basis of material, nonpublic informa-
tion,” the trader “gains his advantageous market position through decep-
tion; he deceives the source of the information and simultaneously harms
members of the investing public.”150  O’Hagan’s actions made him a “mis-
appropriator” and criminally liable under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.  In
so holding, the Court reinstated O’Hagan’s forty-one month sentence.
Importantly, the Court did not let O’Hagan off the hook notwith-
standing the uncertainty swirling around the application of the misappro-
priation theory at the time of O’Hagan’s actions.  In retrospect, and for
our purposes, if O’Hagan can be found liable and sent to jail under an
ambiguous standard in a supremely complex area of the law, the argu-
ment that a taxpayer should not be held liable for violations of unsettled
areas of the law—and required to pay back taxes, interest, and penalties—
is considerably less persuasive.  Loss of undeserved, ill-gotten tax benefits
does not compare to loss of liberty.  And while O’Hagan’s misconduct was
not discovered and reported by a whistleblower, other forms of miscon-
duct under unsettled areas of the law could certainly be the subject of a
whistleblower claim submitted to the SEC’s current Office of the
Whistleblower and subsequently prosecuted to conclusion.
Two additional examples underscore that tax is certainly not the only
area of the law that suffers from ambiguity and uncertainty in outcome.  In
fact, the following two cases describe an ambiguous area of the law (securi-
ties law) that effectively enforces other ambiguous and substantively diffi-
cult areas of the law (here, municipal public finance and taxation).
In SEC v. Dain Rauscher, Inc.151 the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion had charged an investment banker for an underwriter of municipal
offerings with multiple securities violations.  According to the SEC, the
defendant failed to conduct a proper investigation and omitted material
information related to the offering statements of taxable municipal
notes.152  At the time of the offering, taxable municipal notes were new to
the industry and used solely for investment purposes and interest arbitrage
opportunities rather than for infrastructure improvement, debt reduction,
150. Id. at 656.
151. 254 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001).
152. Even more specifically, the SEC charged the defendant with violating
section 17(a) of the Securities Act as well as section 10(b), rule 10b-5, and section
15(B)(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act. See id. at 853–54.
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or capital projects.  The gambit involved the issuer of the notes planning
to pay back bondholders at a certain rate of interest while investing the
proceeds from the notes at a higher rate of return to make a profit equal
to the spread between the rates.
The defendant argued that he met the standard of care for the securi-
ties profession by satisfying the industry standard in preparing and draft-
ing the offering statements.  He also reminded the court that it had found
similar conduct as satisfying the standard of care in the context of account-
ing professionals.153  The court distinguished its earlier holding respect-
ing accountants, however, and found that meeting the industry standard
was just one factor to consider in applying the broader standard of “rea-
sonable prudence.”154  Unlike the industry standard for accountants, the
industry standard for investment bankers and underwriters pertaining to
these new securities was “sparse and not particularly helpful.”155  Even
more importantly, it was “set, in part, by [the defendant] himself who was
one of the first of the securities professionals to participate in such an
offering,”156 and who might be motivated to develop a standard falling
short of ordinary reasonable care.157  Viewing under an objective stan-
dard, the defendant’s conduct—which included failing to describe the in-
vestment purpose of the notes, further failing to disclose that the proceeds
would be invested in Orange County investment pools (the same pools
that hastened the county’s bankruptcy), and making no inquiry into the
investments and securities held by the pools158—the court held in favor of
the SEC and remanded for further proceedings.159
Five years later, in Weiss v. SEC,160 the court evaluated whether bond
counsel for a school district made material misrepresentations and deceit-
ful acts in providing an unqualified legal opinion on a bond issuance.161
Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code excludes interest on local gov-
ernment bonds from gross income of bond purchasers.162  At the same
time, it places limits on the use of “arbitrage bonds,”163 bonds offered at,
153. Id. at 857.  In making this argument, the defendant relied on SEC v.
Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1979).  In Arthur Young, the court
held that accountants acting “in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards (GAAS) were not liable under Section 17(a), Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-
5, and that the industry standard, namely compliance with GAAS, was the relevant
standard for measuring the accountants’ conduct.” Dain Rauscher, 254 F.3d at 857
(citing Arthur Young, 590 F.2d at 788).
154. Dain Rauscher, 254 F.3d at 854.
155. Id. at 857.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 855.
159. Id. at 859.
160. 468 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
161. Id. at 855.  More specifically, bond counsel was charged with violating
sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act. Id.
162. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2012)
163. See id. § 148.
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss3/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR302.txt unknown Seq: 29 14-AUG-14 14:25
2014] NOT JUST WHISTLING DIXIE 453
say, a 3% rate of interest with bond proceeds invested in U.S. Treasuries
earning a 4% rate of return.  If structured in compliance with detailed
regulations,164 issuers can earn a risk-free profit.  On the other hand, fail-
ure to meet the regulatory requirements turns the tax-exempt bonds into
taxable “arbitrage bonds.”  Given the importance of meeting the require-
ments, local government entities hire bond counsel to ensure that the issu-
ance satisfies a series of tests to evaluate whether the issuer possesses a
“reasonable expectation”165 it will spend a certain amount of the bond
proceeds on capital projects (rather than on arbitrage opportunities)
within a certain period of time.
The court endorsed the SEC’s finding that the defendant failed “to
look for even minimal objective indicia of the School District’s reasonable
expectations to spend Note proceeds on projects . . . .”166  The extent of
his due diligence involved examining a “wish list” of projects that the
school district was considering, “not a list of the projects the Board had
decided to undertake.”167  And while Weiss argued that his client merely
had to “intend” to undertake the project before issuing the bonds,168 an
interpretation of the rules that reflected industry practice, the court held
that “the question is not whether the Board intended to do projects, but
whether a reasonable person would have expected the Board to follow
through on those projects.”169  Weiss neglected to conduct a reasonably
diligent and objective inquiry to make that determination, and thus “failed
to provide investors with full information concerning the substantial risk
that the IRS would find the Notes to be taxable.”170  The court upheld the
SEC’s determination.
As these examples indicate, tax is not uniquely complex, ambiguous,
or uncertain as compared to other areas of the law.  By the same token,
violations of the tax law do not deserve special treatment vis-a`-vis other
equally complex, ambiguous, or uncertain legal contexts.  In other words,
tax cheats do not deserve lesser enforcement or liability than, say, Medi-
caid cheats, under either applicable black letter law or under false claims
acts.
B. Whistleblowers Are Not Bad for Tax Administration
As part of the specious “tax is different” argument, critics of permit-
ting tax claims under false claims statutes assert that tax whistleblowers are
bad for tax administration.  Allowing citizens to act as pseudo-revenue
agents creates an “alternative tax administration process” that erodes tradi-
164. See Treas. Reg. § 1.148-0 through 1.150-5.
165. Id. § 1.148-1(b), 1.148-2(b).
166. Weiss, 468 F.3d at 855.
167. Id. at 856.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tional taxpayer rights of process, privacy, and confidentiality.171  Moreo-
ver, according to the critics, whistleblower regimes circumvent tax
agencies and expert tax officials trained in identifying noncompliance and
instead substitute inexpert citizens looking for a quick settlement or a cut
of the larger tax enforcement pie.  Citizen enforcement of the tax law also
encourages frivolous and harassing claims, whether prosecuted by citizen
whistleblowers or overzealous attorneys general acting on information pro-
vided by whistleblowers, a result that can sully innocent taxpayers’ reputa-
tions and drain resources spent on baseless litigation.  Such a parallel tax
administration process, moreover, conflicts and overlaps with existing (or
likely) tax investigations, creating additional expense for taxpayer defend-
ants and duplicative investigations for state tax agencies and attorneys
generals’ offices.
These claims are unnecessarily alarmist.  Moreover, they seem to stem
from fear of the unknown rather than from practical experience.  Many of
the assertions reveal critics’ lack of familiarity with false claims statutes and
how the statutes already address and mitigate the asserted cataclysms.  Part
III.B.1 addresses these gaps between perception and reality.  As impor-
tantly, critics exhibit a fundamental misunderstanding of why
whistleblowers report alleged misconduct in the first place.  Rather than
simply reflecting disgruntled employees looking for a quick settlement,
study after study reveals that the vast majority of whistleblowers are “moti-
vated more by principle—that is to say, wanting to do the right thing—
than by money.”172  Part III.B.2 addresses this misunderstanding.
1. Whistleblowing Does Not Threaten Taxpayer Rights of Process, Privacy, or
Confidentiality
Elements of the defense bar have charged tax whistleblower laws, par-
ticularly qui tam statutes permitting tax claims, with eliminating “many of
the rights that exist in the normal tax administration process.”173  Promi-
nent on the list of endangered rights are administrative procedure, tax
privacy, and taxpayer confidentiality.  “We are used to litigating tax cases
in private,” one practitioner has said, “and we’re used to taxpayer confi-
dentiality.”174  In the qui tam context, “otherwise confidential tax return
171. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 112 (quoting Jim Wetzler, former commis-
sioner of New York’s Department of Finance and Taxation, now partner with
Deloitte).
172. Dolan & McCormally, supra note 70, at 1542.
173. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 112 (quoting Wetzler, who further concludes
that New York’s recently amended FCA is “not good for tax administration . . . and
certainly not [good] for taxpayer rights”).
174. Waltreese Carroll, Panelists Question FTB Rationale in Gillette Appeal, 66
STATE TAX NOTES 623, 623 (2012) (quoting Hollis Hyans of Morrison & Foerster
LLP).  Ms. Hyans overstates her case: once a tax matter reaches formal litigation
(unless it is subject to a court-issued protective order or proceeds under the cloak
of arbitration rather than in a courtroom), confidentiality protections for tax re-
turn information quickly disappear. See I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4) (2012) (expressly per-
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information will become available for public inspection.”175  Additional
rights are jeopardized under some FCAs by longer statutes of limitations
for actions brought under false claims statutes versus actions originating
under a state’s revenue statutes,176 as well as retroactive application of
FCAs that have been amended to allow tax claims.177
The critics make it sound as if accused taxpayers will have their tax
returns published on the front page of the Wall Street Journal and fully
searchable in online databases.  Such impressions lack reality.  It is cer-
tainly possible that a taxpayer’s aggressive tax avoidance transaction(s)
(and not its entire tax return, which could run thousands of pages) could
be exposed to the court of public opinion, an outcome that would, on the
one hand, publicize the taxpayer’s knowing submission of false or fraudu-
lent information to the government (which should elicit little sympathy)
or, on the other hand, illuminate an area of the law that needs clarifica-
tion to avoid further knowing exploitation by overaggressive taxpayers.  In
either event, false claims statutes contain procedural mechanisms (dis-
cussed below) that significantly minimize potential harms from publicly
mitting disclosure of tax returns or tax return information in federal and state
judicial or administrative proceedings).  Ms. Hyans may have been referring to pre-
trial dispute resolution procedures or administrative appeals; in that event, she
inappropriately extends the litigation model to proceedings that, though perhaps
adversarial in the mind of taxpayers and counsel, possess few of the trappings of
litigation and reflect an administrative process rather than a judicial process. See
Gustafson et al., supra note 70, at 54 (“[U]nlike most administrative audits and
appeals, qui tam proceedings are public.”); James W. Wetzler, New York’s False
Claims Act—Good or Bad Tax Administration?, 60 STATE TAX NOTES 165, 169 (2011)
(“[M]ost FCA legal proceedings will be publicly disclosed.”).
175. Gustafson et al., supra note 70, at 54.
176. See Martire & Ferrante, supra note 70, at 130 n.1 (discussing New York’s
FCA); Trachtenberg et al., supra note 29, at 375–76; Wetzler, supra note 174, at
169.  In general, New York’s Tax Law provides a three-year statute of limitations on
tax enforcement actions, “except in the case of a willfully false or fraudulent return
with intent to evade the tax . . . .” N.Y. TAX LAW § 1147(b) (McKinney 2013).  For
knowing submissions of false and fraudulent tax information, the state imposes a
ten-year statute of limitations. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 192(1).
177. See Trachtenberg et al., supra note 29, at 375–76; Wetzler, supra note 174,
at 169.  Effective August 13, 2010, the New York Legislature amended the state’s
False Claims Act.  Among other changes to the statute, the legislature expressly
applied the FCA to knowing violations of the New York Tax Law. See 2010 N.Y.
Sess. Laws 379 (McKinney), available at http://ssl.csg.org/dockets/2012cycle/
32B/32Bbillls/1332b06nywhistleblowerfraud.pdf.  The legislature also made the
2010 amendments retroactive to “apply to claims, records or statements made or
used prior to, on or after April 1, 2007.” Id. § 13.  In June 2013, a New York court
upheld the retroactive application of the amendments pertaining to knowing viola-
tions of New York’s tax law. See People ex rel. Schneiderman v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
970 N.Y.S.2d 164, 176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (finding that section 189(1)(g) of FCA,
pertaining to reverse false claims—whereby persons are liable for avoiding paying
or transmitting money or property to government, including tax payments—“is
not sufficiently punitive in nature and effect as to warrant preclusive application of
the Ex Post Facto Clause to [taxpayer’s] alleged conduct prior to August 10, 2010,
when the Act was amended to expressly apply to knowing violations of the State’s
Tax Law”).
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airing a taxpayer’s dirty laundry.  Meanwhile, for taxpayers who genuinely
take a good faith position in an unsettled area of the law, the fear that
confidential tax return information will be a news item is remote.178  Only
a fraction of qui tam complaints (which universally proceed under seal)
evolve into live actions.  Moreover, all false claims statutes limit public ac-
cess to private or confidential tax return information.  And, as further pro-
tection for taxpayers, courts have the authority to fashion additional
remedies to protect tax return information from undue disclosure.
Under all FCAs, qui tam complaints are filed in camera and remain
under seal for a specified period of time.179  During this period, the gov-
ernment (either state attorneys general or the U.S. Department of Justice)
investigates the allegations.  The government may request additional time
to investigate the matter, while the complaint remains under seal with any
supporting affidavits or submissions made in camera.180  Generally, the
seal is lifted once the government notifies the court that it intends to pro-
ceed with the action or, alternatively, once the government notifies the
court that it declines to proceed and the qui tam plaintiff assumes respon-
sibility for prosecuting the matter.181
Even if a court lifts the protective seal, thereby technically making the
proceedings “public,” additional means are available to restrict access to
confidential tax return information.  For example, current FCAs provide
avenues for the government to dismiss the action (notwithstanding objec-
tions of the whistleblower initiating the action),182 settle the action with
the defendant (again, notwithstanding objections of the whistleblower)183
178. It is worth noting that the burden of proof in false claims actions, unlike
in administrative tax actions, is on the person or the state agency prosecuting the
suit.  Thus, as one knowledgeable commentator has observed, “it’s possible to ar-
gue that taxpayers will have even greater [procedural] protections in the false-
claims area than they do in issues before state tax administrators.”  Hamilton, supra
note 25, at 112 (quoting William Comiskey, former deputy commissioner of Office
of Tax Enforcement with New York Department of Taxation and Finance).
179. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012) (at least sixty days); CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 12652(c)(2) (West 2014) (up to sixty days); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/
4(b)(2) (2012) (at least sixty days); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(2)(b) (at least sixty
days).
180. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12652(c)(2); 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 175/4(b)(3); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(2)(b).
181. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/4(b)(2) (providing no explicit direc-
tive for when court unseals complaint, but indicating that complaint is in fact un-
sealed once it is served on defendant); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (same as
Illinois’s FCA); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12652(6)(A)–(B).
182. The statutes require that the person initiating the action be notified of
the motion to dismiss and provided an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12652(e)(2)(A); 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 175/4(c)(2)(A); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(5)(b)(i).
183. The statutes require that a court determine the settlement is “fair, ade-
quate, and reasonable under all the circumstances.”  31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B);
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/4(c)(2)(B); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12652(e)(2)(B);
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(5)(b)(ii); State ex rel. Beeler, Schad & Diamond, P.C. v.
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 860 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ill. App. Ct.
32
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with any settlement hearing being held in camera upon a showing of good
cause,184 and impose limitations during the course of litigation on the
participation of the whistleblower.185  The statutes also permit defendants
to request restrictions on a qui tam plaintiff’s participation by showing
that such participation “would be for purposes of harassment or would
cause the defendant undue burden or unnecessary expense.”186  Moreo-
ver, if a qui tam plaintiff ends up prosecuting the action rather than the
government, at least one state’s FCA requires the plaintiff to obtain ap-
proval from the attorney general before even submitting a motion to com-
pel the state’s tax agency to disclose a defendant’s tax records,187 a
requirement that could be adopted in all jurisdictions.  Finally, at their
discretion, courts can craft protective orders and require in camera review
or redaction of documents and materials to prevent unnecessary disclo-
sure of tax return information.188
2006) (holding that action could be dismissed by state’s attorney general over rela-
tor’s objections so long as relator was given notice and opportunity to be heard).
184. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/4(c)(2)(B);
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(5)(b)(ii).
185. The statutes require the government to show that unrestricted participa-
tion during the course of litigation by the person initiating the action would “inter-
fere with or unduly delay the prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious or
irrelevant.” N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(5)(b)(iii).  Enumerated limitations include
restricting (i) the number of witnesses the person may call, (ii) the length of wit-
ness testimony, and (iii) the person’s cross-examination of witnesses. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(c)(2)(C); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/4(c)(2)(C); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW
§ 190(5)(b)(iii).
186. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/4(c)(2)(D); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(C);
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(5)(b)(iii).
187. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(4)(b).
188. The general rule under section 6103(h)(4) of the Internal Revenue
Code provides for disclosure of tax returns and tax return information in judicial
and administrative tax proceedings.  In this and other ways, the protections af-
forded tax return information are less absolute than most people think.  In 2012,
for instance, the IRS made more than eight billion disclosures of tax returns and
return information to authorized recipients under section 6103, with the majority
of the disclosures constituting government-to-government requests for informa-
tion, as well as requests from Congressional committees and the U.S. Census Bu-
reau. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, IRS, DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR PUBLIC
INSPECTION PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 6103(P)(3)(C) FOR
CALENDAR YEAR 2012, JCX-8-13 (2013), available at https://www.jct.gov/publica-
tions.html?func=startdown&=4514.  During the course of investigating false or
fraudulent behavior under the New York FCA, for instance, that state’s Office of
the Attorney General regularly obtains tax return information from the federal
government. See Hamilton, supra note 33, at 156 (reporting that the New York
Attorney General “follows the federally prescribed process for obtaining tax return
information”); Letter from Eric T. Schneiderman, supra note 38, at 1 (describing
“the right of state officials to obtain and utilize information that may appear on tax
returns in carrying out [ ] law enforcement functions”).
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2. Whistleblowers Do Not Threaten Expert Tax Administration or Lead to
Frivolous Claims
Critics of tax whistleblowers and qui tam for tax overstate their case
even more dramatically when it comes to perceived threats to expert tax
administration.  “Tax administrators are often relegated to the sidelines in
these suits,” the critics allege, “and have limited input as to how the tax law
is applied.”189  Moreover, whistleblower cases disrupt tax enforcement
processes in that the misconduct alleged in a whistleblower complaint
might already be under government review or would eventually be flagged
and investigated.190  Furthermore, in some states, officials with no tax ex-
pertise and motivated more by politics than tax enforcement can “override
the tax administrator’s decisions about enforcement priorities and how to
interpret the law.”191  And, the argument goes, under FCAs that permit
tax claims, “taxpayers immediately get branded in the press as ‘tax frauds’
and ‘tax cheats.’”192  Elements of the corporate bar even charge that “peo-
ple who do not understand tax—but understand false claim acts and qui
tam actions—are being allowed to decide who gets punished and who
does not.”193  Interpreting and enforcing the tax law requires “specialized
knowledge” and “ought to remain within the authority and expertise of
the state’s taxing authority,”194 rather than with private persons who sim-
189. MTC Project Would Minimize, supra note 44, at 367 (quoting Todd Lard of
COST).
190. See Carroll, supra note 174, at 623 (quoting Lynn Gandhi, of Honigman
Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP, with respect to New York’s FCA permitting tax
claims, saying “I don’t know why we need this,” and suggesting that traditional tax
administration process works just fine); Houghton et al., supra note 70, at 596 (rec-
ommending that state legislatures “enact clear and explicit safe harbors for those
corporations that are engaged with the appropriate governmental agency regard-
ing the subject matter of the false claim (for example, as part of a state audit exam-
ination, whether conducted by state personnel or retained contract auditors, or as
part of a voluntary disclosure process)”); Houghton et al., supra note 72, at 458
(“[A]llowing a [whistleblower] to initiate a lawsuit when the company has already
alerted the government to the matter, in any form, contradicts the public policy
and stated purpose underlying the qui tam statutory regime.”); Wetzler, supra note
174, at 167 (discussing potential situations where “a whistleblower simultaneously
files claims under the IRS whistleblower program and the FCA, the information
provided under the FCA would have eventually been received by the department
when the IRS reports federal audit changes to the department through the fed-
state information exchange program,” and “[c]ases in which the ordinary tax ad-
ministration process would have a high probability of uncovering tax underpay-
ments would include . . . allegations based on tax return positions disclosed on the
tax return”).
191. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 112 (quoting Wetzler).
192. Waltreese Carroll, Brunori: Transparency Key to Effective Tax Administration,
64 STATE TAX NOTES 879, 879 (2012) (summarizing comments by Jack
Trachtenberg of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP).
193. Id. (summarizing comments by Jordan Goodman of Horwood Marcus &
Berk).
194. Carr, supra note 45, at 38 (summarizing practitioner concerns).
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ply initiate whistleblower complaints and then “say that it is fraud—with
headline-grabbing allegations against the company.”195
The critics craft a tale of elected officials misusing and misapplying
false claims statutes for personal gain; of ill-informed citizens (usually dis-
gruntled employees or former employees) out for financial windfalls
bringing baseless, frivolous, and harassing lawsuits; of innocent taxpayers
being accused of cheating on their taxes without due process; and of tax
officials completely shut out or circumvented.  It all sounds terrible.  But it
distorts the truth.
For starters, agencies and officials with tax expertise will be as in-
volved in FCA actions as the underlying statute allows (and as it should
allow).  In New York, for instance, the FCA requires the attorney general
to “consult with the commissioner of the department of taxation and fi-
nance prior to filing or intervening in any action . . . based on the filing of
false claims, records or statements made under the tax law.”196  The statu-
tory requirement for consultation with the tax agency was one of the rea-
sons that the state’s Department of Taxation and Finance supported the
2010 amendments permitting tax actions to be brought under the FCA.197
Section 7623 of the Internal Revenue Code also guarantees that tax ex-
perts will decide the fate of all whistleblower submissions.  In the words of
Dan Bucks, former Executive Director of the Multistate Tax Commission,
under existing federal and state tax whistleblower regimes, “[c]itizen ac-
tions are referred first to the government for the application of the tax
agency’s special expertise.  The government may then proceed with the
case” or allow the whistleblower to prosecute the action.198  “That general
process of combining the information and initiative of the citizen with the
established knowledge and expertise of the tax agency,” Bucks concludes,
“is appropriate in the realm of taxation.”199
Even in states without a directive requiring attorneys general to con-
sult with their state’s tax agency, tax experts can (and should) be involved
in evaluating and investigating a whistleblower’s complaint.  As a matter of
prudence, due diligence, and competence, state attorneys general will
want to involve their tax agencies in tax-related false claims actions.  More-
over, many attorneys general offices enjoy in-house tax expertise.  For ex-
ample, the California Office of the Attorney General includes a Business
195. Carroll, supra note 174, at 624 (quoting Hollis Hyans of Morrison &
Foerster LLP).
196. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(4)(b) (McKinney 2013); see also Hamilton,
supra note 25, at 112 (quoting William Comiskey, former deputy commissioner of
Office of Tax Enforcement with New York Department of Taxation and Finance:
“The statute calls for the Tax Department to have a key role in false-claims act
cases,” and “[c]ases are filed under seal and are not made public until they have
been vetted by the attorney general and by the department”).
197. See Hamilton, supra note 25, at 112.
198. Dan Bucks, Making Corporate Taxes Work, Part 5: Empowering Citizens for
Tax Equality, 69 STATE TAX NOTES 283, 288 (2013).
199. Id.
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and Tax Section that investigates and litigates complex tax cases.  In addi-
tion, attorney general offices can leverage the expertise of whistleblowers
themselves to understand the true nature of positions or transactions on a
taxpayer’s 1000-page return.  Indeed, according to Gregory Krakower, se-
nior advisor and counselor to the New York Attorney General, the list of
persons submitting tax claims under New York’s FCA includes potential
“accountants, bookkeepers, employees of banks, accounting firms, and
other businesses that handle tax matters.”200  These insiders are essential
to uncovering and then deciphering tax noncompliance “hidden in a
complex web of structured transactions,” in the opinion of William Comis-
key, a former deputy commissioner of the Office of Tax Enforcement with
the New York Department of Taxation and Finance.201  “The False Claims
Act,” Comiskey says, “will provide the state with the best tool available to
expose these schemes,” namely the knowledgeable insider.202
Concerns over duplicative and premature enforcement investigations
due to whistleblower actions are equally unconvincing.  Just because a tax
agency may be auditing a company’s tax return, for instance, does not
mean that the investigating agents will flag the transaction that is the sub-
ject of a whistleblower submission or, in the event the transaction has been
flagged, will understand what is really going on with the transaction be-
yond what the taxpayer has chosen to reflect on the return.203  We cannot
forget that abusive tax avoidance deals such as LILOs and SILOs resem-
bled plain vanilla leveraged-lease transactions on corporate tax returns,
while fraudulent inflated-basis transactions were made to look like run-of-
the-mill high-basis, low-value partnership interests.  Whistleblowers can il-
luminate tax-motivated transactions that revenue agents will continue to
misinterpret or fail to uncover.  And, in fact, insiders rather than revenue
agents alerted government officials and members of the press to the in-
flated-basis transactions in the late 1990s204 as well as other mass-marketed
shelter schemes.205  Thus, calls for safe harbors for taxpayers “engaged
with the appropriate governmental agency regarding the subject matter of
the false claim” could halt otherwise fruitful inquiries into a taxpayer’s
200. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 111.
201. Id. at 112 (quoting William Comiskey).
202. Id. (quoting William Comiskey).
203. The observation that traditional audit and tax administration procedures
miss or misunderstand items on tax returns also applies to claims that
whistleblower complaints are inappropriate because “the ordinary tax administra-
tion process would have a high probability of uncovering tax underpayments” asso-
ciated with disclosed positions (unless, of course, the position is one that had a
high probability of being flagged by computer scoring programs such as the IRS
Discriminant Function System (DIF) or Unreported Income DIF (UIDIF)).  Wet-
zler, supra note 174, at 167.
204. See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
205. See Tanina Rostain, Travails in Tax: KPMG and the Tax-Shelter Controversy,
in LEGAL ETHICS: LAW STORIES 19, ch. 3 (Deborah L. Rhode & David J. Luban eds.,
2006) (describing efforts of Michael Hamersley, tax lawyer who blew whistle on
KPMG’s extensive—and fraudulent—tax shelter practice in 2002).
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hidden noncompliance, precisely the kind of misconduct that false claims
statutes are designed to reveal.206  If anything, the investigating units (that
is, the agents conducting the audit and the unit or agency assigned to
investigate the whistleblower submission) should share information and, if
appropriate, coordinate their efforts for a more streamlined, thorough in-
vestigation.  Where a whistleblower submission is deemed valid but in fact
duplicative or unripe, a false claims statute could require that the FCA
action be stayed while the administrative action proceeded.207
Finally, some commentators have suggested that state-level
whistleblower actions are unnecessary when a whistleblower has also filed
a claim under the federal whistleblower statute.208  These arguments as-
sume that the IRS will eventually alert the state to any audit changes when
the case closes, at which point the state can piggyback on the work per-
formed by the feds.  But the whistleblower’s claim may include complex
issues of state taxation with which the federal examiners are unfamiliar or
lack sufficient expertise such that the federal examination would fail to
uncover or comprehend issues relevant to the states.  Moreover, it takes
years for the IRS Whistleblower Office to process and close cases.  In 2006,
the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration reported that
whistleblower claims under the federal program languished in administra-
tive and judicial processes for, on average, seven and a half years between
the filing of a claim and the payment of a reward, the point at which cases
are closed administratively.209  In 2013, six years after Congress signifi-
cantly enhanced and improved the program, the IRS Whistleblower Office
was still advising whistleblowers that the time to process claims could “take
five to seven years and longer.”210  In the intervening period, states reliant
206. Houghton et al., supra note 70, at 596.
207. In Illinois, a 2013 attempt to amend the state’s FCA by giving the attor-
ney general sole authority to prosecute false claims involving taxation (which
would have had the effect of prohibiting qui tam plaintiffs from prosecuting tax
claims) adopted a slightly different tact.  Upon the submission of a whistleblower
complaint, the state’s tax department would have the authority to process the alle-
gations through its usual administrative channels.  However, if the attorney general
decided to turn what would otherwise be an administrative proceeding into a civil
action by filing suit, the administrative processes—excepting a tax department au-
dit or investigation—would be stayed until resolution of the judicial action.  The
bill died in the General Assembly’s Rules Committee. See supra notes 42–47 and
accompanying text.
208. See Wetzler, supra note 174, at 167.
209. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., Ref No. 2006-30-092, THE
INFORMANTS’ REWARDS PROGRAM NEEDS MORE CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OVER-
SIGHT 8 (2006) [hereinafter TIGTA REPORT], available at http://www.treasury.gov/
tigta/audit/2006reports/200630092fr.pdf.  A primary reason for the protracted
process is that the IRS cannot make award determinations to whistleblowers until
after the taxpayer-defendant exhausts all administrative and judicial appeals.
210. IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2012 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
ON THE USE OF SECTION 7623 16 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
whistlebl/2012%20IRS%20Annual%20Whistleblower%20Report%20to%20Con-
gress_mvw.pdf.  To underscore the lengthy period between submission of a claim
and payment of an award, consider that in 2011, the IRS issued the first award
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on the federal program would continue to leak revenue due to noncom-
pliance that state-level FCAs or standalone whistleblower statutes could
have long since identified and prosecuted.
Part of the argument that tax experts will be cut out of the process for
deciding which tax claims to prosecute under FCAs involves concerns over
frivolous or harassing lawsuits.  As discussed above, however, false claims
statutes contain numerous procedural mechanisms that act to filter out
such claims:211 filing complaints in camera and under seal; keeping com-
plaints in camera and under seal while the government investigates the
underlying claims; and allowing courts to fashion additional remedies to
prevent harassment, undue burden, or unnecessary expense of defend-
ants.  Add to that list the fact that the burden of proof in false claims
actions, unlike in administrative tax actions, is on the person or the state
agency prosecuting the suit.212  Furthermore, FCAs can (and do) include
threshold levels on (i) the income or sales of the taxpayer against whom
the action is brought and (ii) on damages pled, both of which, when com-
bined, mitigate small-dollar claims involving small-time taxpayers;213 FCAs
can (and do) provide that courts may award costs to defendants (in the
event they prevail in the action) if a court finds that “the claim of the
person bringing the action was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or
brought primarily for purposes of harassment”;214 states could enact addi-
tional and more onerous penalties on frivolous and harassing claims;215
and, finally, experience indicates that “a decision by the government not
to intervene [in a whistleblower complaint] is a signal to plaintiffs’ lawyers
that their claim has little merit.”216
under section 7623(b), which Congress enacted in 2006. Id. at 1.  Further con-
sider that the majority of awards paid during fiscal year 2012 involved claims filed
under pre-2006 law. Id. at 16.
211. See supra notes 179–88 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 178.
213. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(4)(a)(i)–(ii) (McKinney 2013) (limit-
ing claims to taxpayers with net income or sales over $1 million and damages
pleaded over $350,000).  The federal tax whistleblower statute also includes mone-
tary thresholds to concentrate claims on high-income taxpayers and businesses. See
I.R.C. § 7623(b)(5)(A)–(B) (2012) (limiting claims to taxpayers with gross income
over $200,000 and the sum of tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and addi-
tional amounts in dispute over $2,000,000).
214. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(6)(d) (applying only to qui tam plaintiff); see
also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12652(g)(9)(A)–(B)(West 2014);
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/4(d)(4) (2012).
215. Such a strategy would be particularly appropriate in jurisdictions such as
Illinois, where some law firms are improperly submitting nuisance claims under
the state’s FCA. See supra notes 40–47 and accompanying text.
216. Trachtenberg et al., supra note 29, at 375.  Data from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice’s fraud statistics reflect the stunningly low rate of return for
whistleblowers on claims where the government declines to proceed, the actions
are not dismissed for good cause, and qui tam plaintiffs take over prosecutorial
responsibilities.  In 2013, in qui tam actions where the government declined to
proceed, whistleblowers received a meager 0.5% of total qui tam collections (and
an equally paltry 3.5% of total qui tam awards), compared to 12.6% of collections
38
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Notwithstanding these protections, members of the defense bar con-
tinue to beat the drum of whistleblower abuse.  In fairness, the zealous
defense lawyer construes any lawsuit, meritorious or otherwise, as frivolous
and harassing.  But based on the persistent, outsized fear over whistleblow-
ing run amok, the unavoidable conclusion is that some members of the
defense bar are either engaging in purposefully inflammatory resistance to
whistleblower laws or they are inappropriately (and to their clients’ dis-
tinct detriment) stereotyping who blows the whistle and why.  The dis-
torted, broad-brush view of whistleblowers states that they are merely
puppets deployed by puppeteering, avaricious trial lawyers;217 that they
are motivated only by the lure of financial gain rather than exposing
fraudulent behavior;218 that they possess a rolodex of invalid claims, and
will move on to the next innocent victim if met with sufficient resis-
tance;219 that they are primarily disgruntled employees or former employ-
ees;220 and that unlike the virtuous defenders of frivolous and harassing
claims, whistleblowers enjoy too many protections under the law (particu-
when the government intervened or prosecuted the action itself. See CIVIL DIV.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS—OVERVIEW (2013), available at http://
www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf.  Over a longer
time horizon, the discrepancy persists: between 2009 and 2013, in actions where
the government declined to proceed, whistleblowers received 1% of qui tam col-
lections (and 6.4% of total awards), compared to 14.1% of collections when the
government intervened or prosecuted the action itself. See id. (providing fraud
statistics from October 1, 1987 through September 30, 2013).
217. See Hamilton, supra note 25, at 109 (quoting Jim Wetzler as saying that
ability to bring tax claims under NY’s FCA would “open[ ] up the prospect of qui
tam lawsuits against large taxpayers who a trial lawyer thinks might have underpaid
state tax”).
218. See Carr, supra note 45, at 39 (“[A]llowing tax prosecution under the
state’s FCA gives some individuals a considerable financial interest in bringing in
as much revenue for the state as possible. . . .  There is always a significant potential
for abuse when enforcers of the law are given a personal financial incentive.”);
Hamilton, supra note 25, at 113 (writing that while “we’ve always admired the peo-
ple who step bravely forward to expose wrongdoing by the powerful. . . .  [I]t seems
to me that the issue becomes far more ambiguous when the whistleblowing turns
on the prospect of outsized financial reward”); Martire & Ferrante, supra note 70,
at 130 (“Many whistleblowers file these suits hoping for a quick settlement.”); Noo-
nan & Comiskey, supra note 73, at 353 (“[A]lmost anyone may become a
whistleblower with a financial incentive to report questionable transactions . . . .”);
Neil Weinberg, The Dark Side of Whistleblowing, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2005, 12:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/0314/090.html (writing, with respect to
whistleblower laws generally, “[i]n this hell-bent pursuit of jackpot justice, the
prospect of a big payoff draws would-be whistleblowers ‘like moths to the flame’”).
219. See, e.g., Martire & Ferrante, supra note 70, at 130 (counseling would-be
defendants of whistleblower or qui tam complaints, “[i]f you make it apparent that
you intend to aggressively defend your litigation, the whistleblower may back away,
focusing instead on less bothersome opponents”).
220. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 25, at 113 (relaying his experience with
Texas’ tax bounty statute as former deputy comptroller for Texas Office of the
Comptroller of Public Accounts: “Informants often turned out to have a grudge to
settle or simply wanted to use the information they had to reap a payday at a for-
mer employer’s expense”).
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larly in the form of anti-retaliation statutes) and thus should be forced to
exhaust all internal remedies with employers before blowing the
whistle.221
There is some truth to these perspectives.  To be sure, a limited num-
ber of attorneys have abused qui tam and whistleblower statutes.222  More-
over, financial awards surely motivate some whistleblowers to report
alleged misconduct, while other whistleblowers would qualify as disgrun-
tled employees or persons who see fraudulent behavior where none exists.
Upon close inspection, however, the reality looks considerably differ-
ent than the portrait of whistleblowers painted by elements of the defense
bar.  A 2012 report published by the Ethics Resource Center, a non-profit
that has compiled and analyzed organizational ethics and compliance data
since 1922, investigated whether potential financial bounties encouraged
employees to go outside their company to report misconduct directly to
law enforcement agencies.223  The results were eye-opening.  Respondents
reported being considerably more motivated by the nature of the miscon-
duct (82% would report if the crime were “big enough”) as well as its
potential harm to others (76% would report if failing to do so might harm
people), compared to any financial reward (only 43% would report for the
“potential to receive a substantial monetary reward”).224  Nor are
whistleblowers necessarily low-level employees looking for a big payday:
the likelihood of reporting to the government increases with seniority
(56% of top-management say they would go to the government, compared
to 41% of non-management employees)225 and among employees who
consider themselves influential within the company (76% compared to
52% of those who feel unlikely to be heard).226  Even more surprising,
particularly in light of the misimpressions of whistleblowers, only 18% of
221. See Houghton et al., supra note 72, at 457 (arguing that whistleblowers
“should be required to affirmatively notify the potential defendant of the relator’s
belief in writing and provide the potential defendant a three-month window to
remedy the issue”); Noonan & Comiskey, supra note 73, at 353 (stating, while criti-
cizing whistleblower protections under New York’s false claims statute, that “an
employee who pilfers documents from his employer to establish a false claim is
protected from retaliation even if the employee violated a rule, contract, or duty
owed to his employer when he took the documents”).
222. See, e.g., supra notes 40–51 and accompanying text (describing improper
nuisance suits in Illinois).
223. See ETHICS RES. CTR., 2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: WORK-
PLACE ETHICS IN TRANSITION (2012) [hereinafter ERC 2011], available at http://
www.ethics.org/files/u5/FinalNBES-web.pdf; ETHICS RES. CTR., INSIDE THE MIND
OF A WHISTLEBLOWER: A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE 2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS
ETHICS SURVEY (2012) [hereinafter ERC 2012], available at http://www.ethics.org/
files/u5/reportingFinal.pdf.  For another rigorous, though non-survey based anal-
ysis of the costs and benefits of blowing the whistle, see Sachin S. Pandya, Tax
Liability for Wage Theft, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 113, 132–40, 143 (2012) (examining
whistleblowing in context of illegal wage underpayment by employer).
224. ERC 2011, supra note 223, at 44; ERC 2012, supra note 223, at 14.
225. ERC 2012, supra note 223, at 16.
226. Id. at 5.
40
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respondents reported the observed misconduct outside their company,227
while 92% of those did so only after first attempting to report inter-
nally.228  A mere 3% of all whistleblowers went outside their company as a
first resort.229  Finally the report found that victims of retaliation are far
more likely to report misconduct outside the company,230 a cautionary
finding for those offering less than enthusiastic support to anti-retaliation
measures.231
The takeaway is clear and summarized thoughtfully by two practition-
ers advising corporate compliance officers and tax executives on how to
create a culture conducive to uncovering internal fraud while also mitigat-
ing whistleblower risk.  “Providing employees with the means of raising
concerns remains a best practice even when a company is not legally re-
quired to [do so] because whistleblowers are often motivated more by
principle—that is to say, wanting to do the right thing—than by
money.”232  The same source reminds us that whistleblower Bradley
Birkenfeld233 reported UBS’s misconduct to the federal government only
after the company’s compliance office repeatedly ignored his internal
complaints.234  Organizations should embrace whistleblowers, studies em-
227. Id. at 2; see also ETHICS RES. CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY OF
THE U.S. WORKFORCE 29–30 (2013) [hereinafter ERC 2013], available at http://
www.ethics.org/downloads/2013NBESFinalWeb.pdf (finding that only 20% of
whistleblowers ever reported outside company).
228. ERC 2013, supra note 227, at 29; see also ERC 2012, supra note 223, at 2
(noting that 84% first reported internally); NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., IMPACT
OF QUI TAM LAWS ON INTERNAL COMPLIANCE: A REPORT TO THE SECURITIES EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION 4 (2010) [hereinafter NWC], available at http://www.
whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowers/documents/DoddFrank/nwcreport-
tosecfinal.pdf (finding that 89.7% first reported internally).
229. ERC 2011, supra note 223, at 43.  Just 2% of whistleblowers went outside
the company without ever reporting the misconduct to their employers. ERC
2012, supra note 223, at 2.
230. See ERC 2011, supra note 223, at 37 (reporting that 90% of employees
considered reporting outside company after experiencing retaliation for reporting
misconduct, compared to 69% who did not experience retaliation).
231. The anti-retaliation statute contained in New York’s FCA has received
particular attention of late.  Section 191 protects whistleblowers from retaliation
(and provides corresponding relief) due to “lawful acts . . . in furtherance of an
action brought under this article or other efforts to stop one or more violations of
this article . . . .” N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 191(1) (McKinney 2013).  The definition
of “lawful act,” moreover, permits whistleblowers to “violate a contract, employ-
ment term, or duty owed to the employer or contractor, so long as the possession
and transmission of such documents are for the sole purpose of furthering efforts
to stop one or more violations” of the FCA. Id. § 191(2).
232. Dolan & McCormally, supra note 70, at 1542.
233. See supra notes 1–17 and accompanying text.
234. Dolan & McCormally, supra note 70, at 1542; see also KPMG AUDIT COMM.
INST., IS GOVERNANCE KEEPING PACE?  CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES SHAPING THE AU-
DIT COMMITTEE AGENDA 1 (2012), available at http://www.kpmg.com/BM/en/Is-
suesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Advisory/
IsGovernancekeepingpace.pdf (“Escalation of complaints outside of the company
happens when employees feel like they’re being ignored . . . .”); Alex MacLachlan,
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phasize, as they represent a uniquely potent tool to combat fraud and eco-
nomic crime,235 both of which erode employee integrity, business
reputation, and the bottom line.236
Additional obstacles discourage whistleblowers from doing the right
thing, including high emotional and economic costs.  Universally,
whistleblowers face tremendous risks.  “There is a 100 percent chance that
you will be unemployed,” says Patrick Burns of Taxpayers Against Fraud,
“the question is, [w]ill you be forever unemployable?”237  Whistleblowers
experience “fear of bodily harm, loss of professional license, loss of em-
ployment, loss of career, loss of family”238 in addition to “bankruptcies. . . .
[h]ome foreclosures, divorce, suicide and depression,”239 any of which
might reasonably muzzle a would-be whistleblower.
Some members of the defense bar express as much concern that the
government will initiate and prosecute frivolous suits as disgruntled em-
ployees.  These practitioners worry that under state-level FCAs, “the attor-
ney general will issue press releases accusing the taxpayer of fraud (even
though fraud does not have to be shown),” thereby imposing undue harm
on taxpayer-defendants, including “significant reputational risks.”240
Others acknowledge that provisions like the one contained in New York’s
FCA requiring the attorney general to consult with state tax authorities on
whistleblower complaints “ostensibly gives the commissioner—the custo-
dian of most tax records—some authority as a gatekeeper to influence the
attorney general in deciding whether to proceed with a case.”241  These
same voices express concern, however, that the attorney general, “who is
Ignoring Whistleblower Hotline Costs UBS $780M, WHISTLEBLOWER SECURITY NEWS
(Sept. 13, 2012, 1:34 PM), available at http://info.whistleblowersecurity.com/
blog/bid/221094/Ignoring-Whistleblower-Hotline-Costs-UBS-780M; supra note
228 and accompanying text.
235. See ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, 2008 REPORT TO THE NATION ON
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD & ABUSE 18, 23 (2008), available at http://www.acfe.com/
uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/documents/2008-rttn.pdf (finding that
46% of all frauds perpetrated against U.S. corporations were detected by tip or
employee complaint and that 57% of all tips came from whistleblowers); PRICE-
WATERHOUSECOOPERS, ECONOMIC CRIME: PEOPLE, CULTURE AND CONTROLS 12, 23
(2007) [hereinafter PWC REPORT], available at https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/eco-
nomic-crime-survey/pdf/pwc_2007gecs.pdf (reporting from global survey of 5,400
firms that 43% of corporate fraud was uncovered by whistleblowers and tips, and
that “whistle-blowing systems that are both well designed and properly imple-
mented can play a decisive role in uncovering criminal activity”).
236. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, Global Economic Crime Survey 2014 (2014),
http://www.pwc.com/CRIMESURVEY.
237. Paul Sullivan, The Price Whistle-Blowers Pay for Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/your-money/for-whistle-blowers-
consider-the-risks-wealth-matters.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
238. Thomas C. Pliske, Is the Tax Whistleblower’s Identity Protected Under the IRS
Tax Whistleblower Program?, TAX WHISTLEBLOWER BLOGS (May 2, 2011), http://
taxwhistleblowerblogs.com/?p=267.
239. Sullivan, supra note 237 (quoting John R. Phillips of Phillips & Cohen).
240. Gustafson et al., supra note 70, at 54.
241. Trachtenberg et al., supra note 29, at 375.
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an independently elected official in New York,” may nevertheless “advance
a case over the objection of the Department of Taxation and Finance.”242
These concerns are unpersuasive.  It is certainly possible that an attor-
ney general’s office could interpret a tax statute differently than a state tax
agency and choose to proceed with a whistleblower claim where the tax
agency would have declined to prosecute.  But that possibility seems re-
mote.  Prosecutors do not like losing cases of any kind (tax or otherwise),
and if a state’s tax experts believe that the chances of successfully challeng-
ing a tax position or transaction are slim, there is very little to gain and
much to lose by proceeding headlong toward likely defeat.  As one practi-
tioner put it, “[i]t would be very irresponsible to use [prosecutorial au-
thority under a false claims statute] as a tool for political gain, other than
to do a good job and get headlines for that reason. . . .  You’re not going
to risk a case and embarrass yourself for personal political purposes.”243
Indeed, there is a difference between diligently enforcing the law and
abusing one’s power, just as there is a difference between advocating fair
and effective law enforcement and slipping into conspiracy theories about
prosecutorial abuses.
C. The Positive Case: Whistleblowers Can Bridge the Information Gap and
Shrink the Tax Gap
Part of the claim that tax noncompliance is an inappropriate subject
of whistleblower actions (especially actions initiated under FCAs) involves
the attempt to control the flow of information from taxpayer to tax
agency.  Currently, taxpayers and their advisors dictate the sharing of in-
formation, a reality that puts tax agencies at a significant disadvantage in
enforcing the tax laws.  In fact, as I have written elsewhere, tax enforce-
ment “is so severely handicapped by informational asymmetries that tax-
payers can engage in abusive tax planning, accurately report transactions
associated with that planning, yet still provide [ ] no indication of abusive
activity.”244  Private enforcement of the law—through private attorney
general statutes, whistleblower laws, and qui tam statutes—can shrink sig-
nificantly the information deficits faced by tax officials at all levels of gov-
ernment.245  Such forms of enforcement can rebalance the flow of
242. Id.
243. Hamilton, supra note 33, at 156 (quoting David Koenigsberg of Menz
Bonner Komar & Koenigsberg LLP).
244. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 458
(2008).
245. See id. at 453–62 (examining resource and information deficits faced by
tax officials and discussing private enforcement of law as partial solution); Dennis
J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 376–82 (2008)
(same, with particular reference to qui tam actions for tax noncompliance); see also
William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement: Paying Informants to
Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 766, 767, 774 (2001) (writing, in context of
private enforcement of cartels, “[o]ne way to counter greater efforts at conceal-
ment is to establish mechanisms for inducing [ ] insiders to disclose their miscon-
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information, recalibrate the compliance playing field between taxpayers
and their advisors versus tax officials, shift the cost of compliance to the
party or parties with the lower cost of monitoring,246 and clarify (rather
than exploit) “unsettled” or “uncertain” areas of the law by shining a light
on practices that would otherwise remain in the shadows.
For precisely these reasons—transparency, lifting the veil of secrecy,
and settling “unsettled” areas of the law—members of the defense bar op-
pose tax administration regimes that include private enforcement.  “Cor-
porate interests favor a process that allows them to raise tax questions for
resolution,” writes Dan Bucks, longtime head of the Multistate Tax Com-
mission, “but they do not want citizens to raise questions. . . .  In the end,
the issues about citizen participation in compliance actions are simply
about power and control of the tax agenda.  Corporations have that power
now, and they prefer not to share it with citizens.”247  Yet there is “no
question” that allowing “citizens an incentive to report tax fraud will likely
lead to more revenue collection and less undetected fraud,” tax journalist
Jennifer Carr has said.248  “Increasing the ability of the state to detect and
duct” such that “private monitoring” becomes “an antidote to concealment”);
Joshua D. Rosenberg, Narrowing the Tax Gap: Behavioral Options, 117 TAX NOTES
517, 525–31 (2007) (arguing for tax whistleblower laws and qui tam provisions to
address shortcomings in traditional tax enforcement regimes); Joshua D. Rosen-
berg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We Can Make Them
Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 205–219 (1996) (stating, while arguing for private en-
forcement of tax laws through qui tam actions, “[u]nfortunately, the Service is
likely to detect noncompliance only when it has access to tax-relevant information.
Given the taxpayer’s strong financial incentive to avoid taxes, reliance on the tax-
payer to provide self-incriminating information would be, and has been, seriously
misplaced.”).
246. Scholars have shown that private enforcement of the law can provide a
particularly efficient form of regulation.  Modern economic theory, in particular,
holds that the optimal solution to allocating compliance burdens often involves
shifting the cost of compliance to those with lower monitoring costs, such as to
insiders or knowledgeable outsiders with intimate knowledge of potentially
noncompliant behavior.  As former FTC Commissioner William Kovacic stated the
proposition: “The chief virtue of private monitoring is that it gives monitoring
tasks to individuals closest to the relevant information.”  Kovacic, supra note 245, at
774; see also Jonathan B. Baker, Antitrust in the 1990s, FTC HISTORY: BUREAU OF
ECONOMICS CONTRIBUTIONS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT, RESEARCH, AND ECONOMIC
KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY 103–12 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/public_events/roundtable-former-directors-bureau-eco-
nomics/directorstablegood.pdf. See generally Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler,
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–15
(1974) (concluding that private enforcement of public laws can be more efficient
than public enforcement).
247. Bucks, supra note 198, at 287.  Bucks served for nearly twenty years as the
Executive Director of the Multistate Tax Commission and subsequently as the
longest serving Director of Revenue for the state of Montana.
248. Carr, supra note 45, at 39; see also Hamilton, supra note 25, at 112 (quot-
ing William Comiskey, former Deputy Commissioner of Office of Tax Enforce-
ment with New York Department of Taxation and Finance, in context of enhanced
New York FCA authorizing tax claims: “It’s a law that should be welcomed by hon-
est taxpayers and businesses”).
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eliminate tax fraud is a positive for law-abiding taxpayers whose tax bur-
dens are bigger because of scofflaws.”249  In addition to leading to “signifi-
cant recoveries,” expanding tax enforcement regimes to allow citizen
participation “will shine a light on major tax abuses that are unknown to
government, and it will change taxpayer behavior for the better.”250  In
fact, as former New York tax official William Comiskey has observed, pri-
vate tax enforcement amounts to “the most powerful tool that government
has for penetrating complex schemes to defraud the government.”251
Tax agencies are totally outgunned.  They “need all the help they can
get from the public” due to the severe resource and information deficien-
cies under which they operate.252  Without “access to all the reasonable
information they need,” tax agencies simply cannot collect all taxes
owed.253  Whistleblowers can close the information gap by bringing to
light complex and hidden interpretations of the law, turning them over to
tax officials for investigation, and allowing dispute resolution procedures
and the judicial process to “settle” unsettled areas of the law.
Meanwhile, elements of the defense bar argue that some areas of the
tax law are so cutting-edge that they should be allowed to develop before
being put under the microscope by either tax authorities or courts.254
But, in the words of Dan Bucks, that “is not a credible argument.”255  For
one thing, the more complex the law, “the more critical it is to have peo-
ple with inside knowledge explain what is going on to the taxing authori-
ties.”256  For another, enforcement regimes that get the hard cases in
front of tax officials and judges for scrutiny “will clarify the application of
the law in more cases, bringing greater certainty and transparency to the
entire tax system,” a result all interested parties—taxpayers, tax advisors,
tax officials, and regular citizens—should embrace.257  In the event the
hard cases involve sufficiently significant ambiguities in the law that mili-
tate against attaching liability to an alleged underpayment of tax, courts
should be trusted to filter out those situations and concentrate on the
249. Carr, supra note 45, at 39.
250. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 112 (quoting William Comiskey); see also
Carr, supra note 45, at 39 (noting, while endorsing public participation in tax en-
forcement, that “the state and its auditors can only do so much because of the
number of taxpayers and the complexity of potential tax evasion schemes”).
251. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 112 (quoting William Comiskey).
252. Bucks, supra note 198, at 287.
253. Id.
254. See id. (writing that these voices argue that “state tax matters are simply
too ambiguous to be reviewed by tax agencies and courts”).
255. Id.
256. Carroll, supra note 54, at 442 (summarizing comments of Peter Wilson
Chatfield of Phillips & Cohen LLP); see also id. (quoting Monica Navarro, professor
and whistleblower attorney, “[b]ecause the tax laws are complex, insiders are often
needed to expose those people who are ‘gaming the system’”).
257. Bucks, supra note 198, at 287.
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cases that reflect truly culpable behavior.258  If taxpayers and their advisors
genuinely believe in good faith that their “ambiguous” or “uncertain” tax
position is correct, they can afford themselves of the numerous proce-
dures for resolving the disagreement: seeking a private letter ruling or
some other formal or informal advanced guidance; challenging the
agency’s interpretation of the position (if the agency has one) by paying
the tax and suing for refund; or disclosing the position.
In any event, we should remain suspicious of voices that, on the one
hand, criticize ambiguities and uncertainties in the tax law and, on the
other hand, undermine efforts to clarify the law.  Or, as Dan Bucks has
observed, “[i]nterests that thrive on creating, amplifying, and preserving
ambiguities in the laws are not well positioned to use those same ambigui-
ties as an argument against allowing citizens to file cases to request and
require equitable tax compliance.”259  Over the years, practitioners have
exploited “ambiguous” and “uncertain” areas of the tax law to create and
endorse tax avoidance transactions for the benefit of taxpayer-clients and
for themselves.  Many of these transactions were fraudulent and invali-
dated by courts.
Consider the leveraged-lease and inflated-basis shelters of the late
1990s and early 2000s.  Prominent members of the tax bar argued that
excessively leveraged-lease transactions—including LILOs, SILOs, and
QTEs—were innocuous variants of leveraged-lease deals endorsed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States.260  The transactions
were blessed by “decades of settled law,” practitioners insisted, “including
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and Treasury regulations.”261  A
number of well-respected law firms vouched for the transactions’ legiti-
macy,262 rendering opinions that, when examined closely, flouted statu-
tory and regulatory rules, defied regulatory guidance;263 contrived to
258. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Beeler Schad & Diamond, P.C. v. Ritz Camera Ctrs.,
Inc., 878 N.E.2d 1152, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (ruling, in analyzing alleged false
claim under Illinois FCA, that liability cannot attach when it is premised on viola-
tion of unsettled area of law because taxpayer cannot be said to have made “know-
ingly” false claim).
259. Bucks, supra note 198, at 287–88.
260. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
261. Kenneth J. Kies, “Leave Us A Loan”: A Rebuttal to Claims that Defeasance
Invalidates Lease Transactions, 102 TAX NOTES 763, 765 (2004); see also Michael J.
Flemming, Equipment Leasing Association Unhappy with LILO Revenue Ruling, 83 TAX
NOTES 477, 477 (1999) (saying that challenges to LILOs were “inconsistent with
the fundamental tax principles that have governed similar issues in leasing transac-
tions for more than 30 years”); William A. Macan, IV, Good vs. Evil? Not this Time:
SILO’s Bad Rap, 103 TAX NOTES 241, 242 (2004) (“SILO transactions present no
issues on the transfer-of-control front that have not been a part of leasing from the
outset 40 years ago.”).
262. See Kies, supra note 261, at 771 (“At least 11 major law firms are under-
stood to have issued tax opinions regarding LILO transactions.”).
263. Despite an onslaught of IRS guidance attacking heavily leveraged-lease
deals, leasing shelter lawyers were undeterred and continued to plan, advise, and
consummate LILOs, SILOs, and QTEs.  The guidance that these shelter lawyers
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avoid legislative attempts to curb abusive leasing deals; and virtually ig-
nored longstanding anti-abuse doctrines created by the courts, particularly
the economic substance doctrine.264  These deals crumbled once under
the judicial microscope, but not before costing the U.S. Treasury billions
of dollars.  Courts eventually found that the transactions contained none
of the efficiencies present in traditional leveraged finance,265 and invali-
largely ignored included most prominently: Rev. Rul. 99-14, 1999-1 C.B. 835 (disal-
lowing tax benefits for interest and rent in connection with a LILO transaction
that failed to transfer the indices of ownership and that ultimately lacked eco-
nomic substance); I.R.S. Notice 2000-15, 2001-1 C.B. 826 (naming LILOs and
“[t]ransactions that are the same as or substantially similar” as “listed” tax avoid-
ance transactions); Rev. Proc. 2001-28, 2001-1 C.B. 1338 (modifying and supersed-
ing Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 367); Rev. Rul. 2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 760
(modifying Rev. Rul. 99-14 and adding future interest argument for invalidating
LILOs and substantially similar transactions); IRS, COORDINATED ISSUE PAPER—
LOSSES CLAIMED AND INCOME TO BE REPORTED FROM LEASE IN/LEASE OUT TRANSAC-
TIONS (2003); Memorandum from Deborah Butler, IRS Assistant Chief Counsel, to
Dist. Counsel, Ohio Dist. (June 30, 2000), available at F.S.A. 2000-45-002.
264. I describe these activities in a forthcoming article, entitled, A Tale of Two
Shelters: What Tax Advisors Knew or Should Have Known (examining behavior of tax
practitioners in two tax shelter case studies, one involving leveraged-lease transac-
tions and another involving inflated-basis transactions).
265. Commentators and observers had long recognized the sharp distinctions
between permissible and impermissible leveraged-lease transactions, even while
leasing practitioners blurred the line. See, e.g., Tax Shelters: Who’s Buying, Who’s Sell-
ing, and What’s the Government Doing About It?, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin.
108th Cong. 3–5 (2003), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/102103janettest.pdf (statement of “Mr. Janet,” witness pseudonym) (testifying
on LILO and SILO deals, and reporting “the leasing industry has not always been
this way, nor are all leasing companies involved in this scam. . . . It is mostly [mem-
bers of the Equipment Leasing Association] belonging to the ‘Big-Ticket Leasing
Group’ . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2005 REVENUE PROPOSALS 124 (2004), available at http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-
FY2005.pdf (concluding that SILOs “have no meaningful financial or economic
utility other than the transfer of tax benefits to a U.S. taxpayer (by means of a
purported ‘sale’ of property) in exchange for the payment of an accommodation
fee to the tax-indifferent party”); Letter from Edmund S. Cohen to Pamela Olson,
Assistant Treasury Sec’y for Tax Policy, Re: Tax-Exempt Leasing Budget Proposal
(Jan. 30, 2004), available at 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 29-25 (differentiating between
legitimate transactions meeting “‘true-lease’ requirements” and illegitimate
“‘defeased’ debt structures” such as “ ‘SILO’ or ‘LILO’ transactions”);  Letter from
Pamela F. Olson, Assistant Treasury Sec’y for Tax Policy, to Norman Y. Mineta,
Secretary, Dep’t of Transp. (Nov. 26, 2003), available at 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 40-
49 (noting that while sale-leasebacks were “a time-honored method of raising capi-
tal to finance or refinance acquisition or construction,” SILOs were “fundamen-
tally different”); Lee A. Sheppard, Lease In, Lease Out: Safe Harbor Leasing Revisited,
81 TAX NOTES 1167, 1167, 1170 (1998) (“[B]usiness and economics have been
stripped out [of LILOs and SILOs] so only the purchase of tax benefits re-
mains. . . . In contrast [to Frank Lyon deals], a LILO transaction has no business
reason to exist.  The real owner of a large and unwieldy asset may want to borrow
against it but, as a borrower, it would want the unfettered use of the borrowed
funds, which the European government clearly does not have in a LILO deal.”).
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dated them as prohibited transfers of tax benefits designed and propped
up by over-reaching practitioners.  But the damage was done.266
The story was much the same for inflated-basis shelters.  Planners and
promoters of these deals played even looser with the rules than the leasing
shelter lawyers, creating an assembly line of notoriously abusive tax avoid-
ance products including “BOSS” (bond and options sales strategy), which
the IRS considered the corporate precursor to its partnership progeny:
“Baby Boss”267 or “Son or Boss,” “OPS” (option partnership strategy),
“SOS” (short option strategy), and “MLD” (market-linked deposits).  As
with the leasing shelters, prominent law firms and accounting firms en-
dorsed the inflated-basis deals with legal opinions that circumscribed stat-
utory and regulatory rules, scorned regulatory guidance,268 disdained
legislative attempts to curb inflated-basis deals,269 placed undue and un-
reasonable reliance on a single, inapposite Tax Court case,270 and reck-
266. See, e.g., BB&T Corp. v. United States, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008); Altria
Grp., Inc. v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 658 F.3d 276
(2d Cir. 2011); Local 295/Local 851 IBT Emp’r Grp. Pension Trust & Welfare
Fund v. Fifth Third Bancorp., 731 F. Supp. 2d 689 (S.D. Ohio 2008); AWG Leasing
Trust v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Ohio 2008); Hoosier Energy
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins., Co., 588 F. Supp. 2d 919, 921,
928 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (calling aggressively leveraged lease deal at issue “blatantly
abusive tax shelter” and “rotten to the core”), aff’d, 582 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009);
Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 35, 38 (2010) (“Although well dis-
guised in a sea of paper and complexity, the SILO transactions essentially amount
to [ ] purchase of tax benefits for a fee from a tax-exempt entity that cannot use
the deductions.”).  The only case involving aggressive leveraged-lease deals in
which the taxpayer prevailed (and only temporarily) involved unique facts that the
court took pains to differentiate from other deals. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y.,
Inc. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228, 232 (2009) (emphasizing that “[t]he conclu-
sions of the court offered in this opinion are based on the specific and unique facts
which led to, and were part of, the [ ] [t]ransaction”), rev’d, 703 F.3d 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
267. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Shuts Down “Son
of Boss” Abusive Tax Shelter (Aug. 11, 2000) available at http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/ls831.aspx; Lee A. Sheppard, Treasury Shuts
Down Baby BOSS Deals, 88 TAX NOTES 850 (2000).
268. The guidance that these shelter lawyers brushed aside included most
prominently I.R.S. Notice 99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761 (warning practitioners and tax-
payers that losses generated by BOSS transactions lacked economic substance,
were subject to challenge under array of IRC sections, would be disallowed for
federal income tax purposes, and that persons who participated in or promoted
transactions would face significant penalties); see also I.R.S. Notice 2000-15, 2000-1
C.B. 826 (identifying BOSS deals as “listed” transactions); I.R.S. Notice 2000-44,
2000-2 C.B. 255 (disallowing inflated-basis, contingent liability transactions on stat-
utory, regulatory, and economic substance grounds); I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-1
C.B. 730 (identifying inflated-basis, contingent liability tax shelters as “listed”
transactions).
269. See, e.g., Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
554, 114 Stat. 2763.  For a discussion of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of
2000, see infra note 270.
270. The impertinent case was Helmer v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 727
(1975), which purportedly established the rule allowing the planners and promot-
ers of inflated-basis transactions to argue that a partner need not account for cer-
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lessly disregarded longstanding judicial doctrines, particularly the
economic substance doctrine.  Even more spectacularly than the leasing
shelters, these schemes collapsed when scrutinized by courts: to date, the
government has not lost a single case litigated to conclusion involving in-
flated-basis, contingent liability shelters.  Once more, however, the dam-
age had been done with the national exchequer losing tens of billions of
dollars.
tain contingent liabilities when determining outside basis.  As one practitioner
recently put it, the inflated-basis, contingent-liability shelter “was based on taxpay-
ers misapplying a government victory in a case that should not have been prece-
dential . . . .”  Andrew Velarde, Supreme Court Applies Valuation Misstatement Penalty
in Woods, 141 TAX NOTES 1014, 1016 (2013) (quoting Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., of
Alston & Bird LLP). Helmer should have been further irrelevant for shelter lawyers
authoring opinions propping up these deals due to proposed retroactive regula-
tions that were part of President Clinton’s fiscal year 2001 budget proposal pertain-
ing to the assumption of liabilities that sought to invalidate the basis arguments
allegedly blessed by Helmer. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVE-
NUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2001 BUDGET PROPOSAL
317–22 (2000), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=
startdown&id=1224. Helmer should have been still further inapposite as precedent
when Congress enacted the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act in December
2000, which fulfilled the long-running effort to prevent “duplication of loss
through assumption of liabilities giving rise to a deduction,” and also authorized
the Treasury Department to prescribe similar anti-abuse rules for partnerships and
S corporations with prospective changes made retroactive to October 18, 1999. See
Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 309, 114 Stat.
2763.  Together, the provisions “effectively ended the BOSS transactions.”
Clearmeadow Invs., LLC v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 509, 513 (2009).  And, ac-
cording to subsequent court decisions, they put an end to the Son of Boss deals as
well. See Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2008)
(concluding that retroactive section 752 regulations “applie[d] to this [Son of
Boss] deal and prevent[ed] Cemco’s investors from claiming a loss”); Maguire
Partners—Master Invs., LLC v. United States, No. CV 06-07371-JFW(RZx), 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8361, at *59–62 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) (agreeing with Cemco
court that section 752 regulations should be applied retroactively to contingent
partnership liabilities). But see Murfam Farms, LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl.
516 (2009) (refusing to apply section 752 regulations retroactively).  Finally, Helmer
transactions were already vulnerable to attack under the partnership anti-abuse
rules and the economic substance doctrine, even before Congress authorized the
Treasury Department to promulgate retroactive regulations.  According to two le-
gal scholars:
The controversy over the Helmer rule amounted to little more than a dis-
traction because the Helmer-based technical arguments advanced by shel-
ter counsel could not survive scrutiny under the economic substance
doctrine.  Stated differently, shelter counsel invoked the Helmer rule to
justify rendering penalty-shield opinions while discounting the contrary
position of revenue rulings and Notice 2000-44 as well as the lack of eco-
nomic substance in the contingent-liability shelters.
Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, COBRA Strikes Back: Anatomy of a Tax
Shelter, 62 TAX LAW. 59, 79 (2008); see also Karen C. Burke, Tax Avoidance As a
Legitimate Business Purpose, 118 TAX NOTES 1393, 1398 (2008) (stating that inflated-
basis transactions were subject to challenge under section 701 partnership anti-
abuse rule, which “explicitly requires a weighing of business purpose against the
purported tax benefits”).
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These schemes “worked” so long as they were in the shadows.  Pro-
moters pitched the “cutting edge” deals individually to potential clients
but prohibited anyone from leaving the secretive marketing presentations
with even a shred of paper describing the schemes.  Taxpayer-clients
signed confidentiality agreements that prevented them from discussing
the deals with personal lawyers and accountants.  Banks colluded with pro-
moters to set up defeasance arrangements and circular cash flows (for the
leveraged-lease deals) and offsetting options trades (for the inflated-basis
deals) that generated the phony tax benefits.  And lawyers and account-
ants devised ways to hide the schemes on their clients’ tax returns.
It was precisely the environment where the government needed the
help of an insider to have any idea what was happening.  A lawyer or ac-
countant in one of the firms, a bank official, a member of the promoter’s
covert syndicate of tax shelter participants, anyone could have provided in-
formation to end the deception and enormous revenue loss.  And while a
sufficient number of anonymous packages made their way to government
officials and members of the press containing confidential transaction
documents that described some of these deals,271 the officials were slow to
respond, the deals were opaque, and the IRS whistleblower law at the time
was ineffective and virtually invisible to the public, several years away from
the 2006 amendments that would invigorate the statute.272  A viable
whistleblower regime that afforded knowledgeable insiders a process to
turn over information to the government and its army of tax experts could
have blown the lid off the shelter shenanigans.  In the process, such a
program could have saved untold billions of dollars in lost revenue,
slashed the number of shelter cases on overloaded court dockets, and al-
lowed officials to allocate resources to core tax administration.
Whistleblowers can do more than just uncover and report knowing
violations of the law.  They can also prevent noncompliance from happen-
ing in the first place.  An effective whistleblower program (run either
271. See Lee A. Sheppard, Captain Sandy’s Tax Shelter, 89 TAX NOTES 1208,
1209 (2000) (describing “package” sent to author “with the identity of the recipi-
ent removed and an anonymous handwritten note asking ‘Why is a VP Tax of a
major company peddling this crap?’”); Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Tax Shelters:
More Plain Brown Wrappers, 87 TAX NOTES 321, 322 (2000) (discussing “unmarked
envelopes [and their contents] that contain tax shelter materials sent anonymously
to journalists and government officials”); Lee A. Sheppard, Shelter Opinions: What
They Won’t Do for Money, 87 TAX NOTES 17, 17 (2000) (discussing contents of “plain
brown envelope” that author received, “the tax equivalent of porno—one of the
legal opinions used by the investment banker in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner”);
Janet Novack & Laura Saunders, The Hustling of X-Rated Shelters, FORBES (Dec. 14,
1998, 12:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1998/1214/6213198a.html (re-
porting on “two different letters” authored by tax professionals at accounting firm
Deloitte & Touche peddling marketed shelter to non-audit clients, and, further,
discussing an anonymous letter received by the IRS “blowing the lid off a particu-
larly smelly scheme . . . signed simply ‘A Pressured Practitioner’”).
272. See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406,
120 Stat. 2922, 2958–60; see also infra notes 354–58 and accompanying text.
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through a state’s FCA or as a standalone statue) would add significant risk
to noncompliance by increasing the probability of detection and the likeli-
hood of potential penalties, the two most important variables in tradi-
tional tax deterrence models.273  In turn, increased aversion to
noncompliance—due to increased fear of detection and palpable penal-
ties274 as well as additional variables such as moral, ethical, and reputa-
tional inputs275—would result in increased revenue collection and, by
273. For traditional economic deterrence models see Michael G. Allingham &
Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 324
(1972) (extending classic work of Gary Becker’s general theory of criminal deter-
rence to tax compliance, and arguing that degree of deterrence, calculated as
product of probability of detection and size of penalty, determines the amount of
income evaded for any particular taxpayer).  For studies indicating the importance
of detection on tax compliance, see Kurt J. Beron, Helen V. Tauchen & Anne
Dryden Witte, The Effect of Audits and Socioeconomic Variables on Compliance, in WHY
PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 67 (Joel Slemrod ed.,
1992); A. Mitchel Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998); Joel Slemrod, Marsha Blumenthal & Charles W.
Christian, Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Con-
trolled Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 455 (2001).  For studies indicating
the importance of penalties on compliance, see James Alm, Isabel Sanchez & Ana
de Juan, Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance, 48 KYKLOS 3 (1995);
Ana de Juan, Miguel A. Lasheras & Rafaela Mayo, Voluntary Tax Compliant Behavior
of Spanish Income Tax Payers, 49 PUB. FIN. 90 (Supp. 1994); Steven Klepper & Daniel
Nagin, Tax Compliance and Perceptions of the Risks of Detection and Criminal Prosecution,
23 L. & SOC’Y REV. 209 (1989).
274. Recent scholarship on tax compliance provides additionally sophisti-
cated analyses of taxpayer behavior and optimal tax enforcement models by exam-
ining, among other factors, the role of uncertainty, the use of fault-based penalties
and random audits, and the potential for “cooperative” or “responsive” tax admin-
istration. See, e.g., Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 111 (2009); Mark P. Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Mod-
est Fault-Based Penalties, 64 TAX L. REV. 453 (2011); Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random:
On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L. REV. 161 (2008); Sarah B. Lawsky,
Modeling Uncertainty in Tax Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 241 (2013); Sarah B. Lawsky,
Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1021 (2009);
Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain, 27
VA. TAX REV. 241 (2007); Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncer-
tainty, 64 TAX L. REV. 489 (2011); Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxa-
tion: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 599–605
(2006); Ventry, supra note 244.
275. See James Alm & Chandler McClellan, Tax Morale and Tax Compliance from
the Firm’s Perspective, 65 KYKLOS 1 (2012); Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian,
Joel Slemrod & Matthew G. Smith, Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evi-
dence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 125 (2001); Dan M.
Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333 (2001); Michael S.
Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols, Shaming, and Social
Norm Management As a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 863 (2004);
Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003); Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation
Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REV. 675 (2012); Eric A. Posner, Law and
Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781 (2000); Bruno S. Frey
& Lars P. Feld, Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis (CESifo
Working Paper No. 760) (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=341380.
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extension, reductions in the tax gap at both the federal and state levels.  At
the federal level in 2006 (the year for which we have the most recent
data), the gap between what taxpayers owe and what they pay on time
exceeded $450 billion,276 which, adjusted for inflation, amounts to more
than half a trillion dollars in 2014.277  States, too, are leaving money on
the table.  In California, the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) reports that the
state’s tax gap surpasses $10 billion annually,278 a figure that the FTB
hopes to shrink through, among other measures, information provided by
whistleblowers.279
It cannot be said enough: “[T]ax agencies need all the help they can
get from the public.”280  Whether a revenue agent or a whistleblower iden-
tifies tax noncompliance should be irrelevant.  The point is to stop cheat-
ing, in both “settled” and “unsettled” areas of the law.281
IV. EASY ANSWERS TO INFLATED CONCERNS OVER TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS
This final Part embraces current tax whistleblowing regimes, while at
the same time acknowledging their shortcomings.  It offers recommenda-
tions for improving whistleblower statutes at both the state and federal
level.  Moreover, it highlights thoughtful contributions from members of
the defense bar suggesting compliance and cultural changes within busi-
ness organizations designed not only to reduce risks associated with tax
whistleblower laws but also to help whistleblower programs succeed in
rooting out misconduct.  Finally, it offers tax whistleblower alternatives for
276. IRS, TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006: OVERVIEW 1 (2012), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf.
277. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI Inflation Calculator, http://www.bls.
gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2014).
278. See CAL. STATE FRANCHISE TAX BD., Tax Gap, https://www.ftb.ca.gov/
Tax_Gap/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 30, 2014).
279. Id.  The “Tax Gap” website includes a link to the state’s web-based
whistleblower hotline. See CAL. STATE FRANCHISE TAX BD., Reporting Income Tax
Fraud, https://www.ftb.ca.gov/online/Fraud_Referral/index.shtml (last visited
Apr. 30, 2014).
280. Bucks, supra note 198, at 287.
281. Some members of the defense bar appear reluctant to embrace tax
claims under FCAs, even for settled areas of the law.  In a 2011 State Tax Notes
article expressing a dubious opinion of the New York false claims statute, Timothy
Noonan and William Comiskey provide six hypothetical scenarios under which
“whistleblowers might find fertile ground.”  Noonan & Comiskey, supra note 73, at
350.  With one possible exception, all of the authors’ hypotheticals reflect in-
stances where the taxpayer knowing or knowingly (as defined under false claims
statutes, the Internal Revenue Code, and its underlying regulations) submitted
false or fraudulent information to the tax agencies, exactly the situations where
traditional tax administration desperately needs help from insiders to uncover and
prosecute noncompliance.  The one hypo that presented a moderately murkier
situation involved an aggressive interpretation of a purported “unclear and ambig-
uous” state sales tax issue; even here, as Part III.C described, exposing the aggres-
sive interpretation to the light of day would clarify rather than exploit any
ambiguities.
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states to consider beyond permitting tax claims under their FCAs, espe-
cially standalone whistleblower statutes based on section 7623 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.
As others have observed, “[t]he developments in false claims laws
[and, I would add, in section 7623] provide an opportunity for designing a
broader set of reasonable policies for citizen complaints and actions re-
garding tax noncompliance.”282  Rather than simply rejecting these poli-
cies or attempting to beat them back, the time is ripe to “work out the
details of how citizen actions can become a regular part of the compliance
process,” to engage in a constructive debate on tax whistleblowing, and “to
choose to be on the right side of history.”283
282. Bucks, supra note 198, at 288.
283. Id.  Some commentators remain on the wrong side of history. See, e.g.,
Martire & Ferrante, supra note 70, at 128 (“Be a strong voice against the enactment
of FCA litigation in the tax arena.  Emphasize the powerful enforcement mecha-
nisms that already are present and available for use by state tax departments
against tax cheats.  Explain the risks created when private citizens, with no tax
experience, are armed with legislation that gives them the power to drive tax policy
by filing whistleblower claims.”); id. at 129 (“Speak up in favor of the amendment
of existing state FCAs to exclude tax claims, or other modifications designed to
limit a whistleblower’s right to file tax-related claims.”); id. (“In all likelihood, the
state did not initiate the FCA litigation.  The state’s attorneys may even agree with
you, at least privately, that the whistleblower’s claim lacks merit.  Despite this fact,
the state may not have the resources to take an active role in the matter.  It may
simply decline to intervene, which frees the whistleblower to proceed with the liti-
gation on its own.  This is cheaper for the state, but it does not relieve the litigation
expense for the taxpayer defendant.”).  The authors make these observations with-
out any substantive analysis or evidence to support their claims.  Moreover, and
with respect to the authors’ last assertion, data from the federal False Claims Act
(reliable state-level data is not available) clearly indicates that when the govern-
ment declines to intervene in a whistleblower action, its decision is reinforced by
the phenomenally high probability that its enforcement dollars are better spent
elsewhere.  Indeed, between 1988 and 2013, in instances where the government
declined to intervene in a qui tam action, whistleblowers generated just 0.8% of
total qui tam collections (and only 4.8% of total qui tam awards). See CIVIL DIV.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 216.  There is also substantial evidence that state
governments routinely seek dismissal of whistleblower complaints that lack merit
or that, in the eyes of the state, should be handled administratively by the tax
department. See, e.g., State ex rel. Beeler, Schad & Diamond, P.C. v. Burlington
Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 860 N.E.2d 423 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (affirming dis-
missal of action on motion brought by state attorney general over whistleblower’s
objections); Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 127 P.3d 1088,
1105 (Nev. 2006) (granting state’s motion to dismiss for good cause, including
“consistent interpretation and application of the tax statutes”); see also Carroll,
supra note 174, at 623 (quoting Lynn Gandhi of Honigman on New York’s FCA, “I
don’t know why we need this”); Houghton et al., supra note 70, at 595 (stating that
FCA claims “waste[ ] valuable resources of the states, the courts, and the defend-
ants forced to defend themselves against overreaching”); Noonan & Comiskey,
supra note 73, at 350, 353 (exclaiming “Holy smokes!” at three different points in
article while purporting to rigorously analyze New York’s FCA).
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A. Constructing a Model False Claims Act Permitting Tax
Whistleblower Claims
The following recommendations do not constitute a “model” false
claims statute authorizing tax whistleblower claims, at least not in the
traditional sense of the word.  Instead, they outline essential threshold
components of a model statute.  The distinction is important.  Jurisdic-
tions need comprehensive baseline provisions to reflect the lessons of past
experience, but they also need flexibility to craft a tax whistleblower stat-
ute that reinforces their own priorities.  Part IV.C, on the other hand, ex-
amines how a “model” standalone tax whistleblower statute might look.
The recommendations below attempt to offer a standardized yet flexible
starting point, while at the same time accounting for the criticisms of FCAs
discussed in previous sections of the Article:
• The most important recommendation involves defining who
can bring an action under false claims statutes.  Too restric-
tive a definition will quash potentially valid actions, while too
permissive a definition will encourage nuisance actions.  The
definition should reflect the policy foundations of permitting
citizens to sue on behalf of the government: To leverage and
reward inside or otherwise unique information or knowledge that un-
covers, interprets, or helps prosecute misconduct that, in other respects,
would go undetected.
° Several caveats are worth noting.  The definition should
not be restricted to pure insiders—that is, persons em-
ployed or contracted by the person or entity against which
the action is brought—because it might be interpreted to
exclude persons with inside or unique information about,
say, an industry practice across many firms.  Moreover, the
definition should follow existing false claims statutes and
embrace whistleblowers with “knowledge that is indepen-
dent of and materially adds” to allegations or transactions
that have already been publicly disclosed.284  Such a defi-
nition would shut the door on “parasitic lawsuit[s]” where
informants “possess no substantive information at all.”285
Similarly, it would prevent situations where whistleblowers
284. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2012); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12652(d)(3)(C)
(i)–(ii) (West 2014); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/4(e)(4)(B) (2012); N.Y. STATE FIN.
LAW § 188(7) (McKinney 2013).  In perceiving a “threatened relaxation of the
public disclosure bars,” members of the defense bar have recommended that the
definition be further refined (though not necessarily restricted) to interpret “ma-
terially adds” to refer to information “which is derived from inside knowledge,
notwithstanding that the information is not inconsistent with that which is already
known within the public domain and is necessary to allow suits that have elements
which are publicly known.”  Houghton et al., supra note 70, at 599.
285. United States ex rel. Barber v. Paychex, Inc., No. 09-20990-Civ., 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 83789, at *29–30 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2010).
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“did relatively little to no work to uncover the alleged
wrongdoing; they simply relied on publicly available infor-
mation to develop a claim.”286  It would also prohibit the
kind of nuisance suits currently being filed in Illinois
where law firms (not insiders) are mass-compiling com-
plaints based purely on publicly available (not unde-
tected) information.287
• Make persons liable for “knowingly” presenting false or fraudu-
lent claims both to obtain money or property and to avoid pay-
ing or transmitting money or property to the government.288
Furthermore, define “knowing” and “knowingly” to include
“actual knowledge” as well as “deliberate ignorance” and “reckless
disregard” of the truth or falsity of the information.289  Such a
definition reflects the current understanding of liability
under all existing false claims statutes.  In addition, it reflects
the standard to which both taxpayers and tax advisors are al-
ready held under the Internal Revenue Code and Circular
230; it thus closes a perverse loophole whereby taxpayers and
practitioners would be immune from liability for tax noncom-
pliance under a state’s FCA but liable under substantive tax
law at both the federal and state level.290
• Make innocent mistakes a defense to liability.  Follow the New
York FCA and exempt from liability “acts occurring by mis-
take or as a result of mere negligence.”291
• Impose monetary thresholds on claims, both with respect to in-
come or sales of the taxpayer (depending on whether the
state wishes to include claims under the state income tax, if
any, the state sales tax, or any other tax) as well as on the
damages pled.  For instance, New York requires the net in-
come or sales of the taxpayer to exceed $1 million and the
damages pled to exceed $350,000.292  Use “gross” income or
sales rather than “net” income or sales, because a net figure
could be manipulated below the threshold by the kind of ill-
286. Houghton et al., supra note 70, at 598.
287. See Trachtenberg et al., supra note 29, at 377 (criticizing claims merely
reporting information “that was publicly available on the taxpayers’ websites.  Ar-
guably, this does not comport with the intent of FCA statutes, which are suppos-
edly designed to give government a tool to uncover fraud that might otherwise go
undiscovered”).
288. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 52–135 and accompanying text.
291. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 188(3)(b) (McKinney 2013); see also supra notes
78–79 and accompanying text.
292. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(4)(a)(i)–(ii).  The federal whistleblower law
also uses thresholds: more than $200,000 in gross income and more than
$2,000,000 in “tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts in
dispute.”  I.R.C. § 7623(b)(5) (2012).
55
Ventry: Not Just Whistling Dixie: The Case For Tax Whistleblowers in the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR302.txt unknown Seq: 56 14-AUG-14 14:25
480 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 425
gotten tax benefits that the statute is trying to uncover.  These
thresholds will help prevent nuisance actions, and focus the
statute on significant noncompliance.
• Require whistleblowers to file complaints in camera and keep
them under seal for a specified period of time.293  Permit the
state to request additional time to investigate allegations and
to support such motions with affidavits and other submissions,
also made in camera.294  Consider requiring whistleblowers to
sign a declaration under penalty of perjury that the informa-
tion contained in the complaint is true, as is the practice
under the SEC’s whistleblower program.295  These recom-
mendations will help prevent the unnecessary disclosure of
confidential tax return information.
• Require the court to dismiss any action if it is “based on allega-
tions or transactions which are the subject of a pending civil
action or an administrative action in which the state . . . is
already a party.”296  This recommendation can be thought of
as a “government party bar” analogous to the “public disclo-
sure bar,”297 and discourages complaints involving matters
the taxpayer is already attempting to resolve or that the state
is already investigating.  It does not contemplate covering
matters under audit, because an administrative audit proceed-
ing does not rise to the level of an “action” and thus the gov-
ernment cannot be considered a “party” to the action.  If the
state desired, the statute could contain an exception for com-
plaints by whistleblowers possessing unique information not
already in the state’s possession that might assist the state in
pending administrative actions or litigation.  This recommen-
dation will help thwart parasitic actions.
• Require the attorney general to consult with the state tax agency
or tax department during its investigation and assessment of
the complaint, and prior to filing or intervening in any false
claims action.298  This recommendation addresses concerns
293. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
295. See Sullivan, supra note 237 (quoting Sean McKessy, Chief of SEC Office
of the Whistleblower, as calling requirement “a control” to help avoid being “inun-
dated with nonsense”).  For a discussion of the SEC whistleblower program, see
supra note 137.
296. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(3) (2012); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12652(d)(2)
(West 2013); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/4(e)(3) (2012); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW
§ 190(9)(a)(i)–(ii).
297. Telephone Interview with Gregory Krakower, senior advisor and coun-
selor to the N.Y. Attorney Gen. (Jan. 20, 2014).  For a discussion of the public
disclosure bar, see supra note 284 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text.
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that FCA actions might proceed without the expertise and ex-
perience of state tax officials.
• If the subject matter of the complaint is already under review
in the state’s tax department, require the attorney general
and tax department to decide jointly whether to proceed with
the action and, if so, whether it should proceed as an adminis-
trative or judicial action.  If the state decides that the attorney
general should prosecute the action, the administrative action
would be stayed until resolution of the judicial action.  In
2013, a bill in the Illinois Assembly proposed such a proce-
dure for transforming a false claims complaint from a tax ad-
ministrative action into a judicial action.299  This
recommendation further addresses concerns that FCA actions
might proceed without the expertise and experience of state
tax officials.
• If the jurisdiction wished to rely even more heavily on its tax
department than the attorney general to process FCA com-
plaints, it could authorize the tax department to take over pri-
mary responsibility for investigating the allegations.  It could
further provide the tax department a right of first refusal to
process the allegations through tax administrative channels
before permitting the attorney general to undertake a judicial
proceeding.  And it could give the tax department additional
discretion in determining whether the complaint should pro-
ceed at all, effectively giving it veto power.
• The statute should include an explicit expectation that the
state will communicate with the whistleblower throughout its in-
vestigation, assessment, and prosecution of complaints.  In or-
der to ameliorate concerns over undue disclosure of taxpayer
and tax return information, the state should immediately
enter into a confidentiality agreement with the whistleblower sim-
ilar to a “contracts for services” agreement described in IRC
section 6103(n).300  In addition to preserving the confidenti-
ality protections of defendant-taxpayers, this recommenda-
tion permits the state to leverage a whistleblower’s knowledge
and information and to conduct sufficiently thorough
investigations.
• If the state declines to prosecute the action and the qui tam
plaintiff decides to conduct the action, grant the court discre-
tion in sealing or unsealing the complaint (and have it served
on the defendant).  Alternatively, authorize the court to seal
or unseal the complaint (and have it served on the defen-
dant) if either the state or the qui tam plaintiff prosecutes the
299. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
300. See infra notes 376–80 and accompanying text.
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action.301  Direct the court to keep the complaint sealed in
the event neither the state nor the qui tam plaintiff prose-
cutes the action.  These recommendations—subject to the ju-
risdiction’s rules respecting case files as public records—will
help prevent the unnecessary disclosure of confidential tax re-
turn information.
• Upon declining to prosecute an action, a jurisdiction might
consider permitting the state to make a motion to transform
the action into an administrative proceeding (run through
the tax department) before giving the whistleblower a chance
to assume responsibility for prosecuting the action.  If the mo-
tion is granted, the state would serve the taxpayer with the
complaint, provide the taxpayer an opportunity to review the
allegations contained in the complaint, and give the taxpayer
a chance to enter into the regular tax administration process.
The original whistleblower would be entitled to an award for
information that led to the collection of proceeds recovered
in the action or in settlement of the action.  If the motion is
not granted, the state could still submit a motion for dismissal
of the action.  This recommendation allows the state to pur-
sue tax noncompliance that, in its estimation and in consulta-
tion with the state tax department, does not meet the
requirements of a false claims action but conflicts with the
state’s interpretation of the tax law.  It also diminishes the
chance for unnecessary disclosure of confidential taxpayer in-
formation, and avoids the expense of litigation for all parties.
• If the state declines to prosecute the action, permit it to move
for dismissal of the action or to settle the action with the de-
fendant notwithstanding the objections of the person initiat-
ing the action, provided that the person is provided an
opportunity to be heard.302  These recommendations will
help, respectively, prevent nuisance actions and restrict dis-
closure of confidential tax return information.
• If the action proceeds to litigation, allow the court to impose
limitations on the whistleblower’s participation in the litiga-
tion either upon a showing by the state that such participation
would “interfere with or unduly delay the prosecution of the
case, or would be repetitious or irrelevant,”303 or upon a
showing by the defendant that the action would “be for pur-
poses of harassment or would cause the defendant undue
301. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 185 (quoting N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(5)(b)(iii) (McKin-
ney 2013)).
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burden.”304  These recommendations will help prevent nui-
sance actions and restrict unnecessary disclosure of confiden-
tial tax return information.
• If the qui tam plaintiff prosecutes the action, courts should
craft protective orders prohibiting the plaintiff from disclosing
the defendant’s tax return information.  To achieve the same
end, the statute could require qui tam plaintiffs to sign confi-
dentiality agreements upon submitting a complaint.  In the
event a qui tam plaintiff wished to obtain the defendant’s tax
return information during the course of litigation, the plain-
tiff should be required to obtain approval from the attorney
general before submitting a motion to compel disclosure.305
These recommendations will help prevent the unnecessary
disclosure of confidential tax return information.
• If the defendant prevails in a FCA action and if the court fur-
ther finds that “the claim of the person bringing the action
was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily
for purposes of harassment,” the court should award the de-
fendant reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses.306  If the jurisdic-
tion has been experiencing particularly troublesome nuisance
suits, as in Illinois,307 it could also enact additional penalties
to discourage such actions.308
• If, after adopting the above statutory recommendations to re-
duce the prevalence of nuisance suits, a jurisdiction wishes to
take additional precautions against frivolous actions, it might
consider the proposal contained in a 2013 Illinois Assembly
bill.309  In response to a spate of frivolous tax-related suits
filed under the Illinois FCA, the bill would have given the
state attorney general sole authority to prosecute tax-related
matters originating under the false claims statute.  Stated dif-
ferently, it prohibited qui tam plaintiffs from prosecuting tax
claims under the state’s FCA.  If a state wished to pursue a
similar prohibition (which, under a properly drafted and im-
plemented false claims statute, would not be needed to ad-
dress the problem of nuisance suits), it might consider as an
alternative removing tax claims altogether from being
brought under the state’s FCA, while simultaneously enacting
304. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (quoting 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.
175/4(c)(2)(D) (2012)).
305. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 214 (quoting N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(6)(d)).
307. See supra notes 40–51 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
309. For a description of the bill and the suits that motivated it, see supra
notes 40–51 and accompanying text.
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a standalone tax whistleblower statute similar to IRC section
7623.310
• Keep whistleblower awards sufficiently high.  In an ideal
world, we want whistleblowers to report misconduct internally
within organizations that have instituted robust informant
processes and protections.311  But in the event a
whistleblower’s internal reporting is ignored or disregarded
by the whistleblower’s organization (as was the case with Brad-
ley Birkenfeld312), sufficiently high awards could induce ex-
ternal reporting of otherwise meritorious claims and “provide
incentives for [whistleblowers] to incur the risks and costs as-
sociated with an action.”313  For the same reasons, if a defen-
dant is found liable under a false claims statute, the court
should award reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees con-
nected to “a civil action brought to recover any such penalty
or damages.”314
• Keep penalties sufficiently high on defendants found liable
under false claims statutes.  These penalties include treble
damages based on total damages incurred because of the de-
fendant’s actions as well as civil penalties for each false
claim.315  Stiff penalties can serve as a deterrent for “know-
ing” violations of a state’s FCA and, along with bad publicity
and reputational harms, can induce taxpayers and advisors to
rethink the inputs that influence the taxpayer’s compliance
calculus.316  Finally, it should be noted that robust
310. For discussion of such an alternative, see infra notes 351–88 and accom-
panying text.
311. For discussion of such internal procedures, see infra notes 320–48 and
accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 1–17, 228, 234 and accompanying text.
313. Bucks, supra note 198, at 288.  Currently, FCAs provide largely similar
award ranges, though with some notable variation. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(3)
(2012) (providing 15–30% if state prosecutes action and up to 10% for less sub-
stantial contributions, 25–30% if whistleblower prosecutes action, and discretion-
ary reductions if whistleblower “planned and initiated” violation); CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 12652(g)(2)–(3) & (5) (West 2014) (providing 15–33% if state prosecutes
action, 25–50% if whistleblower prosecutes action, and discretionary judicial re-
ductions if whistleblower “planned and initiated” violation); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.
175/4(d)(1)–(3) (2012) (awarding between 15–25% if state prosecutes action and
up to 10% for less substantial contributions, 25–30% if whistleblower prosecutes
action, and discretionary judicial reductions if whistleblower “planned or initiated”
violation); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(6)(a)–(b), (8) (McKinney 2013) (awarding
between 15–25% if state prosecutes action and up to 10% for less substantial con-
tributions, 25–30% if whistleblower prosecutes action, and discretionary judicial
reductions if whistleblower “planned or initiated” violation).
314. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(3); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2); CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 12652(g)(8); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/4(d)(1).
315. See supra note 69.
316. See Ventry, supra note 245, at 376–82; see also supra notes 273–75 and
accompanying text.
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whistleblower award programs do not correlate with higher
rates of employees reporting out misconduct (in search of a
potential award) versus reporting internally.317
• Include strong anti-retaliation measures and equally strong re-
lief from retaliation.  Forms of relief already contained in
FCAs include: injunctions to restrain discrimination; rein-
statement to the same or equivalent position and seniority sta-
tus; reinstatement of full fringe benefits; at least two times
back pay plus interest; and compensation for special damages
sustained as a result of the discrimination (including litiga-
tion costs and attorney’s fees).318  Beyond protecting
whistleblowers from reprisal, robust anti-retaliation provisions
can help employers.  To the extent employers respond to the
statute by evaluating current whistleblower procedures and
instituting programs that effectively intake and process inter-
nal reporting of misconduct—and, that further assess and re-
spond to that misconduct and recognize the organizational
contribution of whistleblowers—companies can experience
fewer employees reporting out misconduct, less reputational
harms, less litigation, and a culture of compliance built on
trust and respect.319
B. Creating an Organizational Culture of Compliance with Internal
Whistleblower Procedures
Some members of the defense bar have responded to the prolifera-
tion of tax whistleblower actions and statutes with constructive advice to
employers.  They offer practical and specific suggestions designed to as-
sess, address, manage, and reduce risks associated with tax whistleblower
laws.  In the words of two commentators, it “behooves” tax executives and
compliance officers “to understand the applicable statutory
[whistleblower] provisions . . . to confirm that their companies’ processes
and procedures for handling whistleblower activity satisfy core legal re-
quirements; and perhaps most critically, to adopt best practices to mitigate
the risks associated with tax whistleblowers.”320  These recommendations
emphasize not only managing whistleblower activity but also rewarding
317. See NWC, supra note 228, at 5 (“The existence of a qui tam whistleblower
reward program has no impact on the willingness of employees to internally report
potential violations of law, or to work with their employer to resolve compliance
issues.”).
318. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12653(a); 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 175/4(g); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 191.
319. For the benefits of a culture of compliance, see Part IV.B. and supra
notes 232–36 and accompanying text.
320. Dolan & McCormally, supra note 70, at 1537; see also PWC REPORT, supra
note 235, at 24 (delineating “best practice tips” for internal whistleblower
programs).
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whistleblowers for reporting misconduct as part of creating an organiza-
tional culture of compliance.321  Moreover, they recognize that the combi-
nation of substantive regulation and responsive internal controls can alter
compliance norms within organizations and at the same time improve the
long-term health of firms, an insight that tax scholars have made in the
context of corporations adopting a new tax shelter compliance norm in
the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.322
1. Assessing and Managing Tax Whistleblower Risk
“A first crucial step,” a group of practitioners recently suggested, “is to
undertake a review of past practice and future compliance determinations
in light of the new risk environment created by” tax whistleblower litiga-
tion.323  Such a review would involve assessing procedures for reporting
misconduct internally, including fulfilling Sarbanes-Oxley requirements
for instituting processes to handle whistleblower allegations and to main-
tain the confidentiality of whistleblowers.324  Central to this obligation is
establishing an ethics or whistleblower hotline.  Beyond generally assessing
whistleblower procedures, in-house tax and accounting departments
“should confirm that their company’s ethics reporting system can deal ef-
fectively with tax matters.”325
Once instituted, employees throughout the organization should re-
ceive regular training in how to handle and resolve internal reports of
misconduct.  The first order of business should be reminding all employ-
ees to avoid misconduct themselves by requiring them to acknowledge and
certify adherence to a company’s code of ethics or code of conduct.326
Employees should be further advised of their responsibility to report ob-
served misconduct internally and of the various avenues for confidentially
in alerting the company of perceived wrongdoing.  Within tax depart-
ments, all personnel should receive periodic training of, at a minimum,
their ethical responsibilities under a company’s code of conduct as well as
under Circular 230 and the IRC.  This training should cover “every em-
ployee’s right and, indeed, obligation to raise questions . . . confidentially
via the SOX/ethics hotline” or through in-person conversations with su-
pervisors and the chief tax officer (CTO); “the right against retaliation”
for reporting observed misconduct; and, finally, “the company’s commit-
321. See Dolan & McCormally, supra note 70, at 1538.
322. See Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax
Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 964 (2006).
323. Gustafson et al., supra note 70, at 56 (expressing particular concern for
“the rise in consumer class action and qui tam lawsuits”).
324. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745,
775.  The Sarbanes-Oxley provisions focus on “complaints . . . regarding account-
ing, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters,” a universe that encom-
passes state and federal taxation. Id.
325. Dolan & McCormally, supra note 70, at 1542.
326. See id. at 1541.
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ment to and procedures for correcting errors . . . and making
disclosures.”327
Instituting whistleblower procedures and educating employees as to
proper processes can lay the groundwork for creating an open and par-
ticipatory culture of compliance.  Proper implementation of the proce-
dures is critical to animating a policy of best practices to mitigate and
manage risks associated with tax whistleblowers.  First and foremost, em-
ployers “should endeavor to establish an ethos of professionalism and
compliance that encourages employees to ask questions about transactions
or other issues that might otherwise become the subject of an external
whistleblower claim.”328  Within a company’s tax department, moreover,
the leadership “should build a culture of trust and respect by emphasizing
that if any member of the tax department staff has concerns about a trans-
action or other matter, then the CTO [chief tax officer] himself has con-
cerns.”329  To this end, the CTO should engage staff members directly on
tax strategies, particularly those involving “unsettled” or innovative areas
of the law.  The idea is to “demystify tax,” not just with respect to proce-
dures within the tax department but also with respect to how tax planning
and compliance is perceived and understood among senior management
and the audit committee.330
A final—and crucial—component of implementing effective
whistleblower procedures involves how companies respond to reported
misconduct.  “Don’t make matters worse,” a thoughtful commentary re-
cently advised, and take every measure to “avoid actual or perceived retali-
ation.”331  Indeed, retaliating against whistleblowers “misses the point
about why the whistleblowing occurred—possible misconduct—and can
compound the reputational risk associated with whistleblowing.”332  It is
also illegal,333 and can result in costly litigation and high-dollar settle-
ments.  Thus, employers should internally evaluate, reinforce, and publi-
cize the company’s existing protections against retaliation.  Furthermore,
they should emphasize to employees that even in an open and transparent
environment, any perceived slight or hint of retaliation—however seem-
ingly innocuous or unintended—could be the basis for a cause of action
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1543.
329. Id.
330. Id.  Dolan and McCormally further emphasize establishing a belief
within the tax department that there is “no right way to do the wrong thing,” a
message that “is vitally important to successfully managing the company’s tax risk
profile, regardless of whether any whistleblower activities occur.” Id.
331. Id. at 1541.
332. Id.
333. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745,
802–04 (providing whistleblower protections for employees of publicly traded
companies).
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against the company.334  Supervisors and managers, in particular, “should
be taught to welcome employee questions openly and respectfully, to af-
firm employees’ right against retaliation, to act expeditiously in addressing
concerns, [ ] to document and communicate resolution of the matter
both to management and affected employees,” and to communicate
clearly an “employee’s right to escalate the matter within the company.”335
2. Reducing Tax Whistleblower Risk
Furthering an open and participatory culture of compliance will, in
itself, help reduce risks associated with tax whistleblowing.  But additional
measures should be considered.  First, companies could evaluate employ-
ees (and reward them, if appropriate) on how they respond to
whistleblower reports and concerns.  In particular, they could assess “how
well [employees] foster the company’s culture of compliance and, specifi-
cally, how well they handle any matters falling within the ambit of the
whistleblower statute.”336
Second, companies could seek advance guidance from tax authorities
on “unsettled” areas of the law or on specific tax positions and transac-
tions.  At the federal level, they could take advantage of a number of pre-
filing337 and dispute resolution programs,338 while at the state level, they
could “consider using state advisory opinion and private letter ruling
processes to obtain written guidance when there are gray areas of law.”339
Third, tax departments might consider modifying their policies of
making regular disclosures to the tax authorities in the event such adjust-
ments could “mitigate the risks associated with whistleblower activity.”340
Pursuing “defensive disclosure of information”341 to state or federal tax
agencies could reduce potential economic exposure under state-level
334. See Dolan & McCormally, supra note 70, at 1541 (“[I]f an employee has
raised concerns about a transaction or other matter . . . the company must remain
sensitive to how any subsequent transfer or any aspect of an employee’s perform-
ance review (that is, raise, bonus, or promotion decision) might be interpreted by
the employee.”).
335. Id. at 1543–44.
336. Id. at 1544.
337. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2014-1, 2014-1 I.R.B. 1; Pre-Filing Agreement Pro-
gram, Rev. Proc. 2009-14, 2009-3 I.R.B. 324 (superseding Rev. Proc. 2007-17, 2007-
4 I.R.B. 368); Advance Pricing Agreement Program, Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-9
I.R.B. 278; Compliance Assurance Process, I.R.S. Announcement 2005-87, 2005-50
I.R.B. 1144; Industry Issue Resolution Program, Rev. Proc. 2003-36, 2003-18 I.R.B.
859; see also Ventry, supra note 244, at 462–67. See generally I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Ruls.
338. See, e.g., Advance Pricing Agreement Program, Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-9
I.R.B. 278; I.R.S. Announcement 2006-61, 2006-36 I.R.B. 390; LMSB/Appeals Fast
Track Settlement Procedure, Rev. Proc. 2003-40, 2003-25 I.R.B. 1044 (modified by
I.R.S. Notice 2013-78, 2013-50 I.R.B. 633); OFFICE OF APPEALS, IRS, Appeals Resolving
Tax Disputes (June 16, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Appeals. . .-Resolv-
ing-Tax-Disputes.
339. Gustafson et al., supra note 70, at 56.
340. Dolan & McCormally, supra note 70, at 1544.
341. Id.
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FCAs as well as under IRC section 7623, both of which base awards on how
much the whistleblower “substantially contributed” to the action.342
Adopting a strategy of defensive disclosure could also “reinforce the com-
pany’s credibility,” strengthen its relationship with tax authorities, and
“underscore its commitment to transparency and compliance.”343
3. Ameliorating Future Risk by Managing Current Risk
In the event that a company establishes the validity of an internal
whistleblower report alleging misconduct, it might consider several restor-
ative courses of action.  First, it could voluntarily disclose the misconduct
to tax authorities in a good faith attempt to reveal and remedy the miscon-
duct and perhaps limit liability and penalties.  In fact, some states facilitate
such a preemptive move with voluntary disclosure programs.  New York,
for example, has established a voluntary disclosure and compliance pro-
gram that provides for penalty abatement, minimum statutory interest,
and a chance to qualify for a limited look-back.344
In the context of state sales and use taxation, where a company may
be vulnerable to a class action lawsuit due to overcollecting tax from con-
sumers,345 two remedial options are worth considering.  First, the com-
pany could notify its customers of the overcollection and of their right to
request a refund from the state.346  For another option, the company
might choose to “make its customers whole by repaying the overcollected
tax and seeking a refund itself.”347  This second alternative has the benefit
of potentially staving off expensive, frivolous class action suits as well as
reinserting “the substantive tax question back in the traditional adminis-
trative process” where expert administrators rather than plaintiffs’ lawyers
and the uncertainty of the judicial process determine the company’s
proper tax treatment.348
C. Statutory Alternatives to Qui Tam for Tax
Some commentators—typically those critical of false claims statutes
that permit tax-related complaints—have suggested that states consider
342. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2012); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2012);
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12652(g)(2) (West 2014); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/4(d)(1)
(2012); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(6)(a) (McKinney 2013).
343. Dolan & McCormally, supra note 70, at 1544.
344. See Gustafson et al., supra note 70, at 57.  For information on New York’s
voluntary disclosure program, see N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION AND FIN., Volun-
tary Disclosure and Compliance Program—General Program Information (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://www.tax.ny.gov/enforcement/vold/program_info.htm.
345. For a discussion of these circumstances, see supra notes 48–51 and ac-
companying text.
346. See Gustafson et al., supra note 70, at 56.
347. Id. at 57.
348. Id.
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standalone whistleblower statutes as an alternative to qui tam for tax.349
Presumably, the appeal of removing qui tam plaintiffs from participating
in state tax enforcement involves the perceived benefits of fewer nuisance
suits as well as assurances that tax experts (rather than popularly-elected
attorneys general with no tax expertise) will investigate and evaluate tax
whistleblower allegations.  Keeping tax claims within traditional tax ad-
ministration processes and procedures—that is, in familiar territory and
under conditions over which taxpayers and their tax advisors can exert
some control—also contributes to the desire to cut out qui tam plaintiffs
from the whistleblower process as early as possible.350
While a standalone tax whistleblower statute could further some of
these goals—reducing frivolous suits, guaranteeing expert review of tax
claims, and restricting the participation of qui tam plaintiffs after submis-
sion of a whistleblower complaint—a properly drafted and implemented
false claims statute (as discussed throughout this Article and summarized
in Part IV.A) could just as readily achieve these aims.351  Moreover,
standalone tax whistleblower statutes suffer from their own shortcomings,
including a lack of funding and staffing; significant delays in processing
claims; and protecting the confidentiality of tax return information with-
out fatally interfering with the investigation, evaluation, and resolution of
whistleblower allegations.
The remainder of this Part uses the federal tax whistleblower statute,
section 7623 of the Internal Revenue Code, as the best current model of a
standalone tax whistleblower program.352  It discusses the program’s suc-
cesses as well as its failures.  It offers a number of suggestions for states
wishing to leverage inside information pertaining to tax noncompliance
349. See Wetzler, supra note 174, at 170 (“An alternative to a whistleblower
program operated by the attorney general would be a program within the [tax]
department.  The federal tax whistleblower program, for example, is operated by
the IRS outside the purview of the federal False Claims Act.”).
350. See supra note 348 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 171–243
and accompanying text (discussing efforts by elements of defense bar to rely solely
on traditional tax administration for enforcement); supra notes 244–81 and accom-
panying text (discussing efforts by elements of defense bar to control and influ-
ence tax administrative process).
351. Indeed, while I am not agnostic as to whether states should adopt tax
whistleblower programs (they should), I have no preference as to whether such a
program should be run through a state’s FCA or a standalone whistleblower stat-
ute.  States should adopt whichever alternative best meets their jurisdiction’s needs
and challenges.  Other authors are less ambivalent. See, e.g., Franziska Hertel, Qui
Tam for Tax?: Lessons from the States, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1898 (2013) (con-
cluding that “state schemes permitting qui tam provide the most effective enforce-
ment mechanism against tax fraud” compared to IRS whistleblower program).
352. Several states have enacted their own tax whistleblower statutes, though
not all of them are operational and none are nearly as robust as the IRS program.
See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 7060 (West 2014); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 19525; FLA. STAT. § 210.18(3)(b) (2013); FLA. STAT. § 210.18(11); FLA. STAT.
§ 213.30; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3421 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 314.855 (2013).  I
will discuss two of these programs, both in California, in Part IV.D.
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by deploying a standalone statute rather than a false claims statute that
covers tax-related actions.  And, it concludes by indicating that some
states—particularly California—are closer to implementing a robust
whistleblower statute than they might think.
***
By most accounts, the federal tax whistleblower program is a success
story.  Ineffective and moribund as recently as 2006,353 Congress breathed
life into section 7623 of the IRC with significant amendments to the pro-
gram.354  Among other changes, it created a centralized Whistleblower Of-
fice within the IRS to process, investigate, and analyze informant
submissions and to make award determinations;355 it defined information
that qualified for a whistleblower award as that which assisted the IRS in
“detecting underpayments of tax” or “detecting and bringing to trial and
punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws or con-
353. An influential 2006 report from the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration (TIGTA) concluded that the program suffered from ineffective de-
centralized management, no standardized processing of informant tips or IRS pay-
ment of awards, and inefficient processing of claims, examinations, and award
determinations. See TIGTA REPORT; supra note 209, at 7.  Moreover, whistleblower
claims got tied up in administrative and judicial bottlenecks. See supra notes
209–10 and accompanying text.  In addition, the program offered paltry awards (if
any were paid at all) to whistleblowers.  In 1983, the IRS raised the cap on awards
from $50,000 to $100,000. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ADMINISTRATIVE
CHANGES COULD STRENGTHEN IRS’ CLAIMS FOR REWARDS PROGRAM iv (1985), availa-
ble at http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/142661.pdf.  The cap remained until 1996,
when the IRS increased the ceiling to $2 million and then to $10 million in 2004.
IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, supra note 210, at 2.  Even with the promise of more
lucrative awards, payments to informants were ungenerous and infrequent.  Be-
tween 1989 and 1998, only 6.6% of claims resulted in payments, while total pay-
ments only reached $29.3 million of the $1.45 billion recovered from
whistleblower tips (or just 2% of collections).  Terri Gutierrez, IRS Informants Re-
ward Program: Is It Fair?, 84 TAX NOTES 1203, 1205 (1999).  Compared to qui tam
payments and collections made under the federal False Claims Act, the record of
the IRS informants program is particularly disappointing.  Between 1989 and 1998,
FCA qui tam recoveries totaled $2.3 billion, with $360 million paid out to infor-
mants, for a payout rate of nearly 15.7% (again, compared to only 2% under the
IRS program). CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 216.  Also, while an-
nual recoveries under the old IRS whistleblower program never topped $100 mil-
lion, qui tam recoveries under the FCA hit $1.5 billion in 2006. Compare TIGTA
REPORT, supra note 209, at 3 (providing IRS whistleblower program figure), with
CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 216 (providing figure for qui tam
recoveries under FCA).  Finally, whistleblowers had little recourse to challenge
award determinations either administratively or judicially, losing, in fact, every
court case between 1941 and 1998 that sought a redetermination of an award.
Gutierrez, supra note 353, at 1205–06.  For a fuller account of the pre-2006 history
of the IRS whistleblower statute, see Ventry, supra note 245, at 360–68.
354. See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406,
120 Stat. 2922, 2958–60.
355. While the statute provides for investigative powers, the IRS
Whistleblower Office does not currently investigate claims, but rather assigns them
to appropriate IRS offices for investigation.
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niving at the same,”356 and that involved amounts in dispute exceeding $2
million and where the taxpayer had gross income exceeding $200,000 for
at least one taxable year in question;357 and it mandated that
whistleblowers be paid between 15% and 30% of the “collected proceeds”
resulting from an administrative or judicial action or settlement, with the
final award depending upon how much an informant’s submission “sub-
stantially contributed” to the detection and recovery of collected
proceeds.358
Emboldened by the prospect of a standardized and streamlined re-
view of whistleblower claims—as well as sizeable award payments—submis-
sions under the new program skyrocketed, jumping from 50 in 2007, to
377 in 2008, and 472 in 2009.359  Even more encouraging, amounts col-
lected under the revamped program increased significantly, while
amounts paid to whistleblowers rose disproportionately compared to
amounts collected, such that the percentage of collections paid to infor-
mants multiplied.  Over the five-year period between 2008 and 2012, pay-
ments to whistleblowers totaled $180.3 million, compared to amounts
collected of $1.47 billion, or 12.3% of collections.360  By comparison, over
the ten-year period between 1989 and 1998, payments totaled $29.3 mil-
lion compared to amounts collected of $1.45 billion, or just 2% of collec-
tions.361  Such data prompted the program’s biggest supporter, and
architect of the 2006 amendments, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA), to de-
clare that “[t]he potential for this program is tremendous, and it’s up to
the IRS to continue paying awards and demonstrating to whistleblowers
that the process will work and they will be heard and protected.”362
In addition to leaps in collections and payments, the IRS
whistleblower program has undergone significant improvements in terms
of management.  In 2012, IRS leadership—which whistleblower practition-
356. I.R.C. § 7623(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
357. Id. § 7623(b)(5)(A)–(B).
358. Id. § 7623(b)(1).
359. See IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, supra note 210, at 7.  Submissions de-
clined slightly between 2010 and 2012, but still averaged 356 submissions.  These
figures only reflect submissions under new section 7623(b) (described in the text)
and not section 7623(a), the pre-amendment section that continues to co-exist
alongside section 7623(b).  The figures further undercount the number of actual
“cases” contained within a single submission, which typically include allegations of
underpayment pertaining to more than one taxpayer. Id. at 6 n.12.  For instance,
the IRS Whistleblower Office received 332 submissions under section 7623(b) in
fiscal year 2012, identifying 671 taxpayers. Id. at 7.
360. Id. at 17.
361. CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 216.  It is important to note
that the amount of dollars collected under section 7623 understates actual collec-
tions—perhaps by a significant degree—due to the government’s narrow reading
of “collected proceeds,” which is used to calculate award determinations. See infra
note 373 and accompanying text.
362. Jeremiah Coder, Year in Review: Whistleblowers Were Either Rich or Angry
After 2012, 138 TAX NOTES 32, 32 (2013) (quoting Sen. Charles Grassley).
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ers and other supporters of the program had consistently charged (not
unreasonably) was “holding the whistleblower program back”363—ex-
pressed its commitment to “timely action” on whistleblower submis-
sions,364 communicating with whistleblowers early and often during the
evaluation process,365 expanding its use of confidentiality agreements with
whistleblowers “to obtain a whistleblower’s insights and expertise into
complex technical or factual issues,”366 and generally “improv[ing] the
timeliness and quality of decisions as the Service evaluates and acts on
whistleblower information.”367  The Whistleblower Office reiterated these
goals while adding a few others.  It planned expedited guidance for tax-
payers and practitioners, particularly with respect to refining key defini-
tions pertaining to award determinations, including “collected proceeds,”
“amounts in dispute,” and a taxpayer’s “gross income”;368 streamlining the
363. Jeremiah Coder, GAO Faults IRS Whistleblower Program for Award Delays,
TAX NOTES TODAY 2011-19188 (2011) (quoting Dean Zerbe of Zerbe, Fingeret,
Frank & Jadav and National Whistleblower Center), available at http://www.tax-
whistleblower.com/articles/GAOFaultsIRSWhistleblowerProgramforAwardDelays.
pdf; see also id. (quoting Sen. Charles Grassley, “I’m concerned that the IRS man-
agement still might have too many opportunities to say ‘no’ to a whistleblower,
even when the whistleblower office believes a claim has merit”); id. (quoting Bryan
Skarlatos of Kostelanetz & Fink LLP, “[t]here continues to be a sense among some
IRS personnel that the whistleblower program is not a good idea.”); id. (summariz-
ing commentary from Erika Kelton of Phillips & Cohen LLP as saying that IRS had
demonstrated “institutional resistance to whistleblowers”).  For additional practi-
tioner criticism of the program, see infra notes 373–85 and accompanying text.
364. Memorandum from Steven T. Miller, Treasury Deputy Comm’r for
Servs. & Enforcement, to Operating Div. Comm’rs, the Chief of Criminal Investiga-
tion, and the Director of the Whistleblower Office, IRS Whistleblower Program
(June 20, 2012), 2012 TAX NOTES TODAY 121-15, at 1 [hereinafter Miller Memo].
The Miller Memo, as it came to be known, laid out shorter and explicit timelines
for processing submissions, including (1) initial claim evaluation by the
Whistleblower Office within ninety days, (2) review by subject matter experts
within ninety days, and (3) notification of award decisions within ninety days after
final determination of collected proceeds. Id. at 2.
365. Id. at 2 (committing IRS to “debriefings” with whistleblowers as “the rule
not the exception,” and having an “interaction with a whistleblower during an ex-
amination [to] assist in timely and correct resolution of issues”).
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1.  Practitioners and the press praised the Miller Memo and its
discernible effect on internal whistleblower procedures and on altering the per-
ception of the whistleblower program among IRS leadership. See, e.g., Andrew Ve-
larde, ‘Miller Memo’ Seen as Improving IRS Whistleblower Process, 141 TAX NOTES 35
(2013); Erica L. Brady, IRS Whistleblower Office Releases Its Annual Report for Fiscal Year
2012, TAX WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.taxwhistleblower
report.com/guidance/irs-whistleblower-office-releases-its-annual-report-for-fiscal-
year-2013/ (stating, primarily in reference to Miller Memo, that “IRS
Whistleblower Office made leaps forward in fiscal year 2012”).
368. IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, supra note 210, at 12, 15–16.  These sug-
gested refinements were meant to spur Congressional action and came on the
heels of final regulations promulgated under section 7623 that attempted to clarify
“collected proceeds” and “proceeds of amounts collected.” See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7623-1(a) (2012).
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intake process and assessment of potential whistleblower claims;369 and
strengthening whistleblower protections.370  For one final example, the
Treasury Department sought public comment in December 2012 on pro-
posed regulations providing “comprehensive” guidance on tax
whistleblower submissions, administrative procedures on award determi-
nations, additional refinement of key terms used in section 7623, and ex-
panded use of disclosing tax return information “to the extent necessary
to conduct whistleblower administrative proceedings.”371  In other words,
the IRS had finally embraced the notion that whistleblowers could “pro-
vide valuable leads, and offer unique insights into taxpayer activity.”372
Despite these notable advances in the structure and administration of
the program, not insignificant problems persist.  According to practition-
ers, the IRS still adheres to an overly restrictive definition of “collected
proceeds,” by continuing to exclude tax attributes such as net operating
losses as well as foreign bank account reporting penalties and criminal
penalties under title 18 of the U.S. Code.373  In similar fashion, the IRS
applies a narrow interpretation for when it must pay out awards based on
useful information supplied by a whistleblower.  The statute directs the
IRS to pay an award if it “proceeds with any administrative or judicial ac-
tion . . . based on information” provided by a whistleblower,374 but the IRS
has interpreted the directive to apply only to situations where it initiates a
new action or expands an existing action and not to where a
whistleblower’s information increases the amount that would have been
collected in an existing action, an interpretation that practitioners con-
sider “illogical.”375
369. IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, supra note 210, at 12–13.
370. Id. at 13 (describing potential rules “on access to and disclosure of tax-
payer information [that] could provide stronger protection for taxpayers”).  The
IRS recommendation for greater protections for whistleblowers reflected the
Obama Administration’s commitment to a statutory prohibition on retaliating
against tax whistleblowers. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS 204–06 (2013), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explan
ations-FY2014.pdf.
371. See Awards for Information Relating to Detecting Underpayments of Tax
or Violations of the Internal Revenue Laws, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,798 (Dec. 18, 2012)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301).
372. Miller Memo, supra note 364, at 1; see also Jeremiah Coder, ABA Section of
Taxation Meeting: Whistleblower Program Has Strong Support From IRS, 138 TAX NOTES
582, 582 (2013) (summarizing comments by Stephen Whitlock, Director of IRS
Whistleblower Office, that IRS whistleblower award program “has strong support
among senior IRS executives”).
373. See Jeremiah Coder, IRS Whistleblower Regs Continue to Frustrate Practition-
ers, 139 TAX NOTES 250, 250 (2013) [hereinafter Regs Frustrate Practitioners]; Coder,
supra note 362, at 33; Jeremiah Coder, Fight Continues Over Whistleblower Award Eligi-
bility for FBAR Penalties, 137 TAX NOTES 1064 (2012).
374. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2012).
375. Regs Frustrate Practitioners, supra note 373, at 250 (quoting Erica Brady of
Ferraro Law Firm); see also Coder, supra note 362, at 33.
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With equal rigidity, the IRS continues to “hid[e] behind section 6103”
strictures protecting tax return information from disclosure, not only with
respect to communicating with whistleblowers while investigating a sub-
mission and building a case against a taxpayer but also in keeping them
informed of the status of submissions.376  The government’s overly broad
reading of tax return confidentiality under section 6103 means limited use
of the “contracts for services” exception under section 6103(n) that per-
mits the government to enter into confidentiality agreements with persons
not otherwise authorized to receive information pertaining to taxpayer re-
turns.377  Practitioners believe that the agreements “should be mandated”
and “entered into in every case.”378  Even without a mandatory require-
ment, practitioners rightly observe that the IRS should be able to distin-
guish between providing a status update on an award determination and
disclosing confidential tax return information.379  The obvious point is
that section 6103 does not cover every communication, the indisputable
conspicuousness of which eludes the IRS and exasperates the program’s
biggest supporters, including Senator Grassley, who has pled with the
agency to “develop communication guidelines that fit within the privacy
restrictions to communicate with whistleblowers at every step.  At each of
these stages the whistleblower should be given an estimate of the time to
the next step and also [be] provided periodic updates as appropriate” re-
garding claim status.380
Part and parcel of the government’s suffocating reading of section
6103 is the glacial pace of award determinations.381  More than seven
376. Regs Frustrate Practitioners, supra note 373, at 251.
377. Id.  Section 6103(n) provides for the disclosure of returns and return
information “to the extent necessary in connection with the processing, storage,
transmission, and reproduction of such returns and return information, the pro-
gramming, maintenance, repair, testing, and procurement of equipment, and the
providing of other services, for purposes of tax administration.” I.R.C. § 6103(n).
For a discussion of the government’s overly broad reading of confidentiality in the
context of section 7623 and for recommendations for reforming current policy,
see Jeremiah Coder’s contribution to this issue of the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW,
Clash for Cash: The Conflict over Tax Whistleblower Contracts, 59 VILL. L. REV. 409
(2014).
378. Regs Frustrate Practitioners, supra note 373, at 251 (quoting Thomas C.
Pliske of the Tax Whistleblower Law Firm).
379. See id. (quoting Bryan C. Skarlatos of Kostelanetz & Fink LLP, “I think a
distinction can be made” in those situations).
380. Letter from Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Fin., to
Douglas L. Shulman, IRS Comm’r 4–5 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at 2011 TAX
NOTES TODAY 178-51; see also Jeremiah Coder, Strong IRS Headwind Blows
Whistleblowers Off Course, 135 TAX NOTES 938, 941 (2012) (quoting Grassley as la-
menting that “communication with whistleblowers is essentially nonexistent”).
381. For detailed examples of IRS delay, see Jeremiah Coder, A Whistleblower’s
Cautionary Tale, 139 TAX NOTES 695 (2013); Jeremiah Coder, IRS Formally Denies
Award in Whistleblower Challenge, 139 TAX NOTES 383 (2013); Jeremiah Coder, Tax
Court Scrutinizes Whistleblower Delay, 138 TAX NOTES 1316 (2013); Jeremiah Coder,
Whistleblower Petitions Tax Court to End Award Obstruction, 134 TAX NOTES 1353
(2012).
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years have elapsed since Congress revamped the whistleblower program,
yet the time between submission of information to determination of award
(if any) still takes “five to seven years and longer.”382  There are good rea-
sons why years pass between submission of information to the
Whistleblower Office and the payment or denial of an award: the issues
involved are complex, murky, and hidden; the submissions are incom-
plete; and the IRS cannot make an award determination until the taxpayer
exhausts all administrative and judicial appeals.  But, there are no good
reasons why the IRS cannot provide periodic updates on a submission or
pay awards on unappealed portions of underpayments.  Nor is there any
good reason for the IRS to “stonewall[ ]” an award determination, eventu-
ally reject the submission, and then return years later to the information
contained in the submission “to pursue leads regarding unpaid taxpayer
liabilities free from any claims the whistleblower might have to an
award.”383  Yet that is exactly what it appears the IRS has been doing with
some submissions, a practice for which the Tax Court recently “re-
buke[d]” the Whistleblower Office.384  “We do not know whether these
failures were the result of bureaucratic confusion or ineptitude,” the court
wrote, “[w]e do know, however, that the obfuscation surrounding this mat-
ter has either been caused or exacerbated by [the government].”385
If a state chose to enact a standalone whistleblower statute as part of
its tax enforcement regime, it would need to address some of the same
shortcomings that afflict the federal program.  These issues—timely
processing of submissions, communicating with whistleblowers to leverage
knowledge and expertise, and making accurate award determinations
without undue delay—are not insurmountable.  States can learn from the
federal government’s experience in terms of program design, administra-
tion, and implementation.  The federal experience could also help states
determine if they want to run the program through their tax department,
attorney general office, or both, a determination that would be influenced
by the size and agency location of a particular state’s tax administration
apparatus.  A state will also have to determine whether it wants to create a
new, standalone tax whistleblower office to accompany its standalone stat-
382. IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, supra note 210, at 16.
383. Jeremiah Coder, The Whistleblower Whipsaw Process, 138 TAX NOTES 1168,
1170 (2013).
384. See Jeremiah Coder, Tax Court Rebukes IRS for Hiding Whistleblower Informa-
tion, 139 TAX NOTES 851, 851 (2013).  According to Coder, one of the most knowl-
edgeable and diligent observers of the IRS whistleblower program, the case was
“emblematic of the IRS’s attempts to whipsaw informants by issuing de facto award
denials and then later pursuing tax investigations arising from information con-
tained in the whistleblower submissions.” Id. at 852.
385. Anonymous 1 & Anonymous 2 v. Comm’r, No. 12-472-11W (T.C. May 10,
2013), available at 2013 TAX NOTES TODAY 92-40.
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ute—with its own staff, office space, and budget386—or whether it wants to
absorb the new program into existing administrative capacity.
D. The Case of California
Some states are closer than others to implementing a tax
whistleblower program.  California is such a state.  In fact, it already has
two tax whistleblower statutes on its books: one under the authority of the
Franchise Tax Board (FTB), pertaining to the personal income tax law
(PITL) and corporation tax law (CTL); and the other under the authority
of the Board of Equalization (BOE), pertaining to the state’s sales and use
taxes.  Neither program has yet to open for business however.
In 1984, as part of California’s first tax amnesty program,387 the legis-
lature authorized the FTB to administer a standalone whistleblower stat-
ute.  Originally enacted as California Revenue and Tax Code section
19273 (located in the PITL) and 26427 (located in the bank and corpora-
tion tax laws), the state legislature consolidated the sections in 1993 under
section 19525,388 where the authorization has remained undisturbed and
neglected for the last twenty years.  From the beginning, the FTB declined
to proceed with its authority to administer the program, because (i) it re-
quired implementing regulations to establish, and (ii) in its view, the stat-
ute did not grant the FTB explicit authority to make payments under the
program.  Thus, in the eyes of the FTB, it could promulgate regulations to
execute the statute, but it would still have no legal authority to pay rewards
to whistleblowers.  The statutory language reads as follows:
The Franchise Tax Board, under regulations prescribed by the
Franchise Tax Board, may establish a reward program for infor-
mation resulting in the identification of underreported or unre-
ported income subject to taxes [under the Personal Income Tax
Law] or [the Corporation Tax Law].  Any reward may not exceed
386. The budget for a standalone office, including personnel, could be allo-
cated through the regular appropriations process or through proceeds of
whistleblower collections, in the same way that some states pay for supporting their
False Claims Acts.  Under California’s FCA, for example, the state is entitled to “a
fixed 33 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, which
shall be used to support its ongoing investigation and prosecution of false claims
made against the state or political subdivision.” CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 12652(g)(1)(C)(2) (West 2014).  A standalone whistleblower statute could be
funded in the same manner.
387. See 1984 Cal. Stat. 5126-42.  I am indebted to Doug Powers, Tax Counsel
in the FTB’s Technical Resources Bureau, Legal Division, for educating me on the
history of the FTB’s standalone whistleblower statute.  I am further grateful to an
opinion piece by Erika Kelton of Phillips & Cohen that first alerted me to these
programs. See Erika A. Kelton, Bridge the Tax Gap: Bringing in the Whistleblowers,
CAPITOL WEEKLY (May 6, 2010), http://capitolweekly.net/opinion-bridge-tax-gap-
bringing-whistleblowers/ (proposing that California create “an effective tax
whistleblower program” by “invigorat[ing]” the “mothballed” FTB and BOE
whistleblower programs).
388. See 1993 Cal. Stat. 2389-90.
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10 percent of the taxes collected as a result of the information
provided.  Any person employed by or under contract with any
state or federal tax collection agency shall not be eligible for a
reward provided for pursuant to this section.389
In 2004, the FTB sought the explicit authority it believed it lacked.
Through a “Budget Change Proposal” related to “Tax Gap Enforcement
Provisions,” the agency requested funding for the “Informant Reward Pro-
gram.”390  Specifically, the agency asked the legislature “to unambiguously
identify that FTB has the sole discretion to determine the amount of each
reward paid to an informant” and, furthermore, to “provide a mechanism
for FTB to actually pay informants” from taxes collected due to informa-
tion provided by whistleblowers.391  The legislature failed to act on the
request.  But in 2010, renewed hope for explicit legislative authorization
emerged in the form of a bill introduced by State Assembly member, Hec-
tor De La Torre.  The proposed bill, modeled closely after section 7623 of
the Internal Revenue Code, amended section 19525 by requiring the FTB
to establish a reward program for tax whistleblowers and to make any pay-
ments from the “collected proceeds of the administrative or judicial ac-
tion . . . or from any settlement in response to that action.”392  The bill
never made it out of committee.
Nonetheless, the statutory scaffolding is in place for California to im-
plement a whistleblower program (indeed, perhaps two such programs).
The legislature could fund the program, either by explicit appropriation
or through anticipated “collected proceeds” of the program and at the
same time grant the FTB express statutory authority to pay rewards under
the program, at which point the FTB could promulgate implementing reg-
ulations.  Alternatively, the FTB could act on its own authority and inter-
pret the statute as already authorizing the agency to pay awards to
whistleblowers up to 10% “of [and from] the taxes collected as a result of
the information provided.”393  Such an interpretation, already a fair read-
ing of the statute, seems even more reasonable after considering that the
analogous whistleblower program pertaining to California’s sales and use
taxes—provided for in section 7060 and under the administrative author-
ity of the BOE—contains an explicit provision stating that rewards paid
under the program “shall be paid from amounts appropriated by the Leg-
389. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19525 (West 2014).
390. See CAL. STATE FRANCHISE TAX BD., FISCAL YEAR 2005/06 BUDGET DEVEL-
OPMENT: SUMMARY OF BUDGET CHANGE PROPOSALS, BCP No. 3 at III-1 (2004), avail-
able at https://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/meetings/attachments/082504/7b.pdf.
391. John R. Dorocak, State Tax Informants: Rewards and Liabilities Implementa-
tion in California and Guidance from the New and Old Federal Program—Should They Be
Paid?, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 279, 285 (2008).
392. See A.B. 2605, 2010 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010), available at http://
legiscan.com/CA/text/AB2605/id/3481.
393. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19525.
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islature for that purpose,”394 while section 19525 contains no such limiting
directive.
California’s FTB and BOE also run hotlines for, respectively, “tax
fraud” and “tax evasion,”395 with the FTB linking to its “tax fraud”
webpage from its “tax gap” webpage (which describes the state’s $10 bil-
lion tax gap).396  Both agencies alert would-be whistleblowers on their
webpages that they “do not offer rewards for reporting this informa-
tion.”397  Further, the BOE advises its audit personnel that although its
“reward program” is not currently funded nor otherwise paying out
awards, individuals might still offer information “that would enable the
Board to recover sales tax revenues.”398  In these circumstances, auditors
are instructed to say that no funding currently exists to pay awards, but
they are also encouraged “to obtain such information by appealing to the
person’s sense of duty as a good citizen.”399
As we have seen, civic duty can motivate citizens to blow the whistle
on tax noncompliance.400  But additional incentives to contribute to tax
enforcement efforts may be necessary, and rewarding whistleblowers with
a portion of the monies they help put back in state coffers might do the
trick.  Paying whistleblowers for inside, unique information would also re-
inforce the policies behind “hotlines” that encourage citizens to report tax
noncompliance.  And if policymakers in California—or in other states for
394. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 7060(c).  While the first paragraph of section
7060 is nearly identical to section 19525 (though pertaining to sales and use
taxes), section 7060 contains additional provisions directing the BOE to provide a
report to the legislature once the program is up and running that details: (i) the
number of written and oral whistleblower submissions made to the BOE within its
first two years of operation, (ii) the “amount of additional taxes and penalties as-
sessed and collected as a result of this program and the amount of rewards distrib-
uted,” and (iii) the “administrative costs incurred in implementing and operating
this program.” CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 7060(b).
395. Created in 2006, the FTB hotline prompts individuals to report “income
tax fraud.” See CAL. STATE FRANCHISE TAX BD., Reporting Income Tax Fraud, https://
www.ftb.ca.gov/online/fraud_referral/index.shtml (last visited May 9, 2014).  The
BOE hotline, created in 1995, allows individuals “with knowledge of tax evasion
involving any of the Board of Equalization’s tax programs . . . to report any viola-
tions.” See CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, BOE Toll-Free Tax Evasion Hotline,
http://www.boe.ca.gov/info/evade.htm (last visited May 9, 2014).
396. See CAL. STATE FRANCHISE TAX BD., Tax Gap, https://www.ftb.ca.gov/
Tax_Gap/index.shtml (last visited May 9, 2014).
397. CAL. STATE FRANCHISE TAX BD., Reporting Income Tax Fraud, https://
www.ftb.ca.gov/online/fraud_referral/index.shtml (last visited May 9, 2014); see
also CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, Investigations Division—Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, https://www.boe.ca.gov/invest/faqinvestigation.htm#3 (last visited May 9,
2014).
398. CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, SALES & USE TAX DEP’T, AUDIT MAN-
UAL, Ch. 1, § 0122.00 (2014), available at http://www.boe.ca.gov/sutax/manuals/
am-01.pdf.
399. Id.
400. For studies indicating that whistleblowers are motivated more by princi-
ple than money, see supra notes 223–32 and accompanying text.
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that matter—preferred the qui tam approach to a standalone statute, “re-
moving a single sentence from the existing False Claims Act”401 that bars
tax claims402 could immediately establish an avenue for whistleblowers to
uncover tax cheating, assist (if appropriate) in the prosecution of the case,
and shrink the state’s tax gap.403
V. CONCLUSION
State tax agencies are outgunned in the fight against overaggressive
tax avoidance and evasion.  “Public participation,” either through false
claims statutes or standalone whistleblower statutes, “can constructively
contribute to the administration of taxes”404 by uncovering abuse and
fraud that state governments may never detect or that they would detect
only after considerable revenue loss and misdirected administrative re-
sources.405  Authorizing citizens to bring tax claims under FCAs would be
“good for tax administration.”406  It would help rebalance insidious infor-
mation asymmetries between taxpayers and tax agencies, while closing the
persistent tax gap.  Moreover, the “evidence is overwhelming” that the fed-
eral FCA “has proven its value in other areas [besides taxation] and has
helped government recover billions that would otherwise have been lost to
fraud.  There is every reason to think,” knowledgeable observers have
opined, “that it will have a comparable impact in the tax area.”407  The
401. Erika A. Kelton, To Cut California’s Budget Gap, Cut One Sentence from State
Whistleblower Law, FORBES (May 21, 2012, 2:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
erikakelton/2012/05/21/to-cut-californias-budget-gap-cut-one-sentence-from-
state-whistleblower-law/ (suggesting same proposal for California to establish “ro-
bust tax whistleblower program”).
402. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12651(f) (West 2014) (“This section does not ap-
ply to claims, records, or statements made under the Revenue and Taxation
Code.”).
403. Authorizing tax claims under a false claims act would be particularly ap-
propriate in the case of California, where its FCA already commands that the law
“be liberally construed and applied to promote the public interest.” CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 12655(c).
404. Bucks, supra note 198, at 287.
405. Whistleblowers can be particularly helpful in uncovering taxpayer abuse
in areas with less rigorous reporting requirements, such as in the area of partner-
ships. See Cara Griffith, Are States Adequately Auditing Real Estate Partnerships?, 65
STATE TAX NOTES 119, 122 (2012) (writing, in context of real estate partnerships
and New York’s FCA, “New York has an added advantage if it pursues potential tax
delinquency by partnerships”).
406. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 112 (quoting William Comiskey, former dep-
uty commissioner of Office of Tax Enforcement with New York Department of
Taxation and Finance).
407. Id.  In fiscal year 2013, claims brought under the federal False Claims Act
generated $3.8 billion in settlements and judgments plus another $443 million in
recoveries for state Medicaid programs.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice
Department Recovers $3.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2013
(Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/December/13-
civ-1352.html.  Since 2009, moreover, the federal FCA has recovered $17 billion
for the U.S. government and nearly $40 billion since Congress made significant
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same can be said of standalone tax whistleblower statutes, such as the IRS
whistleblower program, which, despite its shortcomings,408 has brought in
close to $1.5 billion over the last five years,409 spawned a vibrant and ex-
pert tax whistleblower bar,410 and significantly altered the compliance and
risk calculus for taxpayers.
A properly drafted and implemented tax whistleblower program, run
either through a state’s FCA or under a standalone statute, could address
and overcome critics’ primary concerns pertaining to tax whistleblowers
(including the proliferation of nuisance suits, undue disclosure of tax re-
turn information, and bypassing expert tax administrators) and bring to
bear the invaluable knowledge of insiders on state tax enforcement efforts.
enhancements to the statute in 1986. Id.; see also CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 216.
408. See supra notes 373–85 and accompanying text.
409. See IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, supra note 210, at 17.
410. See Hertel, supra note 351, at 1926 (“Since the institution of the current
IRS whistleblower program, the number of plaintiffs’ attorneys specializing in the
area of tax law has risen rapidly, and there is no reason to suspect that the tax
attorneys’ bar will not grow into a similarly specialized and expert body as the
plaintiffs’ bar as a whole.”); Ventry, supra note 244, at 461–62 (noting, in 2008,
15%–20% increase in size of tax whistleblower bar in two-year span since Congress
revamped IRS whistleblower law).
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